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This thesis explores political reflections on the emerging risks of hazard and climate 
change in the post-developmental South Korean state. Several cases of both actual and 
anticipated risk are investigated regarding contribution to reshaping a political 
landscape in which change might unfold. Three analytical frames (changes in social 
expectation, institutional change and social innovation) are elaborated. In addition, the 
Risk Society thesis (and its Korean counterpart dual-risk society thesis), studies of 
disaster and climate change adaptation inform this research. Employing a multifocal 
lens, the thesis problematises conventional, apolitical approaches to disaster risk, 
particularly in terms of their dichotomous conceptualisation of society and nature. 
 
This research finds critical realism appropriate, due in particular to its ontological 
account of power relations and the driving forces of change. Using informal interviews, 
reviews of existing, relevant literature, as well as observation, this thesis reclaims the 
political space of the discourse of development and disaster risk. Issues of hazard, risk 
and climate change were found unfamiliar to most of the interviewees. There also 
emerged a translation issue between Korean and English during the stage of data 
analysis. The ways that these challenges were overcome are explained in detail. 
 
This thesis contains strong evidence to suggest that disasters triggered by natural 
hazards and changing risk perception in Korea have surfaced as a political issue. More 
importantly, this research finds that hazard and risk can shake the existing discursive 
space in which alternative ideas can possibly transform into wider societal change. For 
this reason, issues like DRR and CCA can also be kept apolitical by existing discursive 
alliances that can benefit from ideological and institutional stability. The thesis 
concludes by pinpointing the importance of steering different forms of freedom for the 
fruits of incremental change to transform into the disaster-specific resilience that is key 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1: Research problems 
In the modern society, resilience to disaster risk is one of proxy indicators for 
sustainable urban governance and Climate Change Adaptation (CCA). For good reason, 
the compelling need for social change has encouraged societies to reconfigure the 
relationship between, and the discourse of, development, climate change and 
environmental disaster risk (Schipper and Pelling, 2006). This idea serves as a starting 
point for the discussion about politics of disaster as climate change adaptation 
throughout this thesis.  
 
The 2011 east Japanese tsunami-nuclear crisis epitomises the above point. The 
impossibility of decontaminating radioactivity has still blocked refugees’ return to 
home and hence delayed (or will permanently preclude) reconstruction of the disaster-
torn villages. The crisis has put into question even the widely known, high level of 
disaster-specific resilience of Japanese society (c.f., social disorder in the 2010 post-
Haiti earth quake crisis space). It remains to be seen how far disaster-torn Japanese 
society has transformed itself to reflect on her development path at large. Three years 
on however, Prime Minister Abe’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
seems to have taken the path towards extreme conservatism following the failure of the 
Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) transformative experiments from 2009 to 2012. 
However, one cannot simply ascribe the conservative swing to the crisis alone; instead 
it is worth considering the extent and the manner, to which the crisis has unfolding 
upon the entire socio-political landscape of the society. The research does not study the 
case of Japan, but Korea. 
 
In the case of Korea, the root causes of social vulnerability to risk and hazard can 
arguably be attributed to the developmental path, and this has brought about a 
somewhat different type of reflexivity from that of Western societies (Han and Shim, 
2010). The reflexivity may involve change in dominant ideas, behaviors, discourses, 
and the relationship between all of these. Yet, any societal change for climate change 
adaptation and disaster risk reduction is seldom apolitical. This thesis explores the 
ways in which different political reflections and interpretations are formed in response 
to emerging material and socially constructed risks of hazards and climate change in 
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Korea. Political interpretations of risk take differing directions and shapes, with the 
possibility of conflicts coexisting. They rely not only on agents of change and power 
relations but also existing discursive settings. 
 
Again, in terms of risk management for natural hazards, we seem to have more 
knowledge than before, for example in early warning and forecasting; yet we have 
witnessed more losses and damages from disasters too (White et al., 2001). At the 
same time, conventional, apolitical, and technical approaches to disaster risk reduction 
and human wellbeing have proved insufficient at best, and even detrimental at worst 
(Beck, 1996, Mustafa, 1998, Wisner et al., 2004).1 Why is it that more knowledge does 
not lead to better disaster risk management? What are the implications of the mismatch 
between theory and practice in confronting the issue of climate change and disaster 
risk? At this stage, it is useful to look at responses from different scales to the trilateral 
relationship between climate change, hazard and development, as well as their 
critiques: from global to national. 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has 
recently reiterated its commitment to CCA; in addition to other pillars of “a shared 
vision for long term cooperative action”: Climate Change Mitigation (CCM), 
technology development and transfer, finance, and capacity building (UNFCCC, 2010: 
4-5). Following the previous initiatives such as the Marrakech accords, the Nairobi 
Work Programme, and the Bali Action Plan, the 16th conference of parties (COP) in 
2010 led to two significant steps forwards: the Cancun Adaptation Framework and the 
Adaptation Committee. These will help achieve nine tailored sub-objectives to 
“enhance action on adaptation” of the parties (ibid.). At the COP 17 in Durban in 2011, 
more political decisions were made on how the adaptation committee should work, 
what activities should be undertaken by the work programme on loss and damage, and 
the guidelines for the national adaptation plans for developing countries.2  
 
The newly established adaptation framework does not disregard the importance of 
different development needs that each country has in relation to development and 
“country-driven”, “gender-sensitive”, “participatory” approaches to CCA (see footnote 
                                                
1 The database by which to measure and confirm the vulnerability gap is neither comprehensive nor 
accurate since it only counts insured loss and damage. If uninsured losses and damages were included, it 
2 See http://unfccc.int/adaptation/cancun_adaptation_framework/national_adaptation_plans/items/ 
605.php  
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2). Neither does it intend to generalise the order of priority for local CCAs. As of 
January 2012, we see that 47 developing countries have expressed dissimilar 
adaptation priorities for their own National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA). 
For developing countries, the Least Developed Countries (LDC) Fund was set up at the 
2001 Marrakech Climate Change Conference; the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was 
established to support both CCM and CCA projects and programmes in December 
2011. 
 
Even before the Cancun climate change conference, however, some scholars 
questioned if the convention offered the most adequate policy framework for local 
CCA (Burton, 2009, Schipper, 2009). This is most likely because “vulnerability to 
climate is determined by factors that are far beyond the scope of the UNFCCC or any 
global treaty” (Schipper, 2009: 371). The nature of vulnerability of the parties of the 
convention to the risk of climate change and variation is largely subject to their 
development pathways, current capabilities and social expectations of the future. 
Despite the aim to “promote the paradigm shift towards low-emission and climate 
resilient development pathways” of the parties, the role of the GCF will remain 
supportive rather than prescriptive or determinate (footnote 2). Further, differing 
reasons for CCA in different societies, sectors and at different levels will lead to the 
enormous potential for conflicts of interest between different stakeholders. Current 
national institutional arrangements for almost every party of the convention do not 
adequately factor such political issues into the policy-making process of CCA. Indeed, 
the politics of CCA have yet to come to the fore (Giddens, 2009: 162); despite the 
increasing attention to the politics of disaster (Pelling and Dill, 2009). 
 
Given the limited scope and liability of the FCCC, nations and local communities must 
seek to make their own rational for CCA and disaster risk reduction. Yet CCA should 
be seen as more than an objective. As some progressive CCA scholars note, it is also a 
good opportunity for societies to transfer their values, ideas and visions to pursue 
environmental sustainability and resilience (Pelling, 2011, Rodima-Taylor et al., 2012). 
Thus CCA requires questioning possibility and legitimacy of innovation in both short 
and long terms (Chhetri et al., 2012, DiGiano and Racelis, 2012, Eriksen and Selboe, 
2012, Rodima-Taylor, 2012, Scheffran et al., 2012, Upton, 2012).  
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Introducing change, however, is difficult. Certainly, new ideas are not essentially 
better than old ones. Nor are old ideas necessarily outdated. Equally importantly, 
whether a society likes it or not, innovation is not easy to bring about, if not 
completely impossible. Differently put, to establish innovative institutions that embody 
critical ideas is neither easy nor costless (Chang, 2010b). If it were, society would have 
been extremely vulnerable to overly frequent internal changes and would have thus 
lost desirable stability.3 There have been serendipitous social changes in human history. 
In contrast, debates on social engineering, typified by the early 20th century’s 
totalitarian, artificial attempts to renovate society into various kinds of utopia (by 
Hitler or Stalin, for example), exemplify the point that attempts to change social values 
and visions could result in disastrous outcomes (Podgorecki et al., 1996). Nevertheless, 
we are living in a world in which the efficiency and legitimacy of existing institutions 
are questioned in relation to how well they reflect evolving social expectations of 
uncertain external stimuli (for the definition of social expectation, see Chapter three). 4  
 
Amidst growing global concerns about climate change risk, Korean society has arrived 
in the post-compressed development era (Wong, 2004). Korea is seeking to re-
innovate its development strategies and tactics in accordance with a newly introduced 
development vision. It is extremely important to comprehend this vision, which forms 
the basis of the national and local CCA policies. The following passage by Ministry of 
Government Legislation is worth noting as it explains the rationale for the vision: 
 
“Recognizing the necessity for generating creative ideas and making 
audacious decisions to join the ranks of advanced countries, President Lee 
Myung-bak declared the country’s vision for “Low Carbon, Green Growth” 
as a new paradigm for economic and social development designed to speed 
up elimination of outdated production patterns relying heavily on the input 
of factors of production, such as resources, labor, and capital, and create 
engines for future growth in his congratulatory address delivered on the 
occasion of the National Liberation Day on August 15, 2008” (MGL, 2009: 
9). 
 
                                                
3 Of course, new ideas are not the same as innovation; although each partly limits the scope of other. 
Given that institutions embody a set of ideas, it is appropriate to investigate the relationship between 
ideas and institutions through which we can observe how certain ideas gain legitimacy and priority over 
others to either change or reinforce the way of how the real world works (Schmidt, 2008). 
4 The mosaic of divergent expectations that people have of each other, nature, and the future is also 
embodied in institutions, be they formal or informal, political or economic, and micro or macro (see 
Chapter three). 
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This passage does not do justice to the complete breadth of the vision. It underlines the 
need for Korea to transform the orthodox paradigm of development. Whether it likes it 
or not, the government clearly acknowledges that the (pre-)existing developmental 
pathway needs to be radically replaced. It also emphasizes the need to “speed up [the] 
elimination of outdated production patterns” (ibid). The reason for renewing the 
developmental path is to “join the ranks of advanced countries” by creating “engines 
for future growth” (ibid). In fact, this is reminiscent of the past “compressed 
development” in the 1960s to 1990s, because, in a similar way to past polices, it elicits 
radical structural changes to meet the newly established vision of modernization. The 
authoritarian governments of Koreas successfully employed the catching-up 
governance strategy, in alliance with the large conglomerates (Chaebols), compliant 
interest groups and laypersons, and were able to uproot the nation’s pre-existing 
traditions and old norms.  
 
The Korean development experience is far from a “miracle”, however much some 
scholars might label it so (Amsden, 1994, WorldBank, 1993, Chaibong, 2008), given 
the huge costs that will have to be paid in the future. Some critical scholars argue that 
the non-material values that were deliberately overlooked by the authoritarian regimes 
need urgent attention. This idea is the gist of the “dual-risk” thesis, that argues that 
economic growth has been too successful; it became a source of Risk Society (Beck, 
1996), and that socio-political development has been “limping” and became a source 
of traditional types of risk (Kim, 1998: 28). This dichotomistic understanding to some 
extent simplifies the complex multi-level interactions between diverse institutions and 
values. For instance, it does not consider the critical roles that traditional norms and 
informal rules took to cover the institutional gap caused by rapid economic growth. 
Second, the “dual-risk” thesis tends to see Western Risk Society as normal and 
developmental Risk Societies as abnormal. These shortcomings have not gone 
unnoticed, and sociologists have recently acknowledged the “varieties of second 
modernity” (Han and Shim, 2010: 465, Beck and Grande, 2010). Trouble begins when 
emerging social needs and values do not entail alternative institutional arrangements, 
while old norms begin to lose their efficiency and legitimacy (see Chapter seven, 
especially the traditional social capital Gwon-dang). Nevertheless, the dual-risk thesis 
has shed light on the situation in which spatiotemporally heterodox values and 
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institutions structurally shape the underlying causes of risk facing contemporary 
Korean society. 
 
This may be the first time that parallel ideas have been able to reconfigure a nation’s 
paradigm of development. Perhaps, however, radical scholars and the media accuse the 
new vision of subordinating nature to growth, thereby indulging the existing “growth 
coalitions” with more freedom to continue urban and industrial growth (see Chapter 
five). Other scholars might argue that the notions of the new vision, that is, a 
retrogression of the Sustainable Development concept, do not address the root-causes 
of environmental problems. These arguments are backed up by the recently completed 
Four-River Restoration Project (FRRP) and the government’s reaction to the 2011 East 
Japanese tsunami-nuclear crisis (see Chapter five). Some claim that the FRRP is 
nothing more than a large-scale engineering project worth some $20bn. Some people 
see this as similar to the New Deal in the USA in the 1930s that followed the Great 
Depression. Anticipated crises have already taken the shape of algae outbreak over the 
four rivers. In addition to the 23 nuclear power plants in operation, Korea will see 
seventeen more plants by 2030.5 Clearly, given the strong role of the state in carrying 
growth-oriented plans forward, statism still persists in Korea (Bae and Sellers, 2007). 
One question that one might immediately raise is: how far can this new vision and 
subset projects help deal with the dual risk problems facing Korean society? In this 
thesis, no direct answer is given to this question. Rather, this thesis reveals political 
reflections on dual-risk of disaster triggered by natural hazards in the post-
developmental Korean state. 
 
In this thesis, institutional changes, specific to the post-developmental state space, are 
examined, with reference to the recent political responses to climatic risk in Seoul and 
Jeju, Korea. As stressed above, institutional change is not easy to bring about in the 
first place. In preparing for the uncertain risk of climate change, however, how society 
and organizations deal with institutional changes without compromising the positive 
aspects of previous institutions, ideas and values is extremely important. In other 
words, the logic of balance between institutional stability and flexibility comes to the 
fore. In the case of contemporary Korea, however, the balance between institutional 
stability and flexibility has been struck in such a way that the construction of flexible 
                                                
5 See http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf81.html 
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governance space has been built on ongoing narrative competition over the legacy of 
compressed development. This means that gaining stability is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for flexibility. But this should not be understood as replicating the 
argument that the importance of structure comes before that of agency, as some 
institutionalist economists might argue (see Chang, 2002a). Instead, the thesis argues 
that structure and agency have their own roles for the building of both stability and 
flexibility. Stability requires both structure and agency just as flexibility does. 
 
This thesis explores changing socio-political responses to emergent risks and hazards 
in Korea, be they physical disasters or a social construct of climate change risk. In 
doing so, we can better comprehend how social actors recognise and reframe both 
exposed and covered adaptation deficits, how conflicting discursive alliances are 
accordingly formed, and how the conflict itself might become an impetus of 
institutional innovations for CCA and DRR. Going beyond arguing that disasters are 
essentially a political issue, the current research sets up a new conceptual and 
analytical tool to illuminate the various interplays between politics and hazard in 
contemporary Korea. The current research also intends to produce critical insights that 
are of much relevance to studies of development, disaster and climate change. The 
following section expounds the rationale for the current research, and thereby presents 






1.2: Research objectives, aims and research questions 
This thesis seeks to synthesise various ideas and thoughts to sheds light on the 
institutional aspects of disaster risk reduction as crucial part of climate change 
adaptation. The modern Korean society has confronted newly emerging demands and 
expectations. The thesis argues that the post-developmental Korean society is saturated 
with a full of institutional vacuums that need to be filled, if social vulnerability to 
climatic risk is to be adequately addressed. The ideas and practices predicated on the 
notion of neo-liberalism (in both political and economic terms) have offered nothing 
but to emphasize the role of individuals’ freedom in risk management. Yet, the impacts 
of the social transformations on shaping local adaptive capacity, and its political 
implications for the wider community’s resilience have remained largely unexplored.  
 
The aims of the research are to: 1) integrate various ideas of different schools of 
thought (e.g. politics of disaster, the dual-risk thesis and institutionalism); and 2) to 
explain local manifestation of dual-risk by regaining political space in the discourse of 
disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation. In an attempt to achieve these 
research aims, this research intends to: 1) set up the theoretical framework based on 
various ideas of risk, development, institution, social capital and social innovation 
(Chapter two and three); 2) traces the origin of current disaster risk to the development 
path (empirical chapters); 3) expresses political and discursive expressions of dual-risk 
in Seoul and Jeju (Chapter six and seven); and 4) stresses the necessity and possibility 
of mutual, discursive infiltration between disaster risk and climate change adaptation 
in the context of the post-developmental Korean society (Chapter eight).  
 
This thesis adopts a multifocal theoretical perspective in addressing the issue of 
politics of disaster in Seoul and Jeju, Korea. Informed primarily by the works in a 
structural and historical mode – (Adger, 2000a, Beck and Grande, 2010, Chang, 1999, 
Chang, 2009, Han and Shim, 2010, Pelling, 2003c, Wisner et al., 2004), this research 
poses the following research questions: 
 
The main research question: How is a disaster triggered by natural hazards a political 
issue of dual-risk in the post-developmental Korean state? 
 
Sub-question 1: What is the relationship between politics and a disaster triggered by 
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natural hazards in the post-developmental Korean state? (see also core ideas in Chapter 
eight: B, C ,D , F, I , J , K)  
 
There are numerous discursive and material relationships between politics and 
disaster in Korea. Yet, not all disasters become a political issue. Nor all 
political decision makings and activities entail or mitigate a disaster. There is a 
particular condition in which politics and disaster lie in a necessary relationship 
(for understanding of a necessary relationship see Chapter four). In the case of 
contemporary Korean society, political reflections arise from the existing 
discursive space that hazards expose. 
  
Sub-question 2: How does the post-developmental state relate to the localization of 
dual-risk of disaster in Seoul and Jeju? (see Chapter eight: B, C, F, G, L) 
  
The localization of dual-risk of disaster and political reaction in Seoul and Jeju 
differs. As dual-risk is partly, yet largely the result of compressed development, 
the different developmental paths of the two places have led different realities 
of dual-risk. In particular, Jeju has confronted “imported” dual-risk. 
Sub-question 3: To what extent is a disaster triggered by natural hazards a symptom of 
dual-risk in Korean society? (see Chapter eight: C, D, F, K, L) 
 
The dual-risk thesis was originally developed to explicate merely technical risk. 
Dual-risk stems from the post-modernisation situation in which 
spatiotemporally too heterogeneous values and institutions coexist generating 
institutional vacuums. This is where the socionature thesis and dual-risk thesis 
can mutually benefit. Attempts to reconfigure adaptation deficits are directed 
towards transforming an existing development path. 
 
1.3: The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters. This section accounts for the structure of the 
thesis. Chapter Two defines key terms and concepts on which the debate of this thesis 
builds: risk, hazard, dual-risk, compressed modernization, vulnerability, adaptive 
capacity and resilience. When the cause of natural disaster is attributed to nature only, 
that is, a partial perspective, there is less room for hoping to strengthen social 
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resilience to disaster risk as well as adaptive capacity for CCA and DRR. Regrettably 
it has been the case in many parts of the globe including Korea. How to frame the 
discourse of risk, hazard, disaster and climate change, in the light of responsibilities, a 
variety of rights, social relations, the nature of human being and political economy 
regime, shapes the nature and scope of available options, strategies and pace for 
adapting to environmental disaster risk. We need to see disasters triggered by natural 
hazards as not just individuals’ tragedy but also a social and political issue. In this 
regard, it is extremely important to scrutinize the social expectation side of society. 
What we collectively expect not only from each other but also from our future will be 
crucial to understanding of the path we will take to the future. Chapter three offers 
accounts of social innovation that presupposes change in expectation. 
 
Chapter Three in great detail scrutinises institutions, social capital, ideas, social 
innovations and discourse. The relationship between ideas and institutions is crucial to 
address uncertainty issues of economics, politics, and environment. When social 
innovation crosses the vertical and horizontal levels, for example from the individual 
NGO level to the municipal administrative level, the scope and depth of impacts of 
innovative ideas and new thoughts might become far greater. Thus, it is assumed that a 
threshold effect of social innovation opens the opportunity of disseminating new ideas, 
therefore transforming the institutional arrangement in which climate change 
uncertainty is dealt with. As noted by Nilson (2003), the models of social innovation 
embrace complex adaptive systems, institutional theory and social construction, social 
movement, organizational theory, social entrepreneurship, (technological) innovation, 
and social capital. I do not explore the details of each model. They overlap in many 
ways despite their distinctive focus on objects, scopes and levels of social innovation. 
Instead, this chapter limits itself to exploring the way of integrating core tenets of 
social innovation into the theoretical framework of institution for the thesis. 
 
Chapter Four outlines the ontological, epistemological, methodological framework of 
the current research. In addition, the chapter will discuss methodological and analytical 
concerns. Issues related to translation between Korean and English are non-trivial and 
will also be taken up in the chapter. Indeed, this thesis sees language as one of the 
basic institutions that shape the institutional and discursive structure in which various 
ideas, values and cultural expressions are dealt with (Hodgson, 2006). In addition, this 
20  
chapter elaborates the design of the research. It is extremely important to explain the 
gap between the initial aspiration of the research and the reality the researcher faced 
during the fieldworks in a later stage. Initial curiosities, based on Internet searched 
materials and literature were not satisfied for many reasons. The strategy and process 
by which fieldwork challenges were overcome will be explained. 
 
Chapter Five critically reviews how the recent development paradigm (the Low 
Carbon, Green Growth strategy, hereafter LCCG) with its subset projects (e.g. the Four 
Rivers Restoration Project, hereafter FRRP) exploited the perceptual importance of 
nature as a source of future risk, in order to maintain the status quo of contemporary 
Korean society. At first, the governmental initiatives prevented experimental/critical 
thoughts from the bottom-up in various ways. In particular, the legacy of the Cold War 
–ideological enmity – has reduced, if not entirely banned, the public sphere in which 
the generic level of resilience attained throughout compressed development can be 
transformed to hazard-specific resilience. Little is known of how discursive and 
ideational distortion influences the potential of social innovation for environmental 
risk reduction. 
 
The policy and discourse of climate change adaptation in Korea has developed in a 
way that aims mainly to promote the status-quo values and the existing power relations 
of society. Needless to say, this does not mean that the policy of climate change 
adaptation in Korea excludes vulnerable groups from discussion. Present policy 
measures and practices have been directed towards addressing some groups’ health 
vulnerability (e.g. the elderly) to climate-related disaster risk such as heat waves and 
urban floods. Yet, there are some barriers to the integrative approaches (between 
vertical and horizontal actors) to the issue. 
 
Chapter Six illustrates that it is city-level politics at which more compelling evidence 
of political reflections on the dual risk was observed (Kim, 1998) – through the change 
of mayor in Seoul after the landslides and inundation disasters. Of course, the urban 
disasters were not the single, immediate cause of the mayoral change; they probably 
took an ancillary role at best. More importantly, however, the new leadership has taken 
several innovative measures, with a greater emphasis upon civil participation in 
environmental risk reduction. In addition, the heavy engineering works planned by the 
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former mayor have been either cancelled or reduced after reassessments of their 
necessity and cost-benefit analysis, on the strength of critical scholars and civil 
activists who used to be excluded from the previous risk governance space. This case 
illustrates one possible political channel through which alternative ideas within civil 
society penetrate into the local authority, and possibly the wider risk governance space. 
This is juxtaposed with the risk governance process in Vietnam by which re-emerging 
roles of civil society makes up for the lack of governmental roles in disaster risk 
reduction in Vietnam (Adger, 2000a). In the case of Korea, however, it was not just a 
resurgence of local community power but people’s political judgment on the 
incumbent (local) government that brought forth alternative leadership. In this case, 
the recent evolution of institutional arrangements for risk management is down to the 
democratically activated exchanges of cognitive and normative ideas, causal beliefs 
and worldviews amongst different political actors/groups, particularly in the post-
urban disasters space.  
 
Seoul was once critiqued for lacking any policy endeavour to collect and compile 
essential information about its disaster risk experience (Mitchell, 1999, cited in Pelling, 
2003c). More than a decade on, it is still apparent that far more work needs be done if 
the city is to adapt to the uncertain future risk of climate change. This chapter argues 
that the mayoral change in Seoul, in the wake of several urban disasters, was a bottom-
up reflection (with changes in complexly interwoven ideas) of the recent conservative 
government’s top-down approach to dealing with both physical and socially 
constructed risk. 
 
In Chapter seven, the case of imported dual-risk will be discussed with particular 
reference to the case of the naval base construction crisis in Jeju Island. The island has 
remained relatively marginalized by cetralised development, and this thesis argues that 
it has undergone external exploitation for a long time. This has to do with the islanders’ 
independence, exclusivity against outsiders and an endemic social capital called 
Gwon-dang. In addition to being historically unique, the island has played supportive 
role for national development. The tourism industry has been planned and developed 
by the authoritarian government for the last four decades. That said, it seems true that 
the fruits of local development have not been reinvested back onto the island.  
Evidence shows that despite their, local values, ties and the identity of place have 
22  
recently been in danger of disappearing as a result of external capital-directed 
development projects. It is also evident that there is a strong local belief that the 
island’s unique geological characteristics would prevent disasters from occurring. 
Chapter Seven argues that the case of the naval base construction illustrates how dual-
risk can be both ideationally and materially imported. 
 
In Chapter Eight, the thesis articulates the theoretical implications that the current 
research has for existing theories and concepts. A dozen core ideas will be discussed in 
order to address the research questions. Each core idea (A~L) relates to more than one 
research question. Following that the concluding chapter will draw theoretical 
connections between the current research and the resilience thinking and the notion of 
freedom (positive and negative freedom). The chapter briefly introduces the concept of 
developmental resilience emphasizing its theoretical and empirical relevance. It is also 
addressed that there are some research limitations and further research needs. The 
chapter also suggests policy implications for other would-be dual risk societies. The 
chapter concludes this thesis by emphasizing that disaster is already political issue in 
the post-developmental state, and this means that the clashes of heterogeneous values, 
ideas, interests, institutions and expectations will possibly happen in a public space 








Chapter 2: Emerging risk of hazards and climate change in dual-risk society 
2.1: Introduction 
This chapter problematizes the conventional, apolitical and ahistorical understanding 
of the risk of climate change and environmental hazards. It is often overlooked that the 
vulnerability of contemporary society to hazard and risk is a result of political 
decision-makings in the past. This chapter offers a deeper understanding of how 
complex risks facing Korean Risk Society might have originated from its own unique 
developmental path, i.e. so-called compressed modernization. This chapter presents a 
wide range of disciplinary studies, their core ideas, arguments and data in order to 
achieve this objective. 
 
First, this chapter introduces the concept of compressed modernisation, and provides 
evidence of the country’s rapid transformations and the ramifications. Following that, 
key terms such as risk, climate change, hazard, disaster, vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity will be carefully defined. What should be pointed out is the unique process by 
which such rapid growth and its considerable fruits (e.g. material wellbeing) have 
failed to transform into nurturing disaster-specific resilience and adaptive capacity. In 
fact, this thesis argues that compressed modernisation is partly a source of 
contemporary hazard risk; of course it has arguably given rise to political reflections 
on the emerging risk in Korea. Second, after pointing out the need to include the 
concept of vulnerability within development discourse, the chapter will account for the 
changes in structures of risk in Korea. The recent history of disaster and main 
environmental hazards in Korea will be discussed, after which, three charts will be 
used to illustrate the trends of natural disaster outcomes in Korea over the last three 
decades. 
2.2: Compressed modernization 
Thanks to compressed modernisation over the last four decades, Korea has become 
one of the most prosperous countries in the world, if not the wealthiest (Chang, 2007); 
the most democratic (Chaibong, 2008, Jacobs, 2007); and the most highly ranked on 
the Very High Human Development Index (ranked 12th in the world, see 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2013/). Compressed modernity refers to “the 
(re)constructed state of complex modernization in which spatiotemporally heterodox 
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factors coexist due to the extremely compressed – both spatially and temporally – 
manner of modern transformation” (Chang, 2009: 9). In this sense, compressed 
modernization is an extremely rapid transformation in social structures through which 
discursive and material values were (re)produced by East Asian authoritarian regimes 
such as those in Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. In the Korean context, such regimes 
were headed for about three decades by former presidents, Park Chung-hee (1961-
1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87).  
 
Compressed modernisation has had a deep impact on Korean society at the cost of 
other important values and visions; notably, environmental sustainability, labour rights, 
social security, gender equity, freedom of international travel, and regional equity as 
well as disaster risk reduction. The concept of compressed development has been 
developed and elaborated to account for unique process and aspects of modernity in 
Korean society for which Western theory (e.g. Risk Society) cannot properly account 
(Chang, 1999, Chang, 2010c, Chang, 2009, Chang and Song, 2010, Hae-Joang, 2000, 
Whittaker et al., 2010). The notion of “nondecisionmaking”  (institutional inertia), i.e. 
the exclusive focus on economic growth, may be partly applicable to the case of 
Korea’s developmental path (Adger, 2000a: 738). The asymmetric power relation 
between the authoritarian state, large conglomerates (Chaebols), and a weak, yet 
resistant civil society6 was the core institutional driver of encouraging compressed 
modernization. This section offers a detailed account of both fruits and ramifications 
of the rapid socio-economic transformation of Korea. 
2.2.1. Rapid economic growth 
One report from USAID (the then governmental aid agency in the U.S) in the 1950s 
called Korea a “bottomless pit” (Chang, 2007: 3). Korea was extremely poor and 
hopeless after suffering the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. Four million people died 
and ten million were separated from their families. The tragedy of this fratricidal war 
also destroyed more than half of the industrial base and infrastructure of Korea. The 
war disrupted the national educational system, which had already been in an extremely 
poor condition before the war (Sorensen, 1994: 12-13).  
 
                                                
6 Pierre and Peters (2005: 69) state that the concept of civil society assumes “the existence of social 
organizations, and for students of civil society the formation of organizations is in essence the 
dependent variable.” In this sense, civil society in the context of Korea includes student activist groups, 
NGOs, academics, CBOs, religious groups, research institutes, and so forth. 
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Given the severe situation at that time, Korea’s economic growth since the 1970s has 
been outstanding, compared to that of Latin American and African countries, and even 
to that of the U.K and the U.S when they were developing. For example, it took Britain 
and the U.S approximately two centuries to obtain the level of GDP that was achieved 
in Korea in just four decades (see Table 2.1 below). However, the figures account only 
for the rapidity and quantity of the growth, and do not account for crucial factors such 
as the nature and driving forces of the developmental path. 
 
Table 2.1. Per capita income in Purchasing Power 
(1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, except the year 20121) 
Year/ 
country 





Per capita income in Purchasing Power (1990 $US) 
1720 1250 527 N/A N/A N/A 
1820 1707 1257 N/A 665 N/A 
1870 3191 2445 N/A 698 N/A 
1913 4921 5301 8934 1511 585 
1950 6907 9561 770 2554 852 
1967 10049 14330 1483 3598 1149 
1973 12022 16689 2841 4531 1365 
1990 16411 23214 8704 5055 1385 
1998 18714 27331 12152 5795 1368 
2012 35800 50610 30890 N/A N/A 
Sources: Adopted from Maddison (2005), OECD (www.oecd.org/infigures), and World Bank 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD). 
Notes: 1) GNI per capita, PPP (current international $), 2) Latin America includes twenty-one 
Caribbean countries, 3) Africa includes 57 countries, and S = Sub-Saharan and M = Middle-
East/West African countries respectively, 4) 1913 includes North and South Korea.  
 
The conventional idea that rapid economic growth is offset by a deterioration of 
economic inequity due to a lack of skilled and educated manpower (e.g. the Kuznet 
hypothesis) is proved wrong by the Korean case (Dornbusch et al., 1987: 399-400, see 
table 8, Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1989), at least when levels of income distribution 
and poverty reduction in the 1960s to 1980s are taken into account. In general, the 
Korean economic development maintained both economic efficiency and equity 
relatively well until the 1997 financial crisis. For instance, the extension of education 
to foster “industrial learning” appears to have been highly significant in allowing 
Korea to supply the labour market with essential manpower that met  “the new skill 




As Viotti (2002: n/a) notes, technological “[i]nnovation is the engine of capitalist 
development as a whole.” The Korean economy quickly upgraded its industrial 
structure into technology and human capital based one (Amsden, 1989, Hobday, 1995, 
Lee, 2000). Perhaps this means that Korea has thus far not been reluctant to adopt new 
ideas and technology from the external world (mainly the U.S) so as to imitate, invent, 
and innovate new ideas and products. Korea is now ranked first amongst large 
countries and second only to Singapore in the globe in terms of technological 
innovation in manufacturing sectors (Andrew et al., 2009). 
 2.2.2. Multidimensional ramifications of compressed modernization 
The rapid economic growth of Korea is often typified as compressed development 
(Whittaker et al., 2010: 1). The term “compressed” denotes that Korea has achieved a 
material transformation, without following in all the steps that early industrializing 
nations had taken (ibid.). Consequently, the creation and collapse of different kinds of 
modernity have simultaneously coexisted in Korea (ibid.). Needless to say, no society 
entirely dispenses with traditional values, institutions and codes of conduct before 
embarking on (post) modernization. There are no such clear-cut boundaries between 
tradition, modernity, and post-modernity, to borrow Beck’s account. However, it is 
evident that the rapidity of Korea’s transformation has prompted the simultaneous 
creation and destruction of heterogeneous institutions, social relations and values in 
Korea. As Whittaker et al (2010: 1, parenthesis added) rightly put it: 
 
“The social relations and values commonly associated with agricultural or 
early industrial societies – a high value placed on male children, for 
instance – can overlap with late or post-industrial emphases on equality 
and higher education opportunities for women, exacerbating gender 
tensions and accelerating trends towards later marriage, declining 
childbirth rates and societal ageing that typically come with later stages of 
economic development…[w]hile later developers [such as the western 
European countries] have only recently begun to de- (or post-) industrialize, 
however, compressed developers [such as Korea and Singapore] are doing 
this at the same time as they are industrializing.” 
 
In addition, many other tangible and hidden radical changes have taken place in 
Korean society over the last four decades or so as a result of the country’s compressed 
modernization.  
 
A. Coastal industrial complexes; in Busan for a port, Pohang for steel mills, Ulsan for 
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shipyards, Yeosu for petrochemical plants and land reclamation projects – 
Saemangeum and Sihwa district). 
 
B. Technology: structural changes from natural resource dependence to 
technology/human capital-centered industry over the last four decades (Hobday, 1995), 
a patent (ranked among top five countries in the context of “the number of patents 
granted by the US Patent Office” (Chang, 2007: 11), technological innovation – ranked 
first among large countries and second in the world, (Andrew et al., 2009). 
 
C. Education: spiritual and material modernization in the educational system since the 
1960s (Morris, 1996) and excessive education ‘mania’ (Seth, 2002). This has also led 
to the risky situation in which highly educated women encounter traditional roles 
(Chang and Song, 2010). 
 
D. Increasing exposure to periodic environmental hazards: typhoons, flooding, and 
landslides, unprecedented and increasing, man-made disasters: the collapse of the 
Sampung department store and Seongsu grand bridge in the 1990s. 
 
E. Active engagement in international politics, humanitarian development issues, and 
global markets: recent affiliation with OECD Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) after joining OECD in 1996, Free Trade Agreements. 
 
It can be inferred that despite their undeniably positive aspects, these changes in many 
aspects of society might serve as the underlying sources of the risk of natural disaster 
and climate change (see Section 2.6). At the same time, however, the introduction of 
democracy has also formulated several new ways of and limits to dealing with the 
above ramifications of compressed modernization. 
2.2.3. Consolidation of ’87 democratization (87 Minjuhwa) 
The authoritarian regime in Korea was brought to an end as a result of democratization 
in 1987, which was one of two third-wave democratizations in Asia; along with 
Taiwan (Jacobs, 2007). This led to the activation of civil society in Korea (Lee, 1993). 
It is cogently argued that the consolidation of democratization was delayed during the 
subsequent two governments (the President Rho Tae-woo in 1988-1992; Kim Young-
sam in 1993-1998) (Kim, 1997). For two years following his inauguration, President 
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Kim Young-sam conducted a number of “unprecedented political and socioeconomic 
reforms” (ibid: 1140). These reforms entailed the resignation of corrupt government 
officials and politicians; the prohibition of “all anonymous financial transactions and 
accounts”; the reshaping of “civil-military relations”; the normalization and 
strengthening of the power of civil society (including radical social movements) (ibid). 
However, these efforts were tarnished because the civilian government still lacked the 
political will to jettison the country’s authoritarian past. While two former presidents, 
Cheon Doo-hwan and Rho Tae-woo, were charged and imprisoned for illegal 
fundraising due to a backlash from civil society, violent government repression was 
used, once again, to resolve conflict between the state and labour. Amidst the delayed 
consolidation of democratization, Korean society witnessed the first sign of the Asian 
financial crisis: the bankruptcy of Hanbo Steel (one of Chaebols). 
2.2.4. The 1997 financial crisis 
Following that the 1997 Asian financial crisis provoked academic and policy debates 
over the sustainability and moral legitimacy of the “rush-to-growth” paradigm of 
compressed development (Kim, 1998: 28). The question of why the financial crisis 
happened is beyond the scope of this research. The issue of what caused the crisis is 
controversial amongst economists, who for example, debate the relative impact of 
under-regulation and overregulation on the crisis (Chang et al., 1998). Yet, it is 
possible to consider the financial crisis as an opportunity for introspection and 
reconfiguring the conventional development path. The democratic regime under the 
first opposition party President Kim Dae-jung had no choice but to adopt the IMF 
relief loan program. This program entailed the following structural adjustments 
throughout the economy (Shin and Chang, 2005): 
 
Macroeconomic retrenchment – e.g. a tight budgetary policy, and hence 
less state intervention in financial markets; 
 
The opening and further liberation of capital markets – e.g. the abolition of 
subsidies and import barriers, the activation of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) since 2003, with 45 countries including Chile, EFTA, ASEAN, the 
U.S and E.U, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) with India in 2010, and FTAs in progress with 12 countries and in 
the preparation stage for 14 more countries; and 
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Structural reforms – e.g. the Chaebol structure which entailed a decrease in 
debt-equity ratio from 400% to 200%, the sell-off of “peripheral” business, 
and the prohibition of “loan guarantees and internal transactions among 
Chaebol affiliate firms.” 
 
Added to these was the increasing preference to a neo-liberal type of numerical labour 
market flexibility (Crotty and Lee, 2002, for worker's right-based flexibility, see , 
Haagh, 2001), and the reinforcement of private and intellectual property rights (Shin 
and Chang, 2005). 
2.2.5. The recovery process and the empowerment of civil society 
Within two years from 1999, the Korean economy quickly recovered from the 
financial crisis, at least in macroeconomic terms. Yet, the IMF programme had left the 
society with unwelcome social (e.g. the credit card scandal) and economic 
repercussions (Crotty and Lee, 2002, Shin and Chang, 2005). Consequently, it 
provoked a severe backlash from social groups, such as farmers, company and film 
workers, as well as intellectuals.7 
 
Khang et al. (2005) reveals some telling correlations between increases in cause-
specific mortality rate – suicide and homicide, and economic indicators such as rising 
unemployment (from 2.6% in 1997 to 8.4% in 1998), increasing income inequality 
(GINI index 0.298 in 1996 to 0.358 in 2000) and a decline in household income by 6.7% 
in 1998 (see also Chang et al, 2009). In addition, a Keio University Survey revealed 
that 75.7 % of Korean respondents showed “not much” or “little” trust in the Korean 
government (Lee and Arrington, 2008: 77). This can be partly explained by the fact 
that the financial crisis unmasked the corrupt relationship between some senior 
politicians and Chaebols – e.g. Hanbo Steel. 
 
From the political economist view, Shin and Chang (2005: 410) claims that even 
before the IMF programme “mission creep”, the liberation processes of the economy 
had already been willingly proceeded by the then government (then President Kim 
Young-sam) since the early 1990s. They go further to conclude that: 
 
                                                
7 See http://www.fightingftas.org/ for one of anti-FTAs organizations in Korea. 
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“The Korean experience also suggests that the radical transformation of its 
economy towards an idealised version of the Anglo-American system has 
incurred huge transition costs in the economy while bringing only a few 
benefits. These costs were mainly the result of incompatibilities between the 
newly introduced institutions and remaining components of the old economic 
system, which has created a vacuum in the risk-taking function in the economy” 
(ibid: 430). 
 
As Crotty and Lee (2002: 23) rightly put it, “what is surprising perhaps is the shocking 
extent of the damage done to Korea’s economy by the IMF and President Kim Dae-
jung in such a short period time.” 
 
It is beyond the scope of this research to fully depict the post-financial crisis situation 
in Korea, however, one issue remains of particular interest to this research project in 
terms of how it impacts the attainment of social resilience and the capacity for CCA 
and DRR. This issue is the extent to which a chain of political and economic incidents 
and subsequent institutional reforms might have opened up a political space in which 
the advisability and sustainability of previous development paradigms can be 
normatively and politically questioned.  
 
A series of political and economic upheavals have incidentally, yet indirectly provided 
Korean society with a chance to reflect on the legitimacy of compressed development. 
For example, the former two opposition party governments from 1998 to 2007 (the 
first opposition party President Kim Dae-jung, and his successor Rho Mu-hyun) were 
at pains to instil the norms of participatory democracy in the wider political sphere of 
Korean society. Public participation in civil society was further broadened in this 
period when various issues beyond simple political democracy were addressed. These 
included economic and environmental justice, watchdog activity for blacklisting and 
boycotting corrupt candidates and politicians, and an anti-Chaebols movement (Lee 
and Arrington, 2008). This top-down endeavour to liquidate the legacy of 
authoritarianism has led Korean NGOs to address non-materialist values that were 
nearly completely ignored during the periods of compressed development (ibid.). In 
the meantime, the Keio University survey illustrates that 72.2% of Korean respondents 
trusted NGOs “greatly” or “somewhat”; which contrasts sharply with the 22.1 % trust 
level for the Korean government (ibid: 78). 
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Ironically, it is argued in this thesis that the neo-liberal reforms under the Kim and Roh 
presidencies led to an expansion of the social security system in post-financial crisis 
Korean society. The reforms took in place and have continued to be extended in four 
major policy realms; those of unemployment insurance, health insurance, the national 
pension programme and Minimum Living Standard Guarantee (MLSG). Shin (2000: 
83) attributes the underlying causes of this welfare expansion to “the change of policy 
networks from a symbiotic alliance between the state and business to a tripartite 
corporatism and growing social demands for social welfare” from civil society. In 
contrast, some scholars argue that the expansion of social welfare is exaggerated 
rhetoric or partially undertaken to further encourage industrial growth and 
competitiveness (Kwon and Holliday, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.1 Mapping adaptive capacity through social capital 
 
Source: Adopted from Pelling and High (2005: 312). 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the ways in which society can encourage the development of 
social capital and networks in order to increase communities’ access to material and 
institutional assets for CCA and DRR. Pelling and High (2005) urge that we must 
place greater attention on quadrants 2, 3 and 4 in the figure, if we are to grasp a fuller 
picture of adaptive capacity. Quadrant 1 is an area where social capital is intentionally 
materialized by society to deal with the risk of climate change. While significant, 
focusing on only this dimension will not bring about any balanced measures for 
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dealing with CCA. Chapter five shows that existing and alternative discursive alliances 
– each with different worldviews, logics and ideologies – fight over the FRRP (activity 
belonging to quadrant 1). Indeed, it seems crucial to question and scrutinise the 
formation and implication of political conflict among collective actions within and 
between each quadrant. This core issue of disaster politics is dealt with throughout 
empirical chapters of this thesis. 
2.2.6. Imbalance as the legacy of compressed modernization 
The issue of CCA and DRR has become an increasingly crucial object of climate 
change and development policy worldwide (Gaillard, 2010). Similarly, the Korean 
government has started to deal with the issue of CCA if in a partial way. For instance, 
a large technology-oriented civil engineering project, the FRRP, with funding of 17.3 
billion US$8 was disguised as a proactive CCA measure. More evidence will be given 
in empirical chapters that different parties use the issue of climate change risk (more 
precisely perception of climate risk) for different purposes. This phenomenon – 
disaster politics – is not limited only to Korea. Yet, unique is the way in which real and 
socially constructed risk either remains apolitical or partially politicalised in Korea. 
Spatiotemporally heterogeneous values, ideas and interests are interlocked to generate 
political tension and conflict; and this is due largely to the growth-centred tenet of 
compressed development. 
 
Not surprisingly, contemporary Korean society is experiencing emergent 
environmental shocks and stresses (Section 2.6). It is argued in this thesis that research 
into most climate risk challenges in Korea should be based on an understanding of her 
developmental path. Before delving into dual-risk as the legacy of compressed 
development, the subsequent section discusses key concepts such as climate change, 
disaster, risk and vulnerability and adaptation. A full understanding of these concepts 
is important for the discussion in Section 2.6 and empirical chapters. 
2.3: Key concepts: climate change, risk, hazard, vulnerability and, disaster 
Conventionally, the vast body of research on climate change risk has been directed 
towards projecting the likely impacts of climate change on society (Allison et al., 2009, 
                                                
8 This project initially aimed to construct a Grand Canal, which was one of President Lee’s presidential 
election pledges. Yet, due to severe resistance from civil society and religious organizations the project 
has changed its title and aims to restore four major rivers in Korea. Despite this, there are still some 
opponents who claim that the Four River Restoration project is the pre-construction phase of the Grand 
Canal project. 
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Berkhout et al., 2006, Chung et al., 2011, O'Brien and Leichenko, 2000, Reser and 
Swim, 2011, Smit et al., 1999, Urwin, 2005). Lately, however, the intellectual leaning 
towards scientific positivism has become less influential. As an instance, institutional 
partnerships amongst global, national and local organisations and different 
epistemologies are in progress. The Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events (SREX) is one of the outcomes of such international and multi-disciplinary 
cooperation (Seneviratne et al., 2012). 
 
This section will develop the core conceptual debates within political ecology, political 
economics and sociology. Essential concepts such as climate change risk, vulnerability, 
climate change adaptation, development, and compressed modernization (or 
development) will be explained. The main intention here is not to enumerate a wide 
range of concepts produced by various theorists. Rather, this section seeks to offer an 
essential understanding of the concepts upon which the following debates can be 
effectively based. Before moving onto next section, it is necessary to borrow existing 
definitions of risk, hazard and disaster. 
Box 2.1 Key terminologies 
Risk: To be threatened by harm. To be at risk is to be under threat of harm. 
 
Hazard: The potential to harm individuals or human systems. In this work, hazard is 
ascribed to natural, physical or environmental elements. It can be everyday (scarcity 
of clean drinking water) or episodic (volcanic eruption). 
 
Disaster: The outcome of hazard and vulnerability coinciding. Disaster is a state of 
disruption to systemic functions. Systems operate at a variety of scales, from 
individuals’ biological and psychological constitutions or local socio-economies to 
urban infrastructure networks and the global political economy. 
Source: Adopted from Pelling (2003c: 5). 
Note: a translation issue of these terms from English to Korean is discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
 
2.3.1. Global climate change risk 
Among others, there are three considerable policy approaches to the issue of climate 
change risk: mitigation, compensation and adaptation. 
 
Despite the fairly high levels of attention paid to mitigation it never will be a panacea 
for solving climate-related risk problems for at least three reasons (Pielke et al., 2007). 
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The first reason is a mismatch of timescale. The amount of Green House Gases9 that 
has already accumulated in the global atmosphere is severe enough to bring about 
critical risk challenges to human beings, regardless of how successfully mitigation is 
effected. Second, the climate has never been stable by nature. Hence, human beings 
have always faced environmental hazard risk, especially when environmental changes 
and social vulnerability coincide. Third and not least, the need to address the issue of 
adaptation is becoming increasingly important around the world, with calls coming 
particularly from those who will suffer the most from climate change risk. Added to 
these factors, the adaptation deficit argument is worth noting (Burton, 2009).   
2.3.1.1. Ecological thresholds 
Thanks to its descriptive power, the traditional perspective has helped outline possible 
scenarios of the future impacts of climate change (Füssel, 2007). The central concern 
of this perspective is to question how far the changing climate will drive society 
beyond an acceptable (or tolerable) level in confronting climate risks. The concern has 
been represented in terms of “ecological thresholds, where a threshold refers to a state 
in sensitive ecological or physical systems beyond which change becomes irreversible” 
(Adger et al., 2008: 337). This climate determinism is also couched in the language of 
“burning embers” and “tipping points” (Kriegler et al., 2009, Liverman, 2009). These 
modes of expression call attention to the physical dangers associated with future 
climate change: e.g. sea-level rise, desertification, deforestation, changes in marine 
population and the like. However, even if irretrievable (either abrupt or gradual) 
changes in bio physical systems could seriously threaten human-beings, such 
environmental determinism seems partial for the following reasons. 
 
A large part of the reason for this is that there is no universally fixed criterion by 
which to decide what level is acceptable and legitimate. Deciding upon an acceptable 
level inevitably entails the question of value judgment, individual/societal perception 
of risks, and political negotiation within the societal milieu (Adger, 2006, O'Brien et 
al., 2006). For instance, the similar impacts of a “threshold-breaching” natural disaster 
can be quite dissimilarly confronted by different cities, depending on their adaptive 
capacity, affordable resources and infrastructure, such as the transport system (Pelling, 
                                                
9 The UNFCCC (http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php) identifies six GHGs that 
are involved in global warming. These include Carbon dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4), Nitrous oxide 
(N2O), Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCS), Perfluorocarbons (PFCS), and Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6). Among 
these, the greatest concern is about CO2, as a result of the huge amount of it already released into the 
atmosphere and the possibility of its further increase. 
35  
2003b: 7). It is further argued that much attention should be paid to “adaptation 
thresholds” that can be breached by the interlocking of social construct of risk, hazards 
and vulnerability (Pelling, 2011: 70). 
2.3.1.2. Separation between the climate change and variability 
It should be also questioned whether separating anthropogenic climate change from 
climate variability is possible, and if so, why it would be desirable. This issue is now 
less controversial since the IPCC has taken both seriously. The advance in 
environmental sciences is expected to result in GHGs polluters facing more lawsuits 
for precipitating environmental risks of climate change (Allen and Lord, 2004). 
Besides the mitigation policy, scientific development can help implement another 
climate policy, “compensation”; the latter justifies that CO2 polluters should 
technically and financially compensate the South for suffering from the adverse 
impacts of climate change (Füssel, 2007). For good reason, this justice issue remains 
very important. In addition to justice in mitigation, several researchers point out the 
significance of the justice issue in adaptation (Paavola, 2002, Paavola and Adger, 2002, 
Schneider and Lane, 2006, Paavola et al., 2006). 
 
The empirical difficulty of maximizing benefits out of compensation to fortify local 
and regional capacity can be understood by examining the CDM projects under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The main aim 
of the CDM projects is to promote Annex one parties (rich industrial countries and 
countries with transitional economies) to invest in mitigation projects in non-Annex 
one countries, thereby reducing the potential amount of GHGs that would otherwise be 
emitted if no such projects are carried out (Lloyd and Subbarao, 2009, Subbarao and 
Lloyd, 2011). Another aim is to enable sustainable development in non-Annex one 
parties. Thus, the mechanism arose as an attempt to bridge the gap between the 
differing interests of the North and the South. Unfortunately, however, the benefit of 
the CDM has not been substantial, because of a variety of obstacles, such as 
transaction costs, a range of monetary “risks for investors” and institutional obstacles 
(Del Río, 2007: 1365). The CDM projects have tended to take place exclusively in 
large developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. Small countries might need 
locally based small projects that do not necessarily promise the investors a large profit 
in terms of getting the Certified Emission Reductions (CERS). It is not difficult to 
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understand why the CDM has practical limitations in promoting SD in non-Annex one 
parties, especially small and poor countries (Lloyd and Subbarao, 2009). 
 
Taking one of examples regarding the above issue, Yamane (2009) emphasizes the 
need to reconceptualise the CDM (e.g. addressing from cost-effectiveness to livelihood 
and capacity building) to include small scale, yet be practically conducive to the 
livelihood of the vulnerable population in Sri Lanka. For instance, traditional farming 
and a CDM project can be integrated into increasing the resilience of the local 
community to environmental risks, such as drought (ibid.). At the moment (the first 
Kyoto protocol period from 2008-2012), farming does not come under the CDM 
projects. Despite the fact that the notion of “mainstreaming” climate policy into overall 
development objectives has been well acknowledged in literature (Klein, Schipper, 
Dessai, 2003: 8; Schipper, 2007: 7), there are no “concrete” mechanisms for carrying 
out such mainstreaming (Liverman, cited in Yamane, 2009). 
 
However, even compensation will not necessarily encourage individual and social 
protection from environmental hazard and climate change risks. One of examples is 
the Samaritan’s dilemma that denotes the situation in which humanitarian assistance 
becomes rather “a disincentive for preventative action” and the source of long term 
vulnerability to natural hazards (Schipper and Pelling, 2006). It is important to bear in 
mind that financial and technical compensation should be directed towards promoting 
the overall adaptive capabilities of local people, for example through economic assets, 
political stability, educational development, cooperation at various levels, and social 
resilience. This claim has huge implications to the modus operandi of the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF). Crucial is that separating the impacts of humanly-induced 
climate change and natural variability is of little use unless it leads to developing 
individual and social capabilities for coping with both short and long run exposure to 
natural disaster and climate change risks. 
2.3.1.3. Dangerousness of the mitigation logic 
Narrow definitions of global climate change can backfire. Clinging to mitigation logic 
might give society a wrong signal that can be interpreted to justify any activities on the 
pretext of reducing GHGs, but at the expense of other important values, goals, norms, 
and urgent tasks. Building a nuclear reactor and constructing reservoirs, floodwalls, 
and revetments for improving the quality of water and flood control may have some 
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socio-economic benefits. Yet, such engineering-dircted projects are revealed to be very 
costly, ecologically harmful and even somewhat detrimental because they create “new 
risks of their own” (Mustafa, 2009: 465); and “a false sense of security” (Pelling, 2001: 
172). More serious, however, is the (mis-)use of dominant discourse on climate change 
by actors with political/economic power, such as the state government or industrial 
sectors, who aim to cement vested rights through (business-as-usual) development 
projects. This is seriously problematic since the latter could hinder actions necessary in 
the future for tackling climate change-related risks. The term mal-adaptation comes to 
mind, and this point will seriously debated in empirical chapters of this thesis. 
2.3.2. Vulnerability 
The inquiry into what renders Korean society so susceptible to multiple hazard risk 
turns our attention towards the concept of vulnerability. The current research does not 
directly conduct research on vulnerability assessment. Yet, the concept of vulnerability 
is too important to ignore in this research. This is most importantly because the 
concept helps to sketch out the way in which dual-risk of Korean society emerges. 
Rapid urbanisation of Seoul has completely changed exposure profile as will be seen 
in the case of urban disasters in Seoul in Chapter six: e.g. basement flats, residential 
areas adjacent Woomyeon Mt., and increasing urban inundations. It is also argued in 
Chapter seven that the construction of the naval base in Jeju will possibly generate new 
exposure of the navy to future typhoons. The discussion about developmental 
resilience (section 8.2) and political reflections and institutional constraints in 
empirical and concluding chapters would have been impossible without considering 
the conceptual development of vulnerability.  
 
What would negate the increased human, physical and financial capital in Korean 
society in dealing with the vulnerability to natural hazard and climate risks? 
Differently put, when the impacts of natural/technical hazards continue, or are 
expected to increase in the future, what can be done, and how? Who should define the 
risk problems, and in which particular political and institutional settings? These 
contextual questions can better be answered in terms of how the concept of risk 
comprises both hazard and vulnerability (Wisner et al., 2004: 49). Thus, 
 
n Risk = f (Hazard × Vulnerability) 
38  
 
This formula can be extended further into one that addresses the issue of climate 
change and natural disaster risks in many different ways. Yet, this research focuses on 
elaborating the subordinate concepts of vulnerability (see Section 2.3.2.5). For this 
reason it is necessary to examine the conceptual development of vulnerability that has 
been ably done in the social science studies. Climate change risk can jeopardize 
societies in more complex ways than those narrowly perceived by the techno-centric 
perspective towards climate change risk. It is not a new, though less dominant, idea 
that human vulnerability to the risk of environmental hazard will manifest in both 
natural, and socio-cultural and political-economic contexts (e.g. socionature thesis, see 
Castree and Braun, 2001). Non-climate factors shape the ways in which the social 
realities of vulnerability to climate change are (re)produced (Adger, 2006, Adger and 
Brooks, 2003, McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008, Pelling, 2003c). It is very important to 
appreciate the contribution of hazards study, development economics (entitlement 
approach), and human/political ecology to our understanding of social vulnerability, 
which has its conceptual roots in the social science studies. 
2.3.2.1. Vulnerability as physical exposure 
Vulnerability to climate change risk can broadly be identified by “an end point” and “a 
starting point” perspective as in the literature such as Füssel (2007), O'Brien and 
Nygaard (2004). The end point (outcome) approach sees vulnerability as a remaining 
impact after the overall, estimated impacts of climate change are avoided by relying 
upon scientific instruments such as General Circulation Models (GCMs) and taking 
(rational) actions, based on technological/engineering approaches. Rational action 
“start[s] by evaluating the problem of climate change (assessing exposure), mapping 
possible solutions (possible adaptation [and mitigation] measures), and, through a cost-
benefit approach, the best and most feasible adaptation measure(s) would be decided 
and simply implemented” (Inderberg and Eikeland, 2009: 433). Thus, 
 
n Vulnerability = exposure to physical impacts of future climate – (rational) 
adaptation/mitigation 
 
This outcome perspective and the mitigation logic resemble each other as both 
approaches regard the cause of vulnerability to be simply physical. They also lack 
serious inquiry into the underlying socio-political causes of vulnerability. Yet there is 
39  
“a growing realisation that using technological and engineering approaches to mitigate 
losses deals only with symptoms, not causes” (O'Brien et al., 2006: 70). 
 
2.3.2.2. Human ecology approach 
It was the behaviourist approach that initially critiqued the limits of engineering 
approaches to dealing with natural hazard problems (Mustafa, 2009). Among 
pioneering works employing this perspective are White (ibid.) and Kates (1971, cited 
in McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008). Their concerns are based on the role played by 
personal and collective perceptions of risk in affecting the ways people respond to 
natural hazards (Mustafa, 2009). It might be right to say that the same kind of natural 
hazard, say, flooding can induce different responses depending on how the individuals 
affected by hazards perceive of it. This point rightly confutes the naive belief that 
technological solutions – e.g. building levees, sea walls, and reservoirs – are the only 
way forward in dealing with natural hazards and climate-related risks. However, this 
does not imply that hazards management can be entirely predicated on understanding 
risk perceptions and the behaviours of individuals. Besides, if rightly prepared and 
implemented, engineering works can help in protecting societies from natural hazards; 
for example by earthquake/fire-proofing buildings (Pelling, 2001). 
 
Again, what renders the behaviourist perspective vulnerable to criticisms is its lack of 
concern about the underlying social structural and political causes of vulnerability 
(ibid.). One harsh criticism is premised on the below political economic research. 
2.3.2.3. Vulnerability as a lack of entitlement (political economy approach) 
Political economy studies have offered an understanding of the political and economic 
factors that create vulnerability to crises and natural hazards. Much of the initial work 
applied the integrated framework of vulnerability in the case of Africa so as to explore 
“the underlying social causes of famine” (Mustafa, 2009: 467). Vulnerability to the 
risk of famines or other crises is a product of not simply a lack of “food production and 
agricultural expansion” or environmental extremes but “the functioning of the entire 
economy and – even more broadly – the operation of the political and social 
arrangements that can, directly or indirectly, influence people’s ability to acquire food 
and to achieve health and nourishment” (Sen, 2001: 162). Although the concept of 
famine and vulnerability differ, we can learn much from the above passage; the 
“entitlement” of individuals, poverty, and political powerlessness is closely related to 
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“the incidence of hunger” (ibid.). This indicates that freedom and the capabilities of 
individuals, together with enabling the social milieu are the driving force in either 
creating or eliminating human vulnerability to environmental hazards (Adger, 2006).  
 
Sen’s entitlement approach, however, captures the idea that the accumulation of wealth 
or physical capital is of little use if it ends up being merely the ends to development. 
Rather, economic growth should be the means to achieve a range of values that 
individuals, organizations, and societies wish to promote – e.g. freedom or capabilities 
(Sen, 2001). However, the exclusive focus of this entitlement approach on the social 
and institutional causes on famine leads it to disregard other causal factors, such as war 
and pandemic disease (Adger, 2006: 270). 
2.3.2.4. Political ecology and the Pressure and Release (PAR) model 
While there is much to learn from the entitlement perspective, political ecologists 
argue that the entitlement perspective does not account for the role played by the 
environment as an “independent variable”, as well as that played by “human agency 
and culture” in generating vulnerability (McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008: 102). Thus 
political ecologists attempt to re-embed the natural environment into analysis of social 
vulnerability to the risk of hazard and climate change. Besides, the political economy 
approach is contested on the grounds that it tended to focus on the case of a single 
hazard, famine. Thus, the political ecology approach initially emerged in the late 1970s 
as an attempt to integrate human ecology and political economy in order to explore the 
socio-natural relationship in which social vulnerability to a range of natural hazards 
strikes is produced (ibid.). In the broadest terms, the political ecological perspective 
has underscored “the dialectic between environmental and social change” (ibid: 104). 
Moreover, it seriously contests the taken-for-granted, Euro-centric discourses and 
narratives that are not universally applicable in other geographies and contexts (Pelling, 
2003b: 10-11). 
 
Blaikie and his colleagues (Wisner et al., 2004) developed the PAR model, placing 
attention upon the ideologies of the political economy system and the physical impacts 
of hazard so as to produce a causal explanation of natural disaster risks. The PAR 
model dealt with striking a balance between two pressures: hazard and vulnerability. 
Adger (2006: 272) however argues: 
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“In being comprehensive and in giving equal weight to ‘hazard’ and 
‘vulnerability’ as pressures, the model fails to provide a systematic view of the 
mechanisms and processes of vulnerability. Operationalizing the pressure and 
release model necessarily involves typologies of causes and categorical data on 
hazard types, limiting the analysis in terms of quantifiable and predictive 
relationship.” 
 
His argument points out that the vulnerability to natural disaster and climate risks 
needs be analysed in an integrated manner that addresses evolutional aspects of the 
vulnerability, that is, exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. 
2.3.2.5. Integrated approach to vulnerability 
As mentioned above, structural changes such as globalization, modernization and 
urbanisation can alter the entire characteristic of the interconnectedness of 
vulnerability between all scales in the Socio-Ecological System (SES): for example, a 
geographical scale for epidemiological systems (Daily and Ehrlich, 1996). Local 
vulnerability to the risk of coastal flooding in Philippines might be a product of 
climate change. This in turn has been caused by massive industrialization within other 
parts of the globe. It is also possible that the rapid industrialization of Korea is a source 
of global environmental changes. Individuals’ vulnerability to environmental hazards 
(e.g. farmers or fishers) in Korea can be shaped by both the financial crisis in 1998 and 
the heavy snowfall in 2009 in one way or another.  
 
The integrated approach seeks to broaden our understanding of the complex linkages 
between the “properties of social-ecological systems” (Adger, 2006: 272). This 
approach to vulnerability is suitable for explaining and understanding vulnerability to 
climate change risk since climate change is an issue at diverse spatiotemporal scales, 
involving diverse stakeholders (ibid.). According to Adger and Brown (2009), 
 
n Vulnerability = f (exposure × sensitivity/resilience × adaptive capacity) 
 
The three constitutive elements, exposure, resilience and adaptive capacity, are 
explicated as follows. 
 
Exposure 
The exposure of individuals, communities, and nations to environmental changes 
constitutes the concept of social vulnerability. For instance, poor housing adjacent to a 
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coastal area increases exposure to coastal flooding or tsunami. Besides, it is often 
witnessed that tourism development in a certain area and time attracts both labour and 
tourist populations, and then makes them highly vulnerable to environmental hazards – 
e.g. the Indonesian tsunami of 2004. Exposure is therefore a product of physical 
location and timing (Pelling, 2003c: 48). Yet, the timing and location of the exposure 
to hazards are not naturally given; they follow intentional and accidental decision-
makings prior to the incidence of calamities for a range of reasons such as industrial 
development and urbanisation.  
 
Wealth and political power do not totally protect people from disaster risk. The most 
vulnerable and marginalized such as women, children, the elderly, the poor, and the 
disabled tend not to partake in the decision-making processes relating to where to live 
or work (Mustafa, 1998: 300). This point is extremely important that social changes in 
pursuit of decreasing exposure to hazards can be either hindered or encouraged (see 
empirical chapters).  
 
Consider another case, that of a cabdriver during the heavy snowfall in December 2009 
in Korea. Cabdrivers can be divided into the self-employed and employees working for 
a taxicab company. The so-called ‘100 year heavy snowfall’ lasted for nine days in 
December 2009 and increased the toll of dead and injury from traffic accidents by 
about 65% on the daily basis. While averting the possible accident by taking a day off 
means no income to the self-employed, it means minus income to employees because 
they are obliged to pay a fixed fee to the taxicab company, regardless of the weather 
conditions. The different forms of employment can place the employees at greater risk 
than the self-employed. There being no institutions that explicitly guide the behaviour 
of cabdrivers and companies, no compensation is given to the employees for taking 
risks. The right to avoid environmental hazards is apparently subject to the social 
structure of employment and access to economic assets; getting a license for running 
the self-employed cab in Korea costs about US $80,000. 
 
Resilience 
The concept of resilience, which has its origins in ecology, offers a powerful 
perspective for analysing interactions between nature and society (Adger and Brown, 
2009). The resilience of ecological and social systems refers to their buffering ability, 
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through absorbing perpetuations and external stresses, to continue functioning without 
undergoing irreversible changes (Adger, 2000b). In the social system, the unexpected 
occurrence of environmental hazards can be dealt with by both proactive and reactive 
policy initiatives including insurance – a social distribution of risks (Pelling, 2003c: 
48-9). Resilience theorists have also noted that the resilient SES system has the 
learning capacity in the presence of changes, uncertainty, and diversity, bringing 
together heterogeneous knowledge, and yielding a chance for self-organisation (Berkes 
and Seixas, 2005). 
 
By resilience of the system, however, we do not just mean a systems ability to return 
to its pre-disaster state, although this is often how the concept is defined. A resilient 
society can take crises as an opportunity to learn and renovate its social structure and 
institutions so as to extend its adaptive potential for tackling future threats and shocks 
(Dodman et al, 2009; Yamane; 2009). In this regard, adequate social development 
directed towards extending individual excess to entitlement, livelihood assets, and 
empowerment is necessary, if not sufficient, for promoting the resilience of society 
(Dodman et al, 2009). Moreover, unlike some definitions of resilience as simply being 
an antonym of vulnerability (e.g. Paton, cited in Beatley, 2009: 11), this research 
considers resilience, that is, an internal nature of the socio-ecological system, to be a 
constitutive concept of vulnerability (Füssel, 2007). 
 
There have been efforts to integrate the idea of resilience with social contracts. As 
O'Brien et al. (2009) and Pelling and Dill (2009) argue, the legitimacy and capabilities 
of the government can be put into question when society is hit by environmental 
catastrophes. O'Brien et al. (2009) emphasizes three implications of resilience thinking 
for social contract theory. First, as mentioned above, the nature-society dualism is less 
helpful in addressing environmental risk problems. It is important to take into account 
not only what human beings do to nature, but also how social interactions influence the 
production of environmental risk, for example. Second, uncertain thresholds, 
cascading impacts, and surprises are “inherent attributes of complex systems.” This 
means that learning to live with uncertainty is becoming extremely important (Pelling, 
2011). Third, climate change has wide-ranging effects on all scales of human society. 
Hence multi-scales of governance (global, national, regional, and local) need to be 
taken into account. There is a burgeoning body of literature on institutional adaptation 
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to climate change risk (Adger, 2000a, Chhetri et al., 2012, Healey, 2006, O’Riordan 
and Jordan, 1999, Rodima-Taylor et al., 2012, Young, 2010).  
 
Yet within the vast territory of institutional studies of CCA and DRR there remains a 
large piece of uncharted terrain in the context of current Korean society. Section 8.2 
frames the concept of “developmental resilience” and its relationship with two types of 
freedom in the context of the Korean post-developmental state. Thus, the process by 
which Korean society became risk society significantly differs from western societies, 
and this partly accounts for the reason why political reflections on emerging dual-risk 
are accordingly different from those of western Risk Society. 
 
Adaptive capacity 
There are several accounts of the determinants of adaptive capacity for climate change: 
economic wealth, health and nutrition, geography and demography, technologies, 
education, infrastructure, gender, social capital, and information (Allen, 2010, Dayton-
Johnson, 2004, Folke et al., 2002, Grothmann and Patt, 2005, Haddad, 2005, Klein, 
1999, Smit and Pilifosova, 2003, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Pelling and High, 2005, 
Upton, 2012, Yohe, 2002). The enabling social milieu is equally important for CCA 
(Adger et al., 2005, Inderberg and Eikeland, 2009). The capacity of a household to 
respond to environmental hazards can be limited by the environment of community, 
social norms, customs, moral codes, formal laws, and the configuration of all of these 
(Adger, 2000a, Smit and Wandel, 2006, Pelling and High, 2005). The characteristic of 
adaptive capacity is as heavily path dependent as it is “location and context specific” 
(Smithers, 1997: 131). 
 
The government, community, and organisations can learn much from this holistic view 
of vulnerability and from the resilience approach, which holds that knowing of 
physical changes alone cannot protect society from climate change risks. In addition, 
the non-linearity of the cause and effect of natural hazards from climate change points 
out that prediction does not offer what it is believed to provide. Even if one knows 
exactly the characteristics of a single natural hazard, adaptation can fail due to the lack 
of adaptive capacity, the incidence of coupled stresses from other hazards such as 
technical hazards, deteriorating social relations, a lack of institutions, and so forth. 
Equally important is that the existence of socially accepted meanings will not 
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automatically bring about adaption if a society lacks motivation and political will. A 
similar degree of risks continues to influence society while altering the configuration 
between and nature of the components of the risks: hazards, exposure, resilience and 
adaptive capacity. 
2.4: Discourses of development: any space for disaster and climate risk? 
Past development orthodoxies, such as the Keynesian, neo-classical economics, and 
socialist theory, are now put into question by alternative schools of development (Peet 
and Watts, 1996). One is what came to be termed – neo-liberalism, the Washington 
consensus and market fundamentalism (Maxwell, 2009). Another is the developmental 
state discourse, the analytical focus of which lies upon the recent development 
experience of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries (NIC), such as Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore (Peet and Watts, 1996). Yet, neither of these discourses has 
seriously engaged with the wide-ranging debate upon institutions outside the state and 
market, such as social norms and social networks, due in part to their exclusive 
emphases on the roles of the state and the market respectively (ibid: 25). Rejecting 
both extreme positions, the current research sheds light into the new discursive 
alliances (civil society, political entrepreneur and academics) to emerging hazards risk 
throughout the empirical chapters.   
 
In response to unrelenting poverty, inequality and ecological deterioration, the 
discourse of sustainable development (or sustainability) came to prominence (Kemp et 
al, 2005). There was a significant effort to define the term in 1987, after the 
Brundtland report presented the idea of “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(Pearce and Atkinson, 1998: 4). Whilst influential, the definitions of sustainable 
development have differed, depending on the specific perspectives and disciplines of 
the researchers (Bell and Morse, 2003, Mog, 2004). 
2.4.1. Dealing with vulnerability for sustainable development 
It is worth considering, among others, two major schools of sustainability: e.g. the 
economist capital model (Pearce and Atkinson, 1998) versus the ecological model 
(Rees, 1990, cited in Redclift, 1992). The divide between these comes from differing 
ideas about what to sustain; for the former eradicating poverty through the 
implementation of more effective economic growth together with inter- and intra-
generational equity is important; while the latter emphasises the conservation of the 
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environment, particularly renewable natural resources (Redclift, 1992). A detailed 
account of the concept of sustainable development is beyond the scope of this thesis 
(instead see Redclift, 1992). Yet, one point stands out here. In the context of 
“sustainable urbanization”, Pelling (2003c: 10-12) argues that neither school pays 
serious attention to the relationship between sustainability and vulnerability.  
 
Taking a similar view, Yamin et al. (2005: 7) categorise different thoughts of 
development, according to “different policy and institutional frameworks”; 1) 
mainstream development (poverty reduction); 2) basic needs/human development 
(well-being and human development); 3) rights-based approaches (human right 
standards); and 4) sustainable livelihoods (“long-term and large scale trends”, shocks 
and seasonality). Yet, none of these approaches alone appears sufficient. Despite their 
fruitful inputs to research and policy regarding climate change adaptation, the first 
approach lacks the essential quest for vulnerability to environmental risk; the second 
approach heavily relies on normative rather than practical relevance; the extent to 
which the third one can contribute to “long-term changes in the distribution of 
economic resources and political power” is quite uncertain; and the sustainable 
livelihoods approach does not reflect the rapidly changing social structures in rural 
areas in developing countries; nor the uncertainty of climate change risk. 
 
These points are extremely important if this thesis is to appropriately explore the 
politics of disaster in Korea. Actually, the political economy of the Korean economic 
development is “well studied, even over studied” within the development studies 
(Kohli, 2004: 84). There is abundant academic literature that scrutinizes the rapid 
economic growth of East Asian countries including Korea, depicting it as miracle 
(Amsden, 1989, Amsden, 1994, Hobday, 1995, Johnson, 1982). In terms of the 
political transformation of Korea, the consolidation of democracy since the 1987 
democratization is also described as miraculous (Chaibong, 2008; Minns, 2001). This 
thesis does not reiterate the reasons why such miraculous events came about.  The 
current research inquires into less addressed aspect and phase of the miraculous 
transformation – dual-risk. 
2.4.2. The need for the developmental lens 
A developmental perspective informs the subject of this research in two broad ways; 
through the dynamic linkage between past, present and future institutional 
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arrangements, and through the relationships amongst themes and practices regarding 
development, climate change and disaster risk reduction (Schipper and Pelling, 2006). 
By posing several questions, this section makes a provocative, if not decisive, 
argument that the issue of disaster risk and CCA should be dealt with in terms of a 
broader development perspective. 
 
First, adaptive capacity and the enabling socio-political milieu fundamentally rely on, 
but are not limited to, the nature of the developmental path that a society has 
undergone (Adger, 2000a, Pelling, 2003c). Among others, the types of governance, 
social contracts (O'Brien et al., 2009) and social networks (Adger, 2003) are important 
proxies for understanding CCA in terms of the developmental path. The incidental 
outcome of development, which nevertheless influences adaptive capacity, also needs 
particular attention. Furthermore, societies facing uncertain climate risk will engage in 
the processes of future-oriented innovation (including consolidation and stasis).10 At 
this point, several questions stand out: will the current institutional configurations, 
dominant visions of development and the characteristic nature of social capital 
properly protect Korean society from the risk of climate change? Concomitantly, how 
can political actors in local settings adapt to the threshold and cascading effects of 
climate change given an adaptive logic deeply embedded in social norms and culture? 
If sustainable development is the only way forward to deal with climate change risk, as 
Parry (2009) argues, how differently do people with different interests and 
backgrounds conceive of it? Is there any room for political entrepreneurs to modify the 
existing set of institutions or core ideas to address the issue of the risk of climate 
change (Warner, 2003)? These vital, yet contextual questions can only be answered in 
the context of institutional change and the broad trajectory of the political economy. 
 
Second, three issues; disaster risk reduction, development and climate change, all have 
synergetic effects on each other in both theory and practice: (Schipper and Pelling, 
2006). Therefore, they need to be dealt with jointly in order for practices to be effected 
successfully in each of these fields. However, this had not been the case until recently. 
A decade ago, Burton and Aalst (1999, cited in Smit and Pilifosova, 2003: 24) noted 
that development initiatives did not “take risks of climate change into account.” 
                                                
10 Indeed, it is argued that uncertainty stemming from “a gap between the agent’s competence and the 
difficulty of the decision problem” is seen as the source of institutional change (Heiner, cited in North, 
2005: 14). Yet, this does not mean that uncertainty always brings about institutional changes. 
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Dominant schools of development (e.g. neo-classical economists) take it for granted 
that the environment is “benign” and will have little effect on the processes and 
outcomes of development (Pelling, 2003b: 4-5). However, as recent catastrophic 
events such as the 2004 South Asian Tsunami show, natural hazard disasters can undo 
decades of development work. At the same time, they also have the potential to open 
windows of opportunity for social and political change (Giovinazzi and Giovinazzi, 
2008). Ironically, the IPCC did not pay sufficient attention to natural disaster risk 
reduction until the fourth assessment report (AR4) was published in 2007. Despite 
recent attention to a risk perspective that informs climate change adaptation, we had 
until recently yet to see a “comprehensive assessment of the disaster risk reduction and 
management policies and measures” (n/a, but see footnote 11).11  
 
Over the last decade, however, increasing attention has been placed on the issue of 
mainstreaming climate change and disaster risk reduction into development initiatives 
(Halsnæs and Trærup, 2009). Many organizations have thus far promoted cross-
fertilization among the three realms of theory and practice – e.g. the United Nations 
Development Planning (UNDP); the Institute of Development Studies (IDS); The UK 
Department for International Development (DfID); International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies; the Provention Consortium; the Institute for Social 
and Environmental Transition (ISET). Nonetheless, the research projects of these 
institutions tend to focus on cases in either rich or poor countries, but give less 
attention to those countries, such as South Korea, that have recently experienced social 
transformations after experiencing an economic growth miracle (Amsden, 1994) and 
miraculous democratization (Chaibong, 2008). Yet does Korean society express any 
prospect of miraculous CCA and DRR? Do recent changes in the institution of the 
state and civil society contribute to the production of social vulnerability? 
2.4.3. Structural approaches to risk (manufactured and natural) 
Among others, two incisive theories address the issue of disaster risk in light of social 
structures: the Pressure and Release (PAR) model (Wisner et al., 2004) and the Risk 
Society thesis by Ulrich Beck (Beck, 1996). Despite regarding poverty and 
vulnerability as different, the PAR illustrates the way in which the underlying social 
structure of poverty and political inequality along with other pressures from natural 
                                                
11 See “a proposal for an IPCC special report on managing the risk of extreme events to advance climate 
change adaptation”. http://www.unisdr.org/eng/risk-reduction/climatechange/docs/IPCC_Norway 
_ISDR_ system Proposal.pdf 
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hazards fundamentally shape the way natural disaster occurs, and is experienced 
(Wisner et al., 2004). Risk Society thesis has much more to offer in illuminating the 
manufactured risk created by modernization (Beck et al, 2003). Far beyond tinkering 
with single policies, both schools call for institutional innovation and transformative 
change that require “a novel or unprecedented departure from the past” (Hargrave and 
Van de Ven, 2006: 866). 
 
The two schools alike criticise idealist and overly constructivist perspectives of the 
post-modernist school (Beck et al., 2003, Wisner et al., 2004). In addition, the two 
theses are geared towards exploring, if not exclusively, the case of a natural hazard in 
poor countries and technical hazard in their industrial counterparts, respectively. 
Beyond that, both theories stop short of providing valid accounts of multidimensional 
risk facing the post-developmental states, such as Korea, which do not belong to the 
South and the North in terms of their developmental path (for the compressed Korean 
developmental path see below).12 
 
A structural approach to either technical or natural disaster risk offers the theoretical 
basis on which to investigate the root causes of the incidence of hazard disasters. 
However, such an approach hardly mainly accounts for the role of individual and 
organisational agencies in modifying social structures for DRR and CCA in detail: e.g. 
social innovations by grassroots activists. This thesis upholds the necessity of 
structural inquiry, yet goes further to examine the role of agency within specific 
contexts of social structures and their changes in the construction of risk. 
2.5: The Korean dual-risk society 
A decade ago, scholarly dialogues sought to re-evaluate the legitimacy and efficacy of 
Korea’s developmental path in the past, that is, the economic-centred paradigm of 
development (see Korea Journal, 1998, Vol. 38, No. 1). The dialogues, reflecting in 
time, emerged just as the 1997 Asian financial crisis hit Korean society severely. The 
authors in the volume of the journal generally agreed that the orthodox development 
paradigm of the time had reached its limit. It was not surprising at all to see that the 
Korean sociologists paid greater attention to the Risk Society thesis as Korean society 
                                                
12 The intention here is not to determine whether Korea belongs to the South or the North. Rather, the 
rapid changes in the social structures of the Korean political economy seem to have important 
implications for understanding the patterning of the manifestation of vulnerability to climate change 
risks in the Korean risk society. 
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underwent a series of serious, yet unprecedented disasters of different kinds and scales 
(Figure 2.2). 
 
At the heart of the risk society thesis is the concept of reflexivity in “reflexive 
modernization” (Beck et al., 2003: 1). This concept holds that when society achieves a 
certain degree of modernization it radicalizes fundamental institutional arrangements 
and principles that had once been taken for grated (ibid.). Among others, these include 
“the nation state, the territorial organization of production, corporations and regulation, 
the sexual division of labor, the nuclear family, the restructuring of social knowledge, 
the creation of a hierarchy between experts and laymen” (ibid: 5). Current risks facing 
society also change in their nature from relatively knowable to largely unprecedented – 
climate change risk, BSE and swine flu; thus “risks come from and consist of 
unawareness (non-knowledge)” (Beck, 2000: 217). Yet in the above dialogue there 
was no account of Korean risk society in light of climate change and natural disaster 
risk. Drawing on this soft constructionist approach, the following section sheds light 
on the changing nature of risk in Korea in detail.  
2.5.1: Change in structures of risk 
In his essay Rush-To Growth, Economic Crisis, Limping Modernization, and a Dual-
Risk Society, Kim Dae-Hwan depicts Korea as suffering from dually structured risk; 
one from insufficient modernization – a lack of social and political development; the 
other from successful industrialization and economic growth – manufactured risks 
(Kim, 1998). He does not explicitly address the issue of climate change risks, yet his 
contention that the “rush-to [economic] growth” paradigm has manufactured “dual-
structured danger” in Korean society resonates (ibid: 43). Simply put, in this thesis 
dual-risk refers to the gap or mismatch between different values, whereby the society 
confronts both traditional and emerging types of risk in a rather complex way than 
other Western Risk societies. 
 
In response to this assertion, Beck (1998: 201) notes that “[t]he Korean path to risk 
society must be understood in terms of a “dual-risk society”. But this concept enriches 
the analysis of Western societies too, because “what is a dominant aspect in the 
Korean context might be an additive aspect in many parts of the West as well” (ibid).  
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Certainly, many Western countries might have confronted a similar pattern of dual-risk 
problems. Yet, what makes Beck’s statement less persuasive is the likelihood that the 
rush-to growth ideology together with other strongly rooted ideologies, such as 
Confucianism, patriarchism, anti-communism and recently neo-liberalism, has deeply 
penetrated through Korean society, serving as the dynamic underlying cause of 
vulnerability and environmental crises. It is not easy to fully understand how 
urbanization and other global processes have increased and changed the impacts of 
natural hazard in local places in Korea. Failing to do so aptly explains the reason why 
risk problems recur (Blaikie et al., 1994: 30). Hence, an attempt to clarify the causal 
links between the root causes of and the actual manifestation of disaster risks is not 
wasteful, indeed, it is immediately practical. 
 
As fully discussed above, Korea has been well studied in terms of her rapid economic 
growth and poverty reduction through the strong roles of the state and catching-up 
governance (Amsden, 1989, Chang, 2007, Evans, 1996, Evans, 1989, Henderson, 2002, 
Kohli, 2004). For the most part, however, serious debates have tended to centre on the 
question of how such dramatic economic growth could have taken place in Korea 
during such a short period of time? Rapid economic development is seldom seen by 
the development studies literature as an independent variable shaping the vulnerability 
profile of Korea. The lack of diverse angles on Korean economic growth is of little use 
in understanding the vulnerability of Korean society to climate change risks. However, 
it is argued, this gap can be filled by paying greater attention to ideas and concepts 
from sociology, ecological economics and political ecology. 
 
Whilst creating more human, financial and physical capital, social capital. i.e. “trust 
and flow of communication”, might have decreased to a meagre level in Korean 
society (Woo, 2007: 3). However, trust, good flow of communication, and collective 
action are of use in encouraging the adaptive capacity for coping with climate and 
natural risks. Of course, the presence of social capital and adaptive capacity do not 
always mutually reinforce each other. For example, in some cases social capital 
increases the social vulnerability of the elderly to heat waves (Wolf et al., 2010). Of 
importance is that the social aspect of adaptive capacity should be included in any 
endeavours to comprehend the implications of the developmental path for the 
vulnerability profile of the society. 
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Change in land use might have also exacerbated the local vulnerability of coastal zones 
to sea-level rising (long term) and periodic typhoons (short-term). These include the 
massive extension of coastal industrial zones (e.g. steel industry, shipbuilding 
industry), land reclamation projects, and the leisure/tourism industry in the coastal 
region. Companies, including those managed by Chaebols, are located either within or 
close to coastal industrial complexes that were constructed by the government since 
the 1960~70s. There are now 815 industrial complexes ranging across Korea where 
about 55,000 companies currently operate. In this regard, the altered physical exposure 
to environmental hazards is evidently a by-product of promoting economic growth and 
technological innovation through industrialization. These are a crucial, if not sufficient, 
factors in understanding the vulnerability of Korean society to potential threats from 
climate change risks, yet they are seldom addressed by the current development 
literature. 
2.5.2. Disaster risk in Korean society 
This section examines natural and technological hazards that recently struck Korean 
society. Periodic typhoons are amongst hydro-meteorological hazards that amount to 
90% of natural hazards in Korean society. They trigger floods, landslides, and extreme 
rainfalls. More than twenty typhoons influence Korea annually during the summer 
monsoon season and some of them strike heavily and cause a lot of damage in Korea. 
The typhoons Rusa in 2002 and Maemi in 2003 are two exmples (see Table 2.5). There 
should be an important reason why similar typhoons brought about somewhat different 
death tolls to Korea and Japan (Seong, 2006: 178 and see the below table). More 
significant is the fact that early warning was provided in advance, yet citizens did not 
pay enough attention to potential risk of natural disasters (ibid.). 
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Table 2.4. Comparisons of Typhoons in Korea and Japan 











Korea 965~992hPa 18~331 m/s Scale: medium 
Intensity: strong 






Japan 950~980 hPa 26~411 m/s Scale: medium 
Intensity: strong 
No. of the killed and 
the missing 





Korea 910~996 hPa 18~541 m/s large 
very strong 
No. of the killed and 
the missing 
130 
Japan n/a <74.1 m/s large 
very strong 
No. of the killed and 
the missing 
1 
Source: Korea Water Resources Corporation, cited in Seong (2006: 178) 
Given the major reasons for the death from the typhoon Rusa in Korea, torrents (96) 
and landslides (55), the anthropogenic rivers management and road construction are 
thought of as a direct causes of the disasters (ibid: 179). Based on a public opinion 
survey of the riskiness of natural hazards, it is argued that the incident of Typhoon 
Rusa is attributed to the lack of a safety culture in Korea. Seong (2006) does not 
directly examine the underlying causes of vulnerability. However, the insensitivity to 
safety is to some extent an outcome of the dominant discourse and ideology in Korea 
that development is all about economic growth. In this sense, limping modern 
development and accompanying institutions and social structural factors are the 
underlying source of risks facing Korean society (Kim, 1998). 
 
Related to the above point, rapid economic development from the excessive extension 
of industrialization has greatly given birth to the technical disasters. For example, the 
collapse of the Sampoong department store in 1995 killed 502 and injured 938, while 
the fall of Sungsu Bridge in 1994 killed 32 and the injured 17. The Sungsu Bridge was 
a symbol of the successful industrial development of Korea; the Sampoong department 
store was the second largest, luxury department store in the capital city of Seoul. The 
two incidents can be explained by Beck’s risk society thesis in that buildings to which 
modern technology were applied with the faulty permit for building completion 
became the source of technical risks. 
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The MT Hebei Spirit oil spill in 2007 is a recent example of technical incidents in 
Korea. It led to about 10,000 tonnes of oil being spilled around the county Taean on 
the Yellow sea (the west) coast of the Korean peninsula. The direct and indirect 
consequences of the incident were the ecocide of the tidelands; the suicide of the 
residents – four people have thus far committed suicide due to compensation or 
livelihood issues (imagine who might want to consume marine products that are 
polluted by the oil); and the deteriorating health problems of the local people. Despite 
the volunteering work to degrease the oil on the tidelands (undertaken by more than 
one million people) and a private donation, the local people have not fully recovered 
their means of livelihood, and some of them have chosen to commit suicide. The 
impacts of this technical hazard on the coastal area will be more lasting than one might 
imagine. Above all, the tragic incident showed how humanly induced technological 
hazards can in turn ruin the entire local economy, the ecological system and people’s 
lives. More problematic still is the fact that since the oil spill, 23 more incidents 
involving about 50000kℓ of oil spills have recurred in the same region so far. 
 
Figure 2.2. The collapse of Sampung department store and the MT Hebei Spirit oil 
spill 
 
Source: http://www.sciencetimes.co.kr/article.do?todo=view&atidx=0000070958   
 
The above cases of natural and technical hazards represent just very small sample of 
the hazards that have recently confronted contemporary Korean society. Yet, it is 
possible to draw some important points from these cases to reflect on the links between 
modern development and hazards in the context of Korea. It is not difficult to discern 
that poverty or inequality is not a sole independent variable that generates human 
vulnerability to natural hazards or environmental crises in Korea. Rather apparent is 
that successful economic growth (eradication of poverty) has not necessarily provided 
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Korean society with greater preparedness nor advanced adaptive capacity for coping 
with natural and technical hazards. Crucially, this implies that the overall capacity of 
Korean society to deal with the forthcoming risks of climate change must be treated 
with some scepticism.    
 
Korea is not ranked amongst the most disaster-prone countries in the world. However, 
this does not mean that Korea is safe from natural hazards. Table 2.5 and Figure 
2.2~2.5 prove this point clearly. In particular, the fact that the ten most expensive 
natural disasters occurred very recently demonstrates that the wealth and infrastructure 
accumulated during Korea’s rapid economic growth could be easily lost as a result of 
natural hazards (at least at local level). Yet, it seems apparent that nature is not the 
only source of natural disaster, as fully discussed above. What has changed the nature 
of disaster risk in Korean society is to a large degree the process of modern 
development and industrialization. As Quarantelli (cited in Oliver-Smith, 2004: 20) 
rightly put it, not only the increase in the population but also its “location in dangerous 
areas” makes people more susceptible to natural hazards. 
 
Table 2.5. Metrological hazards in Korea 
































Across the country 
(excluding Jeju) 


























187, 265 163 0.63 billion 5 










99,516 345 0.51 billion 6 
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I-ri: 238.5 
















54,041 128 0.37 billion 10 
Source: National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Available at 
http://www.nema.go.kr 
Notes: Typhoon (T), localized torrential downpour (LTD), torrential downpour (TD), 
economic losses calculated at the exchange rate of 1,200 Korean won (₩) to the U.S dollar ($). 
This table does not fully include recent Typhoons and other accompanying hydrological 
hazards (e.g. MAEMI in 2003 which killed 130 people and led to economic losses equivalent 
to 3.51 billion U.S dollar ). 
 
Both typhoons and oil spill incidents frequently occur around coastal zones. It is 
plausible to envisage that the local/coastal dwellers in Korea will be under the threat of 
complicatedly coupled stresses, whatever future scenarios of social-environmental 
change are taken into consideration. The coupled stresses mean that the underlying 
causes of natural/technical disaster and climate change risk are complexly interwoven 
over time and place; globalization, short and long term hazards, urbanization, 
industrial complexes, institutional configuration, trust, communication and so forth 
(for a more detailed account see the section on the definition of social vulnerability). 
 
However, it is wrong to argue that the modern development of Korea has resulted in 
merely negative outcomes. Improved access to economic assents (despite the 
decreasing income distribution since the 1997 IMF financial crisis) and political 
freedom since the 1987 democratization are important factors that shape the adaptive 
capacity of the society for coping with both natural hazards and climate change risks 
(Wisner et al, 2004). For instance, UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI) shows 
that the rapid economic development of Korea has encouraged and been encouraged 
by improvements in education, health, knowledge and the standard of living (0.937, 
ranked among the very high human development group).13 Of course, the HDI tells us 
only a few aspects of development. For example, it does not encompass political 
participation, gender equity or social cohesion. Nevertheless, few would deny that 
                                                
13 See http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_KOR.html 
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access to basic assets such as food, education and income is essential for coping with 
natural disaster and climate change risks. 
2.5.3.Heat waves: natural hazard? 
A heat wave is a slippery concept; several quantitative approaches to defining a heat 
wave relying on the indicators and criteria used: 
 
Intensity, frequency and duration – e.g. “the means of three consecutive 
warmest nights” (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004: 994);  
 
Establishing certain thresholds of maximum temperatures (Robinson, 
2001); 
 
When temperatures exceed fixed absolute threshold values  
Deviation from normal – percentile thresholds (Meehl and Tebaldi, 2004) 
 
Regardless of the indicators and criteria used, what is important is that human 
resilience against a heat wave is also largely affected by societal, economic, 
demographic and political factors. For instance, the SREX report broadly defines a 
heat wave as a period of unusually hot weather (Robinson, 2001). Perhaps, the fixed 
absolute values are less directly applicable to different geographies, economies, and 
societies that have diverse thresholds of extremely hot weather. In this regard, any 
definition of a heat wave based on statistical values (e.g. trends) should be coupled 
with local contexts and the history of the society in question. 
 
Notably, the Korean heat wave of 1994 resulted in an estimated 3350 fatalities (IPCC, 
2012). The death toll of the heat wave is tantamount to that of all the natural disasters 
from 1987 to 2011 combined, which killed some 3491 people. (Note that a heat wave 
has not counted as a natural disaster, see below). The heat wave was exceptional, fully 
meeting the criterion used for the definition in the study; more than a three-day long 
period of hot weather either reaching or exceeding 33°C (see Table 2.6). There were 
twenty heat waves from 1992 to 2005 that fall under this definition.   
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7 33.7 29.8 39.2 35.5 7.6 323 15.1 161 
Source: modified from (Kysely and Kim, 2009: 112). 
Note: CVD = Cardiovascular diseases. 
 
Nevertheless, Korea has yet to establish advanced institutional tools to cope with heat-
related disasters. For example, the current disaster laws of Korea (e.g. the Disaster and 
Safety Management Basic Act, the Natural Disaster Countermeasures Act) are 
inadequate for coping with heat waves. In the first place, the existing laws do not treat 
a heat wave as a cause of either natural or man-made disaster. Without forward-
looking institutional preparation, however, the institutional defenselessness of Korea 
against heat-related hazards will no doubt lead to much higher mortality and 
malfunctions of socio ecological systems.  
 
An additional concern about heat waves is to come up with a resolution to the 
predicament caused by the coexistence and clash of contrasting values. For example, 
the increasing demand for electricity (particularly in summer, see 
http://www.kpx.or.kr), the anti-nuclear movement, corruption in the Korean nuclear 
reactor-parts industry (Kim, 2013) and other needs for change make the issue of heat 
waves in the era of climate change more complicated. This is why research into 
disaster at a single scale requires the consideration of other possibly related forces, 
discourses, conflicts and functions at other scales. Various ecological, physical and 
social “thresholds” coexist and can be breached to lead systems to new stages (Pelling, 
2011). In this sense, not only the direct impacts of heat waves, but also their indirect 
impacts and interlocked changes need be considered, for example, heat waves with 
sporadic change in other systems – demography, social values and the nuclear industry. 
2.5.4. Trends of natural disaster outcomes in Korean society 
Despite the inherent limitations of using statistical indicators, the number of victims 
and the proportion of the population affected are commonly used to define natural 
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disasters (Pelling, 2003c: 6). Issues of data quality and the possibility of failing to 
consider “the cumulative impacts of small impact events” are among reasons that 
quantitative indicators of natural disasters are partial at best. In addition, the numerical 
figures do not speak of the underlying, structural causes of natural disasters (Mustafa, 
1998). Nevertheless, it is useful to project the macro trends of disaster triggered by 
natural hazards to make inferences about the changing risk profile of Korean society. 
 
Figure 2.3. The concentration of losses and damages in the summer 
 
Source: Based on statistical data from NEMA (2011). 
Figure 2.3 exhibits both the death toll and economic losses of natural disasters in 
Korea, and shows that they are concentrated in summer between July and September. 
Had heat waves or other events counted as a natural disaster, the concentration of the 
disaster death toll in the summer would have been far greater. This also means that the 
redefinition of natural disasters, the use of different indicators for natural disasters, and 
the inclusion of “cumulative impacts of small impact events” in the data could easily 
reshape the gradient of the chart in Figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.4. The changing ratio of death toll to economic losses (total costs) 
 
Source: Based on statistical data from NEMA (2011). 
 
Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 illustrate the ratios of human losses to economic damages, in 
terms of the total costs and percent of GNI. The trends of natural disaster outcomes in 
Korea are upward for economic losses and reconstruction costs, and downward for 
human casualties. It is not immediately possible to discern what has actually altered 
these trends, whether the direction of the trends will continue into the future, whose 
losses the data account for, and the way in which climate change will affect the trends. 
Many other questions are worth asking; but the key point is that the meaning of the 
charts in Figure 2.3~2.5 can vary depending on the context and purpose. 
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Figure 2.5. The changing ratio of the death toll to economic losses (percent of GNI) 
 
Source: Based on statistical data from NEMA (2011). 
Notes: Available data cover only the last 30 years to show the ratio of death toll to economic 
losses in terms of percent of GNI. 
 
It is possible to make several inferences from these charts. First, Korean society is 
likely to experience higher economic than human losses (higher exposure of physical 
properties to hazards). Second, the compressed development of Korea and its current 
outcome have not fully transferred to disaster-specific resilience (compare the above 
charts with Table 2.7, note that the population of Korea is about 50 million). In fact, as 
the empirical chapters of this thesis will show, the social relations that once fostered 
the compressed development have in turn delayed the development of local resilience. 
Third, however, it should be noted that there are many other aspects of disaster that 
these charts cannot explain (e.g. institutional aspects). 
 
62  
Figure 2.6. Human Development Index: Trend 1980 ~ present 
 
Source: see http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/KOR.html  
 
International organizations such as the UNDP and IFRC have increasingly embraced 
hazards resilience as a constitutive element of the concept of (sustainable) 
development. Among others, the Human Development Index (HDI) report uses such 
advanced conceptualization of development. Table 2.7 shows that in general all the 
HDI groups have seen a decrease in the number of losses and damages consequent to 
natural disasters over the last four decades.  
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Table 2.7. Disaster-related casualties and costs, median annual values by HDI group, 
1971-1990 and 1991-2010 
 Deaths  
(per million people) 
Affected population 
(per million people) 
Cost (percent of GNI) 
Country group 1971-1990 1991-2010 1971-1990 1991-2010 1971-1990 1991-
2010 
HDI group 
Very high 0.9 0.5 196 145 1.0 0.7 
High 2.1 1.1 1,437 1,157 1.3 0.7 
Medium 2.7 2.1 11,700 7,813 3.3 2.1 
Low 6.9 1.9 12,385 4,102 7.6 2.8 
World 2.1 1.3 3,232 1,822 1.7 1.0 
Source: Adopted from UNDP (2011: 37). 
 
The Very high HDI group to which Korea belongs generally exhibit relatively low 
disaster-related casualties, low levels of population affected and low financial costs 
during two periods, 1971-1990 and 1991-2010. The inter-country comparison in Table 
2.7 should not be taken as an absolute picture of their disaster-specific resilience 
profile. If the comparison is done in light of many other factors, such as change in the 
institutional arrangements, social capital, power relations, discourses, technology, 
culture and demography, it will partly illustrate the evolving structure of the countries’ 
risk. 
 
Whilst Seoul and Jeju are prone to nationwide hazards, such as typhoons, at the same 
time the two areas’ distinct environmental features expose them to different hazards in 
different ways. Environmental features here refer to the wider surroundings of human 
settlements and include geological, socioeconomic, political, discursive and cultural 
settings. This point makes it clear that the above charts in Figure 2.3 ~ 2.5 do not 
facilitate an understanding of why the same hazard leads to different experiences of 
disasters, and this will be dealt with in Chapters six and seven. 
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2.6: Conclusion 
By introducing concepts and ideas from a wide range of studies in sociology, political 
economy, political ecology and research of disaster, this chapter clarified the meanings 
of the key terms and theories. In particular, the dual-risk thesis and the concept of 
compressed modernization are extremely important for this thesis. It was shown that 
Korean society has recently undergone increasing urban risks, and the physical 
damages of disaster triggered by natural hazards have been increasing. Arguing for a 
casual relationship between compressed development and dual-risk might be 
provocative to both environmental determinists and disciples of development 
orthodoxies. While the former group might overlook the political and historical causes 
of contemporary risk, the latter group tends to underestimate the role of environmental 
hazards for human development. Yet, it is clear that after such rapid transformations 
Korean society has confronted multiple disaster risk of new kinds and extents. It is 
evident that development has inextricable relationships with hazards risk. In response 
to these emerging risk challenges, as Chapter three explores, political reflections in 
various forms have accordingly come into existence in the society. 
 
It is not argued in this chapter that the dual-risk thesis is without problems. The dual-
risk thesis is an attempt to adopt and modify Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society thesis in order 
to account for newly emerging “manufactured” risk in Korea. Theorists of the dual-
risk thesis in Korea have stopped short of applying it to the case of disasters triggered 
by natural forces. Probably this is because there is still a strong belief among Korean 
academics that sources of manufactured and natural disaster risk can be clearly 
demarcated. The current research constantly poses a question to this belief. Indeed, the 
empirical chapters of this thesis ably show that in urban settings such a belief ceases to 
be necessarily rational. 
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Chapter 3: Collective change in expectation, institution and idea – a discursive 
institutionalist approach 
3.1: Introduction 
Threats of environmental change risk neither always require nor inevitably entail 
sociopolitical change – be it incremental or transformative. One could even go further 
to argue that consolidation of the status quo might be more appropriate for dealing 
with certain types of environmental hazard risk. That said, and too important to be 
neglected, are the multi-scalar adaptation deficits that have provoked diverse political 
reflections on dual-risk in Korea. In an attempt to offer an analytical tool by which to 
examine the new social responses to the emerging risk, this chapter sorts through three 
cognate, conceptual frames along with one crosscutting concept (social capital): 1) 
changing social expectation; 2) institutional change; and 3) social innovation. 
 
First, this chapter points out the changing worldview that uncertainty is becoming an 
essential part of social expectation of future risk. The scope and nature of social 
expectation is important for encouraging CCA as the former can determine the range 
of available options for the latter. A realist perspective is introduced to emphasise the 
necessity of including a wider range of real adaptation needs and options in scholarly 
discussion about CCA. Then, the importance of adaptation scale is discussed with 
reference to the relevant literature. Adaptation is an essentially local event; and new 
lines of inquiry should be stimulated in local contexts. Most importantly, a range of 
options can be (re-) shaped, if not wholly determined, by changing collective 
expectations. 
 
Second, social capital is presented as a crosscutting concept that helps further elaborate 
the concepts of expectation change, institutional change and social innovation. As 
many studies anticipate, structural forces (e.g. global risk or globalisation) will 
continue to necessitate collective changes. The debate on social capital provides a lens 
to look more closely at how collective endeavours emerge to either transform or 
reinforce existing ideas and institutional arrangements. The multidimensional aspects 
of social capital also need be accounted for in more detail. To examine CCA of 
individuals is neglected in this thesis. This section looks at social capital at the global-
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level for addressing climate risk in an integrated way, and questions if this is possible 
at lower geo-political levels. 
 
Third, institutions and institutional change are approached by critically reviewing the 
existing literature from authors such as Jütting (2003), North (2005), North (1990). 
Additional efforts are made to gain analytical purchase on different understandings of 
institutional change. In particular, this section looks at one way in which structure-
agency interactions are accounted for (Seo and Creed, 2002). Several contextual 
questions are dealt with to further elaborate this model of institutional change. These 
efforts are maximized in the following section of social innovation and idea, thereby 
setting up the ideational approach to institutional change. 
 
The last section of this chapter conceptualises social innovation by closely looking at 
the concepts of idea and discourse. This section offers an account of how novel ideas 
can transfer to social innovation through political-discursive channels. Different types 
of ideas (cognitive/normative and foreground/background ideas) are presented in terms 
of the ways in which they are discussed, dealt with, interlinked, interpreted and 
adopted in two spheres of discourse (public and political sphere). The debate on social 
innovation recalls the rational choice institutional theorists’ equation of idea with 
interest. Yet, it is argued that an idea is much a broader concept than interest, in terms 
of discussing causes of an institutional change. 
Figure 3.1 Analytical framework 
 
Source: The author 
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The linkages among these concepts need to be explained; they together constitute the 
analytical framework of this thesis. The main focus of this research had initially been 
to develop an institutional model of transformation; yet other primary concepts – 
expectation and innovation – emerged as a result of further theoretical and empirical 
research to elaborate the model of institutional change as presented in Figure 3.1 above. 
Thus the formation of this analytical framework itself can be presented as an analytical 
process, as the emerging concepts became mutually constitutive. This framework is 
employed for all of the subsequent empirical chapters. 
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3.2: Changing social expectation 
We live in the so-called “non-ergodic world” where uncertainty makes precise 
prediction of future threats impossible and equilibrium theory untenable (Nell, 1998, 
North, 2005: 13). To be more exactly, older underlying assumptions of the world; 
equilibrium (statics), linear causality, the discontinuousness of change, and the normal 
distribution of world outcomes, seem either inadequate or insufficient to account for 
the dynamics and complexity of the real world (Blyth, 2011). In fact, this is the very 
reason why innovation (or entrepreneurship) was taken as a virtue even under the 
assumption of an ideal world of equilibrium in which society could enjoy stability and 
accumulative growth.14  
 
Clearly, the irony in the above models is that the world was never so stable in many 
dimensions (e.g. financial crises, environmental shocks and epidemics). Continuous 
behavioural and ideational changes were always, albeit of different nature and degree, 
required to acquire stability. Perhaps, the stable world that was once expected to exist 
and continue was never something naturally given but constructed by the human mind 
(North, 2005). Such construction of the world itself might not be wrong. Rather, it is 
not just given but hoped, planned, expected, obtained and lost in the discursive spheres 
of politics. 
3.2.1. Social expectation of environmental risk 
Expectation is a sort of idea, thought or psychological state relating to future 
phenomena, events, outcomes, and the behaviour of other actors. If the future were 
wholly predictable, individuals would not have expectations in the first place. This is 
so because the future would already be pre-determined so that people would be able to 
know exactly what would happen with absolute confidence (Nell, 1998, Dequech, 
1999). Even in this situation, however, it would be hard to precisely know what we or 
other people should do, if we or they would act in an acceptable manner, and who the 
winners and losers would be (Nell, 1998: 138).  
 
Uncertainty is inextricably related to expectation and creativity (Dequech, 1999). The 
inter-linkages amongst the three features are crucial for understanding social 
innovation that will be dealt with later. This neo-Keynesian idea is one of many 
                                                
14 Consider Adam Smith’s, Schumpeterian, and Keynesian ideas of market and technological innovation, 
which are similar despite their different accounts of the driving force (see Nell, 1998: 137). 
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accounts of expectation and creativity. Among others are rational choices theory-
informed (North, 2005), psychological-cognitive (Bandura, 1989, Lazarus, 1991), 
social movement (Hasegawa et al., 2007), and educational (Ferguson, 2003) 
illustrations of expectation. Despite their different focuses and levels of analysis, they 
have contributed to the development of knowledge about how active (agency-driven) 
and passive (structure-driven) expectations clash with each other, or they are combined 
to direct a future developmental trajectory of society. 
 
Whilst political economy mainly deals with social expectation of relations between 
actors (agency) and institutions (structure) with reference to the relationship between 
past social structures and present social needs, political ecology and cognate 
disciplines go further and consider social expectation of society-ecology relationships. 
Concepts, theories and ideas with regard to sustainable development or green growth 
presuppose the present age’s changing social expectations of the relationship between 
nature and society in an uncertain future. Similarly, CCM and CCA connote a change 
in social expectations regarding the socio-ecological relationships. In this thesis, 
various levels of ideas come to the fore in explaining how social institutions, in which 
collective expectations are inherent, alter in terms of addressing climate change 
uncertainty (Schmidt, 2010). 
 
Outcome expectation also plays several roles. Expectation from time to time hinders 
necessary changes. For instance, during the early colonial period of the British 
settlements in America, their “expectations about weather patterns in North America 
were based on the common-sense assumption that climate is constant in any latitude 
around the globe” (Kupperman, 1982: 1262). Nowadays we do not have such 
assumptions any longer. Yet the point is clearly explained that: 
 
“Under stress produced by high death rates, the failure of settlements, and 
pressure from investors disappointed by the colonies’ inability to produce 
the rich commodities associated in their minds with hot climates, colonists 
eventually had to acknowledge that, although it is as hot in summer as the 
English anticipated, the eastern mainland of North America is much colder 
in winter, spring, and fall….yet they clung with persistence to inherited 
notions about climate that their own experience contradicted…it was the 
story of a mental adjustment that was both slow and costly in money as 
well as lives” (ibid.). 
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It is important to stress that the strong expectation of climate patterns brought about 
the obstinate non-decision making for social change that eventually precluded a timely 
adaptive change and required action. This example is full of suggestions in terms of 
the importance of timing and necessity of changes in expectation for adapting to novel 
environmental risk.  
 
Indeed change in social expectation can bring about positive results too. It is social 
cognitive theory that offers a detailed account of how human agency performs to 
generate forethought so that the future outcomes are symbolized into a present 
decision-making process (Bandura, 1989). Instead of psychological aspects of 
expectation, however, the thesis looks into social expectation. For example, defining it 
as “an internalized social norm for individuals and organizations”, Hasegawa et al. 
(2007: 180) argues that, despite the then strong roles of the nation-state, social 
expectation “led a dramatic growth of associational activities” and played a critical 
role in the development of civil society in Japan during the 1990s. The reformation of 
the social expectation of a particular group of elite entrepreneurs and the public were 
the key. It is also worth noting that disaster-torn nations with low expectations of 
receiving international aid are compelled to invest in disaster prevention in order to 
evade political discontent post-disaster (Cohen and Weker, cited in Pelling and Dill, 
2009). This argument is controversial, but the point is that expectation in its many 
different guises has several enabling and restricting roles in CCA, just as institutions 
might do. 
 
Broadly speaking, CCA can partly be conditioned by the scope and nature of social 
expectation with which available decisions are made about the relationship between 
society and the climate. Of course, the role of social expectation for CCA is not 
necessarily decisive. Instead, it limits the range of available options that can be 
imagined, experimented and chosen by actors, organizations and societies for CCA.  
 
Perhaps, then, would it be both convenient and sufficient to conclude that the Rational 
Expectations School is entirely correct in their claim (Nell, 1998) that forming 
expectation rationally would solve the given problems of climate change risk? Indeed, 
the lack of valuable options by which to make “rational” decisions often seems to 
characterise many developmental or risk-based challenges facing developing countries. 
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3.2.2. Real versus right CCA: beyond rational expectation 
In line with the above debates, it is worth questioning why we adapt to environmental 
changes in the first place. This question is deceptively easy to answer (survival or 
continuing utility functions or prosperity, for example); or less often asked in relation 
to CCA (yet for some exceptations, see Muhovic-Dorsner, 2005, Paavola, 2002, 
Paavola and Adger, 2006, Thomas and Twyman, 2005). In discussing the why question, 
first, we should question what would happen when the question is overlooked.  
 
There are some cases showing the importance of questioning the normative question. 
Warner (2010) notes that some victims of water-related disasters in Vietnam are 
suspected to use human trafficking as means to cope with environmental stresses. As 
another instance, hundreds of thousands North Korean have crossed the border to 
China since the mid-1990 famines following floods and droughts, despite the 
expectable risk of being repatriated to North Korea (that could lead to years of 
imprisonment in labor camps, torture, and other violation of human rights) and human 
trafficked or raped (particularly for women) (Noland, 2009). The recent geopolitics of 
climate change adds weight to the likelihood that the invasion of oil and water-rich 
countries could be used as a means to cope with the intensification of energy and 
resources security issues (Giddens, 2009). There is no intention here of abusing the 
term adaptation (for the abuse of adaptation by oil-rich countries, see Schipper, 2009). 
Nor does this intend to ignore that there could be other acceptable options than the 
above extreme coping mechanisms. The clear point here is to highlight the likelihood 
that environmental stresses combined with other shocks and challenges might reinforce 
the already abject circumstances in which stressed groups are forced to choose 
seemingly irrational options.  
 
Can international organisations such as the UNFCCC change the above situations? The 
Convention does not have authority to intervene in the domestic affairs of developing 
countries. Probably the GCF will continue to support CCA projects and programmes in 
developing countries in the future. For example, there have been good cases of 
combating local vulnerabilities to climate-related risks under the Nairobi work 
programmes.15  The GCF will continue to do so whilst the majority of vulnerable 
                                                
15 See http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/best_practices_platform/ 
items/6491.php  
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groups uncovered by the UNFCCC aids might end up making decisions between sub-
optimal/low quality options. In many parts of the world, a huge number of children at 
the age of ten or so have to turn towards local markets or manufacturing factories 
instead of attending schools, because their younger siblings or sick parents would 
otherwise starve to death. This reality is both morally bad and not cost-effective in 
terms of building adaptive capacity. The development of the adolescent brain has non-
trivial implications for “executive function” and “social cognition” (Blakemore and 
Choudhury, 2006: 296) that are both extremely important for encouraging CCA of 
individuals (Grothmann and Patt, 2005). Moreover, it has been disclosed that there are 
currently more than 27 million people enslaved around the world, who are even 
cheaper and more easily disposable than those taken from Africa in the era of the 
transatlantic slave trade (Bales, 2004: 9).  Slavery is not legal anywhere in the world, 
yet is forcedly chosen by vulnerable groups who have no other decent options, and do 
not know beforehand about what their choice would cost. They often end up exploited 
in the sex industry, coalmines or the fishing industry. Probably many vulnerable 
groups will be forced to make such irrational decisions.  
 
From a different angle, it is worth noting how now developed countries have obtained 
their current capabilities and adaptive capacities by expedients previously considered 
rational but which are now regarded as absolutely irrational. Certainly, almost every 
developed country (except for some lucky resource-rich countries) has pursued 
Industrial, Trade and Technology (ITT) policies, particularly for the development of 
manufacturing industry (Chang, 2002b). It is estimated that manufacturing and 
construction industries of the globe account for as much as 21 percent of global GHGs 
emissions (Baumert et al., 2005). Meanwhile, these countries could then adopt rational 
institutions that are now taken for granted; such as antislavery, child labor regulations, 
universal suffrage, and social welfare institutions (insurance and pension) – not to 
mention GHG regulations – only after they had already become relatively rich (ibid.). 
The notion of historical responsibility has centered solely upon debates about CCM. 
Less attention has been placed upon the historical fact that the adaptive capacity of 
now developed countries, if not all, is not a direct result of taking only rational courses 
of action; but also of colonial exploitation, the slave trade, the use of child labor in 




At this point, it is curious to note that instead of being told that developing countries 
need to develop manufacturing industrial capabilities (as my discussion above 
suggests), we are more often informed to believe that: 
 
“Even in the most deprived conditions, poor people are not normally 
without resources – they have assets and capabilities that can help develop 
resilience. Adaptation policies should as far as possible focus on 
strengthening that resilience. For instance, traditional systems of adapting 
to climate variability include switching crops” (Giddens, 2009: 179, 
emphasis added). 
 
Switching crops or strengthening already existing means of livelihoods is important, 
but obviously insufficient. Indeed, stopping short of admitting the historical fact of the 
ways in which rich countries actually acquired the capacities they now have, is 
tantamount to allowing rich countries to kick away the ladder that they used when they 
were developing (Chang, 2002b). It is not claimed that every country should nurture 
manufacturing companies such as Apple, Samsung and BMW. In fact, many 
developing countries are already investing aggressively in manufacturing industries. 
What needs to be emphasised here is that numerical diversity and incremental changes 
are not enough for building adaptive capacity against environmental risks. It should go 
hand in hand with qualitative improvements and transformative changes without 
limiting the scope of social expectation of the future. It should be acknowledged that in 
the case of developing countries, the balance between incremental and transformative 
change is harder to strike than already adaptable societies. 
 
Given the above points, it is unavoidable that local policymakers and laypersons will 
have to bear much of the responsibility for addressing diverse issues beyond the reach 
of the UNFCCC. This drops a hint about how to deal with the aforementioned question 
of why we adapt to environmental changes and why we should be concerned about our 
social expectation. Suffice it to say that local CCA or DRR inescapably involves 
consideration of local institutional arrangements for effectiveness, efficiency and 
legitimacy (Adger et al., 2005) by which to find local answers to the locally and 
historically elicited question. 
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This thesis argues that the aforementioned extreme coping mechanisms in Vietnam 
and North Korea are also real adaptations happening to deal with environmental 
shocks and stresses. This certainly has strong implications for policymakers in relation 
to planning and implementing of CCA policies; of course we do not deny that they are 
morally unacceptable. This argument is neither useless nor misleading because real 
and rightful options for CCA and DRR apparently differ but complexly coexist in 
reality: e.g. there certainly exists real, yet normatively wrong CCA (Sayer, 2010). 
Likewise, adapting “to poverty and deprivation by suppressing their wants, hopes and 
aspirations” is seemingly real, if not always desirable (Clark, 2009: 3). This point is 
clarified later in more detail when discussing ideas. 
3.2.3. Channeling “critical consciousness” to collective innovation 
A psychological account of adaptation to environmental changes helps clarify the 
above points. The foremost psychologist, Lazarus (1991: 611), makes the important 
point that: 
 
“Although serving similar general functions (i.e., promoting survival), the 
three adaptational subsystems are, in principle, distinguishable in an 
evolutionary sense. It is a reasonable inference that emotions evolved from 
simpler and more rigid adaptational systems such as reflexes and 
physiological drives…Undoubtedly, the most important evolutionary 
change was the movement away from specific built-in responses elicited 
by specific environmental stimuli toward increasing variability and 
complexity that decoupled the behavioral response from the environmental 
input.” 
  
This line of argument should be familiar to scholars of different fields such as political 
ecologists, sociologists, and disaster researchers. In fact, such cognate terms as 
reflexive shift in consciousness (Seo and Creed, 2002), the back loop of the adaptive 
cycle (Biggs, 2010), social learning (Reed, 2010), third-loop learning (Argyris and 
Schön, cited in Pelling, 2011), punctuated innovation (Allen and Holling, 2010), and 
background discursive abilities (Schmidt, 2008) are all employed to shed a light on the 
above decoupling process and their driving forces at different levels and in different 
domains. The decoupling process also differentiates “reflexivity (knee-jerk reactions)” 
and “reflection (though-through responses)” in terms of how to tackle ecological crises 
(Beck, 1992, in Pelling, 2003b: 12).  
 
75  
The reason why the decoupling process is crucial for CCA is intimately linked with the 
assumption that informed creativity is an important element of expectation (Dequech, 
1999). Accordingly, this thesis delves into the ways in which the sources and energy of 
individual innovation are collectively channeled into risk governance. As critical 
consciousness is also an essential component of proactive and preventive CCA 
(Pelling, 2011), a social decoupling process is more pivotal than is normally reckoned. 
 
It is not surprising to see that developing countries are full of individual 
entrepreneurship and innovative ideas (Chang, 2010a). Arguably, people from poor 
countries have more entrepreneurship than their counterparts in rich countries (see 
Thing 15, ibid.). It is argued that for the former entrepreneurship is not an option but 
an essential characteristic for survival. While resilient buildings, insurance markets and 
well-developed infrastructures might protect the citizens of rich countries relatively 
well, those in poor countries must always think and act innovatively, if non-
canonically, to fill their own adaptation needs and priorities. What greatly matters to 
society in dire need of CCA as a societal change, as Ha-joon Chang (ibid.) strongly 
argues, might be a conduit through which the energy of individual entrepreneurship 
can be channeled into collective entrepreneurship. This extremely important point 
leads to more questions about the role of social capital for CCA as politics of disaster. 
3.3: Social capital: from fragmented to cooperative adaptation 
As noted in the last section (also see Figure 2.1), critical thinking in the absence of 
social capital cannot be geared towards reshaping the developmental direction of the 
society. It is important to question how it might be channelled into a broader social and 
material change. The recent global cooperation among differing epistemic 
communities (e.g. the UNFCCC and the ISDR) pinpoints the critical role of social 
capital for encouraging cooperative CCA. This type of cooperation should also travel 
down to local scales. Of course, it is not argued in this thesis that the global movement 
is without problem. Instead, such a complex issue as climate change risk requires 
considering various changes of different scales. 
 
Adaptation has existed for a long time, since human history began (Yamin et al., 2005). 
Adaptation refers to different things to different people, yet generally means 
adjustments in social, political, economic and environmental systems to respond to 
changes and perturbations. This section sees one of critical, yet less considered ways 
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of understanding and categorising CCA: social capital. A more detailed account of 
social capital follows. 
3.3.1. Categorisation of adaptation 
There are several suggested criteria by which to categorise CCA and their 
characteristics and components (see Table 3.1). An valuable attempt (to which the 
current research pays greater attention) to categorise adaptation lies in between the 
reinforcement of extant organizational and system stability and institutional 
modification to facilitate resilience through flexibility (Pelling and High, 2005). Thus, 
adaptation is very much subject to mediating between the stability of system and 
organisations and functional flexibility within formal and informal institutions in order 
that both existing/short-term and uncertain/long-term risks of climate change are 
simultaneously dealt with (Duit and Galaz, 2008). 
 
Table 3.1. Bases for differentiating adaptation activities 
Attributes Examples of terms 
System type Natural-human, public-private 
Purposefulness Autonomous-planned, passive-active 
Timing Anticipatory-responsive, proactive-reactive 
Temporal scope Short term-long term, tactical-strategic 
Spatial scope Localised-widespread 
Function/effects Retreat-accommodate-project, prevent-tolerate-spread-change-
restore 
Form Structural-legal-institutional, regulatory-financial-technological 
Performance Cost-effectiveness-efficiency, implementability-equity 
Source: Adopted from Smit and Pilifosova (2003: 19) 
 
That said however, it is the local and community level at which individual and social 
adaptation are actually materialised and manifested; adaptive capacity is also location, 
group and time-specific (Smit and Pilifosova, 2003). Of course, this does not mean 
that the nature of local adaptation and adaptive capacity is irrelevant to the national 
and international level of governance and development pathway. Yet, it is crucial to 
consider that “adaptation, as a social process, is embedded in the formal and informal 
social context that local actors occupy” (High et al., 2005: 1). Thus, scrutiny of the 
developmental path and changes in institutional structures at the national level, 
although important, offers only partial accounts of adaptive capacity unless it is 
reflected in the local settings of social institutions (Yamin et al., 2005: 3). In this 
77  
regard, the “communities of place” approach contributes to this area by looking into 
how structural changes of power and property rights impact on the way local 
institutional assets oscillate to deal with environmental disaster risk (Pelling and High, 
2005, Adger, 2000a, Pelling, 2003c). 
 
Social learning is closely related to maintaining functional flexibility of institutions for 
coping with novel challenges stemming from climate change; this is the area to which 
communities of practice can make much contribution (Pelling and High, 2005). Social 
capital encompasses trust, claims for reciprocity, social and public norms, networks, 
sharing of knowledge and information, and sharing of financial risk (Adger et al., 2003, 
Adger, 2003). Surely, the presence of social capital does not necessarily bring about 
better CCA (e.g. rent-seeking collective action, tacit corruption within informal 
networks, and collective exclusion of the marginalised from the decision-making 
process). This point cements the idea of a mechanism where tactics and strategies of 
adaptation operate are made up of more than visible formal structures of institutions 
such as ministries and the national emergency management agency (Pelling and High, 
2005).  
 
It is clear at this stage that CCA is a complex social process that occurs within social 
relations. In order to further clarify this point, the following section regards the recent 
global endeavor to cooperatively address the issue of climate change risk as evidence 
of the importance of social capital, as depicted in Figure 3.2. 
3.3.2. The integrated perspective to climate change risk: from global to local? 
Holling et al. (2002, cited in Matthews and Sydneysmith, 2010: 223) argues that 
modern knowledge of environment “must be capable of organising our understanding 
of economic, ecological, and institutional systems. And it must explain situations 
where all three types of systems interact.” This perspective has been found within the 
area of the risk of climate change and environmental hazards too. The serious attempt 
to tackle challenges of climate change and disaster risk had its earliest beginning 
shortly after the 1989 removal of the Iron Curtain: e.g. the establishment of the 
UNFCCC, the IPCC, and the IDNDR (the forerunner of the UN/ISDR) in the early 
1990s. That period of time also saw the rise of new discourses of governance and 
sustainable development that have “shared characteristics and overlapping potential” 
(e.g. emphasis on the need of public participation) (Kemp et al., 2005: 13). 
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First, the UNFCCC has been an official forum for debates upon the issue of climate 
change; the national parties in varied groupings and observers from IGOs and NGOs 
partake in it.16 This climate change regime makes political decisions, relying upon the 
assessment of physical-material impacts of the changing climate from a series of IPCC 
assessment reports. The latter emphasises the need of purposeful policy intervention to 
reduce the impacts through mitigation and adaptation projects: e.g. Carbon markets, 
Joint Implementation (JI), carbon taxation and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
projects under the Kyoto protocol. Vulnerability here is seen as the residual impacts 
after the expected impacts from the climate change are reduced in advance by 
mitigation and adaptation projects. Accordingly, the concept of vulnerability is 
primarily future-oriented (Romieu et al., 2010). 
 
Meanwhile, the UNISDR sees social vulnerability as differentiating the way in which 
climate change and natural disaster risk jeopardise, and are confronted by individuals 
and society with differential adaptive capacity. The initial focus of this hazard disaster 
community (still dominated by natural science studies) had been upon physical 
impacts of natural hazards (Mustafa, 2009). Yet burgeoning literature on social 
vulnerability (based on constructionism17 or critical realism) has extended the focus to 
embrace understanding of the deep-rooted, structural causes of vulnerability (Mustafa, 
1998, O'Brien and Nygaard, 2004, Pelling, 1997). Grasping the root causes of 
vulnerability helps comprehend to what extent policy intentions can expect to provide 
risk society with resilience and security when the causes are historical and socially-
embedded (Pelling, 2003c: 168). 
 
The integration of two communities in the course of promoting CCA has been upheld 
by the academic literature (Romieu et al., 2010, Pelling, 2003a, Schipper and Pelling, 
2006). Notwithstanding, there are barriers to the integration between two communities 
(O'Brien et al., 2006). On one hand, institutional conflict is argued to stem from the 
discrepancy of used terms, assessment methods, objectives and political relevance. 
This also proved to be the case in politics of climate change in Korea (see chapter five). 
                                                
16 See http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/2714.php 
17 According to Blaikie (2007: 22), “constructionism has two branches: constructivism and social 
constructionism. The former, also known as radical constructivism, refers to the meaning-giving activity 
of the individual mind, to cognitive processes, while the latter refers to intersubjectively shared 
knowledge, meaning giving that is social rather than individual.” The thesis adopts the latter since its 
analytical focus is upon the social vulnerability and adaptive strategies in the coastal community. 
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On the other hand, there exist different spatiotemporal scales of the impacts of, and 
required reactions for addressing, risk each community deals with (e.g. natural disaster 
risk – abrupt/local and climate change risk – long run/global) (Schipper and Pelling, 
2006). 
 
That said, Romieu et al. (2010) takes a step further to hold up the necessity and benefit 
from the integration by looking at the concept of coastal vulnerability. There are also 
fruits of the integration and partnerships at the global and regional levels, for instance, 
the Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation (SREX) of 2012.  
 
Worth questioning at this point is how far such global trends of integration have 
stimulated the integration at the national level and below in a way that fosters 
cooperative CCA. Birkmann et al (2009, cited in Romieu et al., 2010: 167) also notes 
the necessity of “the implementation of cross-sector, multi-scale and integrative 
approaches to merge both perspectives and to mainstream both into sustainable 
development in rural as well as urban areas.” Pointing out the significance of 
“community-led adaptation”, Yamin et al. (2005) calls for the integration of different 
institutional frameworks as in climate change, sustainable development and disaster 
risk reduction (Parry, 2009). These claims attest to increasing interests in the need for 
integrating different experiences, knowledge frames and institutions that a global 
challenge such as climate change has brought about. 
 
At this point, it is worth taking into account components of implementing integrated 
governance for sustainability (Kemp et al., 2005). The suggested elements are: 
80  
A. Policy integration: the key is to striking a balance between the specialisation of and 
integration between different communities and policies at both horizontal (e.g. across 
policy sectors such as between ministries) and vertical” scales (e.g. within the 
governmental sector) (Kemp et al., 2005: 19). 
B. Shared long-term objectives, criteria for deciding a priority of tasks, rules for trade-
off and indicators for sustainability: sustainability is referred to as “a socially 
instituted process of adaptive change in which innovation is a necessary element.” 
(ibid: 20). 
C. Information and incentives: Information is important for participatory governance 
that supports normal people including the marginalized to partake in the decision-
making process (ibid: 22). 
D. Innovation of system: technological innovation is important, but insufficient. It 
should be essentially accompanied by “co-evolving societal processes characterised by 
continuous changes in formal and informal institutions” (ibid: 22, also see Hargrave 
and Van de Ven, 2006). 
 
Although not exhaustive (e.g. no account of institutional changes), these components 
cement some important points.  
 
First, the concept of governance is critical for going about CCA at all levels of 
government and geography. Governance is argued to refer to a political process of “the 
formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as 
well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions” (Hyden and Court, 
2002: 13). For example, structural inequality of social and political participation in the 
governance process needs to be considered for addressing vulnerability (Adger, 2006). 
In turn, a failure of recognising the vast diversity of plural knowledge of vulnerability 
might obstruct better performance of governance (ibid.). To include the vulnerable into 
the process of decision-making of adaptive governance is necessary, if not simple.  
 
Second, the concept of sustainability and governance are closely related in that both 
share common objectives such as social innovations and public participation (Kemp et 
al., 2005). However, the question of who should participate in what kind of social 
innovations largely depends on the developmental pathway society has undergone. 
Hence, reflecting on the nature of institutional changes in light of a developmental path 
is critical. Pelling (2003c) conducts case studies from cities of three countries 
(Bridgetown, Georgetown in Guyana, and Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic). 
The three cities with different trajectories of development and structures of power 
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undertook different institutional modifications for coping with disaster risk – although 
similar institutional impediments are equally found in three cities; e.g. a lack of “civil 
society-directed or communal efforts to reduce vulnerability” (ibid: 174). The nature of 
societal change for CCA partly, yet significantly depends upon who can participate in 
the course of societal change. 
 
Third, it is not only formal and informal institutions but also the complex relationship 
between the two and other factors that have a strong bearing on meaningful innovation 
necessary for CCA. Yet, a matter of the shadow system where informal institutions 
(e.g. a strong sense of community, trust, and networks) operate has been relatively 
lightly treated by literature (High et al., 2005). Quite opposite, such shadow systems 
can largely impact on both hold-up and promotion of social capital. Trust and 
reciprocity in informal networks and social norms are as important in building up long-
term adaptive strategies as formal institutions and organisations (ibid.). 
 
This section has so far pointed out the increasing need for cooperative integration 
between differing epistemic communities in the context of societal change for CCA. 
Then, it is necessary to closely examine the complex nature of social capital, thereby 
getting firmer grasp of how collectivity in varied forms play a conduit for new 
expectation/ideas to evolve towards CCA as collective innovation.  
3.3.3. Social capital 
As briefly discussed above, the recent adaptation literature has highlighted the roles 
social capital plays in the formation and processes of CCA (Adger, 2003, Pelling and 
High, 2005, Pelling et al., 2008, Wolf et al., 2010). Looking into the changing context 
of social capital in light of compressed modernity of Korea can be briefly discussed to 
clarify the role of social capital for CCA. This can possibly contribute much to a body 
of the adaptation literature too. 
 
Academic articles on social capital have soared in number since the middle of 1990s 
(Halpern, 2005: 9). Two main reasons for this are noted; as a reflexive response to the 
“simplified economic worldview” in the early 1990s, which seriously lacked inquiry 
into the societal variable; increasing academic interests in “a relationship between the 
form and quality of people’s social networks and a range of important outcomes such 
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as economic growth, health, crime, educational performance, and even the efficacy of 
governments” (ibid: 1-2). 
 
Simply put, social capital is “everyday networks, including many of the social customs 
and bonds that define them and keep them together” (ibid: 2). People have friends, 
colleagues and families and belong to certain organizations, communities and 
ethnicities. They cooperate and quarrel with each other with the same and differing 
identities and objectives. 
3.3.3.1. The multidimensional aspect of social capital 
Social capital is a multi-dimensional concept. As in Figure 3.2, Halpern (2005: 26-28) 
conceptualizes social capital according to three criteria: components such as social 
networks, norms, sanctions; levels or domain of analysis – individual, group, 
community, nation etc.; and character or function – bonding, bridging, linking. 
 
Recognition of the multi-dimensions of social capital depends on the idea “whether 
social capital is more than the sum of its components” (ibid: 27). The concept of social 
capital is argued to bundle “too much together, and that we should forget the term and 
simply concentrate on its components” (ibid.). Yet there are certainly intimate causal 
relationships between different elements of social capital; e.g. between the micro level 
linking network (access to the powerful) and macro level bridging norms. Surely, there 
are not such accurate boundaries demarcating the dimensions as in the Figure 3.2. 
Nevertheless, the figure shows that each component cannot remain separate to account 
for the entire aspects of social capital. 
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Figure 3.2 A conceptual map of social capital (with examples) 
 
Sources: Adopted from Halpern (2005: 27). 
 
Needless to say, it is not easy to investigate all linkages amongst components at the 
different ecological and functional levels, and will be more so when considered 
together with other variables such as the natural environment and culture. Of great 
importance is to challenge deterministic claims about the linear causation between 
social capital and certain outcomes. Some researchers focus simply on the quantitative 
change in the stocks of social capital. They seem to believe that more social capital 
always lead to better outcomes. To quantify personal opinion or capture the number of 
NGOs might be helpful to demonstrate the broad patterns of social capital at the 
national level. In many instances, however, some types of social capital such as trust 
have “a strong normative content, something that a positivist epistemology is not well 
suited to unpacking” them (Grix, 2004: 71). As explained on Table 3.2 below, 
discrepancies in methodologies towards social capital result from the underlying 
difference of meta-theoretical perspectives taken by researchers. 
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Table 3.2. Different approaches to social capital research  
Sources: Adopted from Grix (2004: 73), with some modification of terms relying on Blaikie 
(2007). 
 
Relying on this understanding of social capital, the changing characteristic of social 
capital in Korean society can be considered in light of compressed modernization. For 
instance, strong social capital is argued to have linked the state and civil society as the 
critical source of rapid economic growth in Korea (Evans, 1996, Woolcock, 1998). In 
particular, Evans (1996: 1122) notes that: 
 
“It is social capital built in interstices between state and society that keeps 
growth on track. This profusion of concrete ties between officials in 
organizations such as Taiwan’s Industrial Development Bureau, Japan’s 
MITI, or Korea’s Ministry of Communications and those who manage 
private industrial corporations generates in turn a “joint project” of 
industrial transformation… the social capital that is most critical to the 
outcome is formed once again in networks that are neither public nor 
private but fill the gap between the two spheres.” 
 
This passage can be construed as meaning that the industrial transformation of the 
three developmental states was largely thanks to the strong social capital. Relying on 
the World Values Surveys data, Knack and Keefer (1997) also reaches a similar 
conclusion that the high level of trust and civil cooperation has a positive relationship 
with the high rate of economic growth of Korea. 
 
On the other hand, Korean society is recently seen to have undergone obfuscation of 
upholding social capital. Thus Woo (2007: 8) notes: 
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“The low level of South Korea’s social capital results largely from the gap 
between the fast-paced economic growth and the relatively slow-paced 
improvement in norms and regulations during the era of highly compressed 
modernization that was pushed through by an authoritarian leadership.” 
 
The case of the compressed modernization of Korea is critically examined by other 
critical scholars with different focuses (Chang, 1999, Chang et al., 1998, Kim, 1998). 
By and large, these studies see compressed modernization as a source of shrinking 
social capital in Korean society, not to mention its harmful ramifications such as 
environmental degradation and increasing technical hazards. One instance stands out 
to uphold this view as follows. 
 
Despite its highly advanced technology of mobile broadband and Digital Multimedia 
Broadcasting (DMB)18, Korean society is argued to have lacked social norms, 
communicative rationality and code of conducts in cyber communities. These are 
argued to negate the potential advantage of technological advance; this might facilitate 
social capital by vitalizing information exchanges and enlarging social networks (Woo 
et al, 2007: 18). The low political participation in e-government at 10 % is another 
issue; considering that other countries with similar IT infrastructures can achieve 30-
80% participation in e-government (ITU, 2010). As of 2005 in Korea, the government 
and private companies have crafted DMB technology onto an early warning system of 
natural disaster risk. This project is at too an early stage to clearly draw implications. 
For one thing, is it unlikely that non-possession of or low abilities (e.g. the elderly) to 
utilize ICT equipments leads to another form of marginalization from access to 
essential information about disaster risks? 
 
The unbalanced phases of economic and socio-political modernity denote that the path 
of Korea’s development has constructed the social milieu where rapidly emerging 
material and technological realities are not properly dealt with by the hitherto social 
norms and rules. One might argue that this is not a typical nature of Korea’s 
developmental path since every society to some extent shares the characteristics of 
unbalanced modernization, for instance suffering emerging environmental risk 
                                                
18 The percentage of rural and urban households’ access to internet in Korea is the highest in the world 
at over 90 per cent in 2007 to 2008; that to broadband internet is also the highest at around 75% (ITU, 
2010). In addition, Korea became the first country to offer Digital Mobile TV service in 2005, with 17 
million users in 2007, that is, about half of the whole population (ibid.). 
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problems without appropriate governance (Beck, 1998) or the rapid demographic 
change without a proper welfare system (e.g. the elderly).  
3.3.3.2. A dynamic analysis of social capital 
Reflecting on the above debate, the rapid modernization that was once facilitated by 
strong social capital can be seen to have in turn diminished its own driving force (see 
Chang, 1999: 31). Very curious at this point is what determines the changing nature of 
social capital in the context of the Korean developmental path. 
 
In a similar vein, some researchers point to a linear causation between social capital 
and certain variables such as democracy (e.g. Grix, 2004) and political trust (for 
conterargument in the context of Korea, see Kim, 2005). Yet such a perspective ends 
up overlooking a vast complex array of social realms and mechanisms where 
differentially constructed winners and losers come out (regionalism, gender, elite 
education and economic integration); a variety of values are contested and traded off; 
formal and informal institutions are reinforced or modified; and the multiple roles of 
perverse social capital in Korea. 
 
The ways in which a range of social capital are formed and operated to entail certain 
outcomes, and vice versa are very much context-dependent (ibid.). This is also related 
to the important question that: how can we measure the degree and change of social 
capital – qualitative or quantitative? More importantly, whose social capital for what 
shared social objectives are we talking about? In each empirical chapter, different 
forms and levels of social capital will be discussed. These need to be taken into 
consideration when talking about any issue of social responses to the risk of climate 
change and environmental hazards. No research has considered the implications of the 
changing nature of social capital for reconfiguring the adaptation deficit in Korea. 
Addressing the issue of social capital this way has profound implications not only for 
the post-developmental state regimes such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, but 
also newly industrializing economies (NIEs) in terms of CCA. 
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3.4: Institutions and institutional change 
Hyden and Court (2002: 13) sees governance as “the formation and stewardship of the 
formal and informal rules that regulate the public realm, the arena in which state as 
well as economic and societal actors interact to make decisions”. Then why and in 
what way do the actors make decisions? Decisions presuppose a goal so as to provide 
the economy and society” with a certain direction or rationale for future changes 
(peters, 2004: 24). In reality, however, it is tough to embrace all the expressed needs, 
purposes, and interests of individuals and groups into the decision-making processes, 
because of the lack of “resources” (ibid.). Therefore, it is necessary for society to 
constantly seek to develop a systematic “mechanism” in order to decide upon the 
priority of some values over others (ibid.). 
 
According to Bridge and Perreault (2009: 476), the intellectual origin of the term 
governance can be traced back to new institutional economics (Coase, 1988: 72, North, 
1990, Rutherford, 2001: 187, Williamson, 2000-6), economic sociology, particularly 
organization theory (Granovetter, 1985, Hall and Taylor, 1996-17) and regime theory 
(Rosenau, 1995). The three new approaches – also coined as rational choice, 
sociological and historical institutionalism – challenge the traditional theories such as 
neo-classical economics, Marxist analyses of the bourgeois state and realist accounts 
of international relations (ibid.). As will be clearer later, institutional 
stability/continuity is no longer a more preferred subject of research over institutional 
change/flexibility. In this section, deeper discernment of institution and institutional 
change will be done. This is to have a closer look at the process of how already 
collectively accepted ideas get challenged and either abandoned or modified to bring 
about a new institutionalization process.  
3.4.1. Institutions 
Institutions are critical to understanding and coping with environmental changes 
(O’Riordan and Jordan, 1999: 81). Careful examination of institutions becomes 
incrementally significant given the extent to which society is experiencing uncertain 
and complex changes such as threshold events, surprises or cascading effects resulting 
from major disasters such as the Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004 (Birkmann and 
Fernando, 2008, Duit and Galaz, 2008). When the impacts of disasters exceed the limit 
of social capacity to absorb or cope with them, formal and informal changes in society 
might ensue (Pelling, 2011). Nevertheless, an institutional approach has not been 
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employed as much in analysis of the issues of climate change risk as in other issues 
such as “industrial organization, public policy and economic history” (O'Riordan, 1999: 
92, Paavola and Adger, 2005: 354). The concept of environmental governance has 
gained intellectual attention as late as the mid-1990s (Bridge and Perreault, 2009).  
 
Perhaps, it is invaluable to appreciate how such wide arrange of new institutionalism 
can be infiltrated into addressing the issue of environmental risk. Yet this 
consideration is merely beyond the scope of this research (instead, see Hotimsky et al., 
2006). We will limit ourselves to explicating the nature of institution and its change. 
 
Institutions are deliberately created or spontaneously sprouting forms of rules and 
constraints. In addition to constraining and enabling roles (North, 1990), “constitutive” 
roles of institutions that “confine and mold individual aspiration” are important to fully 
identify the role of institutions (Hodgson, 2006: 7). Thus, institutions guide the 
direction towards which individuals obtain, develop and fulfill their own values 
(Chang, 2002a, Seo and Creed, 2002: 551-2, Hodgson, 2006: 92). This argument 
directly disputes the presumption of rational choice theorists that rationality is a pre-
given property of human beings. This thesis understands institutions as providing 
individuals or organisations with an opportunity of recalling, creating, negotiating and 
lapsing heterogeneous values into shared ones in an array of social relations that in 
turn mould the behaviour and belief of individuals and organisations. Therefore, 
institutions play a critical role of linking between agency and structure to (re)produce 
social realities. 
 
The question as to whether to see organisations as actors or institutions relies on the 
level and scale of analysis, but needs a nuanced account. Organisations are not entirely 
the same as institutions or individual actors. It is argued that organisations are players 
at macro levels of analysis (state under the international politics), yet “a special type of 
institution” at micro-organisational level where internal players and systems of rules 
do coexist (Hodgson, 2006: 86, 98). As argued by scholars such as Barry Hindess and 
James Coleman (ibid: 9), understanding organisations as social actors is not 
problematic on general principles. However, at stake is the fact that the presence of 
conflict within the organisations does not do justice to regarding organisations entirely 
the same as single actors (ibid.). Nor is it wholly plausible to argue that organisations 
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are the same as institutions as rule or constraint. This is so because the former hold 
agency emanating from constitutive actors while the latter do not. Following Hargrave 
and Van de Ven (2006: 866) and the above debates, this thesis makes a distinction 
between “institutional actors [or entities]” and “institutional arrangements, with the 
term institution referring to the latter.” It is stated, “it is only by virtue of an 
institutional arrangement that an organisation can act as though it is a person with 
specifically designed rights and duties” (ibid.). 
 
North’s accounts of institution have been widely upheld but can be further classified. 
Based on Jütting (2003: 11-4), different domains, formality and different hierarchical 
levels will be considered for clarifying the multi-layered facet of institutions at more 
length. 
3.4.1.1. Domains of institutions 
Institutions are classified into diverse domains of economics, politics, society and 
environment (ibid.). Yet, it does not mean there are clear cuts exclusively classifying 
them into each arena. Institutions, if not all, belong to more than one area. For instance, 
the market has been seen simply as an economic institution or just “the aggregation of 
mere individual exchanges” by cohorts of the market (Hodgson, 2005: 89-90). Yet the 
market is not only an economic but also political, societal or environmental institution. 
Even in perfectly competitive (free) market that has been adhered by neo-liberalists, 
social justice, social convention and other political principles for markets to properly 
work should inevitably exist (Chang, 2002a: 551-3, Hodgson, 2006: 89). There is no 
reason why the market should be seen only as the economic institution. Rather, the 
market is a complex area in which a variety of social, political and environmental 
aspects should also be dealt with by a holistic approach (Ostrom, 2005: 26). This is by 
and large the case for other institutions, but the key point is that institutional analysis 
generally requires that institutions not be narrowly defined and analysed. Being crucial, 
this point allows moving away from the single-minded and reductionist approach that 
market mechanism or techno-centralism will offer sufficient leverage for solving 
environmental risks.  
3.4.1.2. Formality of institutions 
The concept of different formality helps researchers preclude from ignoring the 
significance of informal constraints (North, 1990: 36-7). In general, formal rules (e.g. 
legislation, constitution) can immediately change as urgent needs arise; yet, informal 
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constraints tend to be less variable as they are profoundly embodied in cultural norms 
(ibid: 6). Of course, this does not mean that informal constraints cannot radically alter: 
e.g. under complex changes such as abrupt events, surprises (Duit and Galaz, 2008). 
Formal rules can also endure over the long period of time. Whilst formal rules are 
codified, informal constraints are not explicitly written or stated (ibid: 46). Perhaps, 
that informal rules are less explicitly stipulated does not mean its expression is weaker 
than formal institutions. Both self/internal (friendship/neighbourhood) and third-
party/external (government/law court) type of enforcement makes institutions 
operative in inducing cooperative behaviour of individuals devoid of information, 
cognitive ability and mutual trust of each other (ibid: 57-8). Therefore, to understand 
and produce a model of institutions necessarily involves taking account of “the 
structural characteristic of informal constraints, formal rules, and enforcement and the 
way in which they evolve” and interact (ibid: 35). 
 
Whereas formal rules have been considered crucial in ordering human life, the 
widespread of informal constraints such as codes of conduct, norms of behaviour, 
conventions and customs has been neglected in the past research (ibid.). It may be not 
wrong to say that as societies transform, ever more perplexing disputes and tension 
between and/or within individuals and organizations require more complex “formal 
structures to specify principle/agent relationships” (ibid). Nevertheless, it does not 
imply that informal constraints are negligible (see, e.g. Birkmann et al, 2008; Pelling, 
et al, 2008). Even the same formal institution in different societies can induce different 
outcomes depending on differing informal constraints (for different cultural capacities 
as a factor in inducing different institution-building, see Fukuyama, 2001: 12). Crucial 
from this point is that informal constraints are as significant causes of human 
behavioural outcomes as formal rules so that they should be examined together for 
institutional analysis. It should also be noted that the assessment of informal constrains 
is not necessarily the same as that of formal rules because unlike the latter the former 
is not recorded in documents, and hence less explicit to be analysed (Birkmann et al, 
2008).  
 
What tools/data can researchers employ to explicate formal and informal constraints? 
At a generic level, it can be said that data about former institutions are relatively easy 
to collect. Researchers can infer by observing, interpreting and understanding 
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collective expressions, standardised meanings or habits, patterned reactions to certain 
external shocks to draw functional roles and normative values enshrined within the 
informal institutions. 
3.4.1.3. Hierarchical level of institutions 
The level of hierarchy enables to classify institution into several hierarchical forms, 
offering an insight into the temporal and spatial differentiation of institution; 1) the 
time needed to emerge and change; and 2) the hierarchical locus where the institutions 
mainly operate. Whilst the institutions at differing hierarchical levels have their own 
effects on society, organisations and individuals, they also influence each other 
through diverse routes (Williamson, 2000: 596-600). However, this classification 
should not be understood to argue that institutions always behave strictly according to 
such fixed criterion (ibid.). As pointed out earlier, for instance, some informal 
constraints can immediately change in the wake of catastrophic events. The tsunami of 
2004 in Southeast Asia brought about an immediate change in informal constrains; 
psychological status and risk perception of the affected people led to institutional 
change for fostering disaster preparedness (Birkmann and Fernando, 2008). 
 
Instead, this hierarchical classification pertinently shows why some countries that 
implement a similar combination of institutions might not entail the same empirical 
outcome. Can the same issue of risk or crisis be dealt with by institutional 
configurations with completely different forms? Or can the homogenous institution in 
differing settings take entirely different roles and objectives? Put it differently, is it 
always beneficial for poor countries to borrow the dominant institutional prescription 
from the rich countries in terms of addressing environmental risks? Answering these 
questions might require numerous studies in probing into the complex interplays 
amongst institutions of different scales. Establishing a general institutional model to 
validate this vein of argument is beyond the scope of this research. Important to bear in 
mind is that when we discuss institution we should get aware of, not only its 
relationship with agency (of human and non-human actors) and other institutions at 
differing levels, but also the whole metabolism in which a change in one institution 
possibly influences the institutional setting as a whole. 
3.4.2. Agent and agency 
Having examined the basic attributes of institution, it is necessary to note that 
institutions do not perform without (human) agency. In general terms, human agency 
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refers to “the capabilities of human beings” to bring about actions or changes, “making 
a difference” (Johnston, 2000: 349). However, the concept of human agency has for 
long been a matter of some dispute at least since the Enlightenment: the debate over 
the true nature of human actions, rational selfish versus norm-laden orientation 
towards actions (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998: 1998). Johnston’s three questions about 
agency deserve attention (ibid.). Should agents be limited to human agents? Is 
intention/purposefulness enough a variable for explaining actions or behaviours to 
occur? Perhaps most importantly, what is the way in which agency relates to its 
structure? The last question will be answered later in the section of institutional 
changes. 
 
First, it has been taken for granted that companies or states are not agents because they 
apparently lack “the will and consciousness” (Giddens, cited in Johnston, 2000: 350). 
Therefore, agents are thought to be limited to human agents on the ground that such 
collective grouping of individuals needs to be interpreted by human agents after all. In 
fact, however, restricting agency to human agency cannot do justice to the complex 
embodiment of agency. For example, Actor-Network Theory (ANT) offers the 
conception of “actants” (Latour, 1996). Agents as the collective rather than individuals 
within networks construct the capabilities to bring about social actions (ibid.). Besides, 
non-human entities (e.g. machines and other human artefacts) also exert a non-trivial 
influence on constituting the ability. Accordingly, “agency is reconfigured as a 
relational effect generated by a network of heterogeneous, interacting components 
whose activity is constituted in the networks of which they form a part” (Whatmore, 
cited in (Whatmore, cited in Johnston, 2000: 350). In this sense, agency can refer to 
more than simply human agency. This perspective is valuable due to not only its 
inquiry into the authenticity of anthropocentric conception of agency but also its 
inclusiveness of material reality in accounting for constituting agency. 
 
Second, while rational choice theory North (2005: 1-3) narrowly identifies an action in 
terms of “intentionality” or “goal seeking”, institutionalists in the organization theory 
of sociology (Giddens cited in Johnston, et al, 2000: 350) attribute the cause of actions 
to “habitus” or “routinized practices” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998). Meanwhile, 
according to some historical institutionalists, actions might happen without any precast 
intentions or purposes (Hay and Wincott: 1998); thus contingent characteristics of 
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institutional change. Interestingly, Emirbayer and Mische (1998) point out that the 
above approaches too narrowly delineate the orientations towards actions because all 
of them fail to consider agency as “an analytical category in its own right” (ibid: 963). 
They argue that the orientation towards actions is subject to “the changing temporal 
frameworks” (ibid: 967). An actor is defined to iterate reconstruction of past ideas and 
actions in order to project possible future actions (new expectation), thereby making a 
decision among available options to deal with emerging challenges in the present (ibid, 
969). In addition, human agents do not merely “repeat past routines” but explore and 
create new strategies thanks to their innovative capacity to envisage “new possibilities” 
(ibid, 983-4). These points will be in greater detail discussed below. Yet, the analytical 
strength of this pragmatist conception of agency lies in avoiding the dichotomy 
between intentionality and culture for explaining the orientation towards actions. 
 
To grasp what agency is requires the consideration of the multi-layered structure and 
constitutive elements of agency, for example as in ANT theory. The origin in agency 
should also be accounted for with consideration of the temporal orientation towards it 
(iteration of reconstruction of the past thoughts and actions, imagination of the future 
possibilities and making a decision out of possible options and actions in the present) 
and its conceptual as well as practical usage (dealing with not only familiar/repetitive 
but also novel problems). By elaborating the concept of agency in light of the 
relationship between institutions, agents and non-human entities including the 
environment, the following section will try to remould the model of institutional 
change. 
3.4.3. Institutional changes 
One question immediately one can have at this stage is: do institutions ever change and 
how? What does it mean by institutions change? The interconnectedness between 
differing institutions and the intimate relationship between individuals and institutions 
are essential to adequately account for institutional changes. Drawing the above 
accounts of institution and agency, an institutional change refers to changes in form, 
function, role and normative objective of as well as relations between a wide range of 
agency, institutions and enforcement mechanism. 
 
All the schools of new institutionalism are, however, appear to have not provided clear 
thoughts of an institutional change since they are “too discipline bound” (O’Riordan 
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and Jordan, 1999: 84) or have paid more attention into institutional stability than 
change in the past (Seo and Creed, 2002: 222). Such relatively less paid attention to 
the given subject might be also ascribed to the difficulty of solving a theoretical 
dilemma: in what way can agents change institutions if their preferences, motivation 
and purposes are constructed by the institutions they intend to change? (Holm, cited in 
Seo and Creed, 2002: 223). There is however increasing interest in, and appealing 
attempts to understand, institutional changes across differing disciplines and schools. 
This is argued in this thesis to have an intimate relationship with the changing 
worldview (see Section 3.2). 
 
First, discipline-bound interpretations of institutional change are not odd at all given 
that the presence of heterogeneous features and domains of institutions leads to 
holding differing starting points, and dissimilar interests in the levels, of institutional 
analyses. Yet, this does not imply that there are not certain points at which institutional 
theorists synthesize different perspectives and ideas. Moreover, sharing ideas does not 
essentially produce useless disputes devastating each other’s perspectives towards the 
given subject. It needs to be clearly mentioned that to encourage learning from others, 
whilst remaining committed to one’s interests, objectives and differing philosophical 
perspectives, is conducive to producing the holistic approach to comprehending the 
complex nature of institutions. 
 
There is a good case for the notion that embracing differing ideas goes beyond mere 
conflation of opposing ideas. North’s fundamental idea about institution and its 
changes stemmed from his initial attempt to modify the neo-classical economics-
informed theory. He previously explained that institutional changes occur in response 
to changes in an incentive mechanism triggered off by “fundamental changes in 
relative prices” (North, 1990: 83). This claim might be seen as supportive of 
individuals-alone (rational choice) theory. This is reminiscent of that of other 
adherents of (free) markets who are generally methodological individualists. However, 
North in recent works reveals somewhat different points of view. It is worth noting 
that: 
 
“the simple fact is that a dynamic theory of institutional change limited to 
the strictly neo-classical constraint of individualistic, rational purposive 
activity would never allow us to explain most of secular change ranging 
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from the stubborn struggle of the Jews in antiquity to the passage of the 
Social Security Act in 1935 North” (cited in Rutherford, 2001: 188). 
 
In this sense, North has not merely tinkered with his early notion of rational/selfish 
agents but also tried to incorporate it into a more comprehensive analytical tool 
through “convergence with the ideas [as well as thematic interests] of old 
institutionalists (ibid.).”19 
 
Next, the thematic issue appears to hinge on the methodological point of view. North 
has become interested in other analytical elements such as individual cognition, 
ideologies, path dependence, social norms, and human physical environment. In his 
recent works he has abandoned the static efficiency view, that is, selfish and rational 
agent in response to changes in relative price mechanism (North, 2005, Toboso, 2001: 
777). Even more, he has obtained non-trivial ideas from other institutional schools of 
thought such as social and historical institutionalism. However, it should be also 
remembered that he has retained some core methodological positions (analytical 
emphases are placed on individuals, North, 2005).  
 
Second, there have been appealing attempts to solve the theoretical dilemma by 
adopting “mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency” (Giddens and 
Bourdieu, cited in Seo and Creed, 2002: 223). Toboso (2002) provides a flexible 
institutional framework in which he takes on core points from both methodological 
individualism and methodological holism. This perspective proposes institutional 
individualism that is “non-reductionist” but “a middle way mode of explanation” of 
institutional changes (ibid.: 766). Three propositions suggested are worth noting that: 1) 
only human beings can direct aims and pursue interests either independently or 
collectively; 2) “Formal and informal sets of institutional rules affecting interactions 
among persons must be part of the explanatory variables” (ibid: 770); 3) “Marginal 
institutional changes always result from the independent or collective actions of some 
persons and always take place within wider institutional frameworks” (ibid: 771). Even 
if the flexibility of this explanation helps to guide the way forward overcoming the 
theoretical dilemma, it still lacks adequate explications. 
                                                
19 In the straightforward meaning of methodological individualism, if one is to examine properly socio-
economic issues, he or she ought to start by looking into the inherent nature of “atomized individuals”; 
rationality, selfishness and purposive behavior (see Granovetter, 1985: 482, Hodgson, 2007: 211). 
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Seo and Creed (2002: 231-8) provide a systematic framework to solve the discursive 
dilemma drawing upon Berson’s core ideas of organisations (see Figure 3.3). They 
elaborate the ideas into the dialectic institutional framework, in light of considering the 
concept of “institutional contradictions” and “partially autonomous and artful actors”. 
The basis on this analysis is to accept that institutional changes are not only constantly 
generated outcomes of processes in which institutional contradictions activate 
collective action of agents but also the source of institutionalisation that result in 
institutional contradictions (ibid.). The focal point of the framework is its applicability 
to institutional “changes of various types (revolutionary and incremental), at various 
levels (organizational, inter-organizational, intra-governmental or international), in 
various institutional contexts (tightly coupled and loosely coupled) (see Seo and Creed, 
2002: 240).” Besides, this dialectical model of institutional changes demonstrates how 
different schools of thought can share their own ideas in explaining institutional 
changes without inevitable abandonment of their own logics and ideas.  
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Figure 3.3 Institutional Contradictions and the mechanism of praxis 
Institutionalization ç  Institutional change   
ê   é     
Institutional contradictions  
(intra and inter) è  Mechanism of Praxis   
Inefficiency 
is caused by “conformity” of 
organisations to institutional 
arrangements. Following 
legitimate strategies enables 
necessary resources, 
although not necessarily 
efficient. The need for new 
solutions emerges. 
 Collective action             é  
comes out through intensive 
political contestation and 
negotiation, collective action 
potentially, if not always, 
entails institutional changes. 
Notes:  
 
1) Actors are defined as 
“partially autonomous.”  
 
2) The authors do not 
assume that these 
explanatory sources are 
independent of each other. 
Instead, in practice they 
are closely interwoven.  
 
3) This framework does 
not give any leaned 
assumptions about 
preference to either 
individuals or specific 
institutions as 
methodological 
individualists or holists 
might do.  
 
4) The authors do not 
mention that institutional 
contradictions and praxis 
are the only sources 
(hence only objects of 
analysis) of institutional 
change. 
 
5) In the phase of 
institutional crisis, four 
arenas of institutional 
contradictions either 
interact with each other or 
act independently to bring 
about institutional crisis 
that has impacts on the 
process of praxis. 
 
Non-adaptability 
arises as a result of 
contradiction between the 
institutionally embedded 
adaptive nature and the new 
external environment. What 
have been successfully 
adapted cannot be adapted 
any longer. 
ê









   
  ê
 
Actor mobilisation         é    
may result from selective 
adoption and development of 
available institutional logic. 
There need be alternative 
logics, skills, and resources 





is the typical nature of the 
contemporary society. It 
results from ongoing social 
construction of the 
institutions. Complex 
interconnectedness between 
institutions at various levels 
offers the space where 
inconsistencies between 
them arise. 
Reflexive shift in             é  
consciousness 
1) Gradual reforming of 
consciousness from 
within the institutional 
context – individual 
dissatisfaction with past 
natural behaviors and 
critical understanding of 
the present. 
2) Revolutionary disruption 
from outside – abrupt 





does not reflect such diverse 
interests and concerns of 
individuals. It is a political 
process through which the 
interests are dealt with. 
 Potential change agents  é  
are either passive or active 
when confronting the 
situation where their interests 
are not served by the existing 
institutional settings. 
Source: Adopted from Seo and Creed (2002: 232) 
 
Rational choice institutionalists might be able to learn from this model about how 
social embeddedness (culture and routinised practices) mould individuals’ belief 
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systems and interests by taking the concept of “misaligned” interests. Individuals’ 
interests are to some extent constructed by precast institutions in place. Yet, it is 
necessary to question if and how ideas as much a broader concept than interest leads to 
institutional crisis (see section 3.5). Historical and sociological institutional theorists 
might learn the way in which individuals become partly artful agents in order to 
intentionally convert inter-institutional contradiction into actual changes in institutions. 
 
As admitted by the article authors, however, this model requires exploring much more 
about “the factors, processes and dynamics involved in the later stage of institutional 
change” (ibid.). Furthermore, core questions have remained untouched. Are the 
institutional contradictions and praxis process only constitutive factors in explaining 
the whole process of institutional change? Can any institutional change occur without 
individuals’ consciousness of unmet interests? Are there any other exogenous or 
endogenous factors inside and outside the whole process of institutional change in 
shaping institutions and agency? Can the risk of climate change and environmental risk 
directly bring about institutional changes? Can political and social changes aggravate 
social vulnerability where there is no environmental change?  
 
Raising these contextual questions does not mean that the above model of institutional 
change is inappropriate; but there is room for further development. For example, 
institutions might fully remain unchanged even if they are considered inefficient, 
inadaptable and incompatible. It would be the case even when interests of certain 
groups (often minority groups) are seriously violated. Meanwhile, institutions might be 
regarded as entirely efficient, adaptable and compatible to some groups (not always 
but often vested interests) whose interests remain unharmed. In this regard, suggesting 
three options for CCA – e.g. no change, marginal change, and transformative change – 
is not enough, if not wrong. This categorisation might better work for policy makers or 
powerful groups in society than minority groups (e.g. migrants). In reality, one can 
easily imagine that the marginalised are forced not to change; forced to change only 
marginally; or forced to change in a transformative way. There is a compelling need to 
discuss why certain ideas are valued over others; only a political perspective can 
inform this debate. This thesis does not directly deal with the case of minority groups’ 
vulnerability that is politically underrepresented. Instead, it is suggested that idea 
should replace interest in the above model (Figure 3. 3). Misalignment of not only 
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interest but also many other kinds of idea need be included in the debate upon 
institutional change (see Table 3.4). More detailed account of ideas and discourses will 
follow in the next section. 
3.5: Social innovation: idea and discourse 
In order to further refine the model of institutional change (Seo and Creed, 2002), this 
section formalises three concepts: social innovation, idea and discourse. The recently 
increasing interest in the role of social innovation for CCA is relevant to the awareness 
of the increasing importance of idea and discourse in political spheres (DiGiano and 
Racelis, 2012, Chhetri et al., 2012, Rodima-Taylor, 2012, Olwig, 2012, Rodima-
Taylor et al., 2012, Bauriedl, 2011). 
3.5.1. Social innovation 
Until fairly recently the topic of social innovation was seldom addressed seriously in 
academia. As Nilson lamented; “there is no literature on social innovation…[t]he term 
‘social innovation’ is rarely used in a scholarly or in a commonplace way” (Nilson, 
2003: 3) (but for the early call for social innovation see Gabor, 1970). Over the last 
decade, however, the term has attracted increasing attention from scholars and 
practitioners. Social innovation differs from business innovation (Pol and Ville, 2009), 
and from social entrepreneurship or social enterprise (Phills, et al.,Phills, 2008). 
Simply put, the notion of social innovation is invaluable in as much as it calls attention 
to the changing view to how innovation helps humans and society (Pol and Ville, 
2009). Despite the recent popularity of the term, the phenomenon for which it accounts 
is not new at all (GOC, 2010).  
 
On the other hand, however, cynical researchers see social innovation as “no more 
than a buzz word” lacking a precise meaning so that it has little explanatory power for 
specific reality or actualities (Pol and Ville, 2009: 878). They see the utility of the term 
limited for a number of reasons; both because what constitutes social innovation is 
arbitrary and depends on the viewers’ interpretation, and because it explains 
everything, and hence nothing in specific. Certainly, researchers have used the term in 
many different, confusing ways. As will be clearer later, however, this does not 
legitimize the abandonment of the term, indeed, it presents a good opportunity for 
diversifying our understanding of climate change adaptation and the ways in which it 
should be problematized. 
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If the concept of social innovation is to help elaborate the analytical framework of this 
thesis, we must consider the strengths and weaknesses of the concept in particular 
contexts. In this section, I shall identify what is known about social innovation, and 
assess how far it can inform research on CCA. 
 
Table 3.3. Accounts and definitions of social innovation 
 Definitions of social innovation 
Heiscala 2007 
(cited in, Pol and 
Ville, 2009: 879) 
Social innovations are changes in the cultural, normative or regulative 
structures [or classes] of the society which enhance its collective power 
resources and improve its economic and social performance. [Unlike 
technological and economic innovations], [r]egulative innovations 
transform explicit regulations and/or the way they are sanctioned. 
Normative innovations challenge established value commitments and/or 
the way the values are specified into legitimate social norms. Finally, 
cultural innovations challenge the established ways to interpret reality by 
transforming mental paradigms, cognitive frames and habits of 
interpretation. Taken together these three classes form the sphere of 
social innovations. 
Mulgan (2006: 
146) / the Young 
Foundation 
Social innovation refers to new ideas that work in meeting social goals. 
Social innovation refers to innovative activities and services that are 
motivated by the goal of meeting a social need and that are 
predominantly diffused through organizations whose primary purposes 
are social. 
Pol and Ville 
(2009: 881) 
An innovation is termed a social innovation if the implied new idea has 
the potential to improve either the quality or the quantity of life 
(longevity). Quality of life refers to macro-quality of life [– the set of 
valuable options in society –] and by improvement in the quality of life 
is meant increase in the number of valuable options that people can 
choose from. 
Phills, et al., 
(Phills, 2008: no 
page) 
A novel solution to a social problem that is more effective, efficient, 
sustainable, or just than existing solutions and for which the value 
created accrues primarily to society as a whole rather than private 
individuals. 
Westley (2008: 1) Social innovation is an initiative, product or process or program that 
profoundly changes the basic routines, resource and authority flows or 





Social innovation is a significant, creative, and sustainable shift in the 
way that a given society dealt with a profound and previously intractable 
problem such as poverty, disease, violence, or environmental 
deterioration. 
Sources: As cited in the table. 
Note: Parentheses added. 
 
Pol and Ville (2009) make some important points that ought to be borne in mind when 
conceptualizing social innovation. First, the concept of social innovation should be 
neither too general (e.g. claiming it to fit every type of innovation), nor too strict (e.g. 
narrow focus on purely social change). Whilst different innovations involve different 
goals, means, and stakeholders they might also overlap or be interrelated. Next, an 
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essentialist definition (e.g. true social innovation) is neither desirable nor practically 
possible, because of “value judgments underlying the notion of desirable social 
innovation” (ibid: 883). Lastly, the necessary environments, which affect “the 
characteristics that define some object,” do not constitute the definition of the object 
(ibid: 884). Mistaking social innovation for a desirable condition (e.g. public 
participation or political freedom) can lead to more confusion over what it actually 
denotes. Social innovation can unexpectedly occur without good faith or intention. 
Relying on these points Pol and Ville argue that: “[a]n innovation is termed a social 
innovation if the implied new idea has the potential to improve either the quality or the 
quantity of life” (ibid: 881). This raises the following questions, however:  Is it 
necessarily new ideas that bring about innovation? 
 
The above question calls attention to ideas about ideas and discourses. We limit 
ourselves to scrutinizing ideas and discourse in terms of politics here. One core reason 
is that politics is a site through which social innovation can be debated, contested, 
legitimized and implemented. 
3.5.2. Ideas 
Few people would deny that ideas matter for life and politics. Even some rational 
choice theorists have been at pains to integrate the notion of interest with that of ideas 
(e.g. see North, 2005, Elster, 1989). As Jal Mehta notes, it is now time to study “how” 
rather than if ideas matter (Mehta, 2011: 26-9). Yet, what are ideas anyway? Where do 
they exist? How are they created, adopted, diffused, changed, exchanged and refuted? 
In fact, there are “so many ideas about ideas” (Schmidt, 2008: 306).  
 
What constitutes ideas has been defined in a variety of ways; they are causal belief 
(Béland and Cox, 2011); “switches for interests, road maps, or focal points” (Goldstein 
& Keohane 1993, cited in Schmidt, 2008: 306); or “claims about descriptions of the 
world, causal relationships, or the normative legitimacy of certain actions” (Parsons 
2002, cited in Béland, 2009: 702). Required are a more comprehensive account of 
ideas in the context of institutional change, and how different schools of 
institutionalism have made differing conceptual linkages of ideas to their core 
propositions of institution: e.g. interest, path dependency and social appropriateness. 
Yet, we here deal mainly with the nature of ideas in politics and in the public sphere in 
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particular (Habermas, 1996). Before that, the brief account of the reason why ideas 
have gained prominence in social science studies should be presented. 
3.5.2.1. The background of the development of ideational analysis 
Béland and Cox (2011: 6-9) ascribes the rising importance of ideational analysis in 
social scientific research to five factors as follows. First, New Institutionalism (NI) and 
cultural theory have emerged to either replace or move beyond the notions of 
behaviorism and systems theory, which had intentionally ruled out consideration of 
ideas and values from their analysis of politics and democracy until recently 
(Habermas, 1996). Second, new scholarship has emerged that sets agendas and defines 
problems anew, which has led to renewed interest in ideational analysis in policy 
studies. Third, the rise of the constructivist school in the area of international relations 
did more much to reignite scholars’ interest in the ways in which ideas, discourses and 
culture structure foreign policy (see also Marsh and Sharman, 2009). Fourth, there was 
an effort to resurrect the notion of ideology while moving beyond the Marxist 
“materialist vision of ideology.” Finally, some analysts placed more attention to what 
roles ideas and discourse play in shaping “racial and gendered identities and 
inequalities.” Despite the differences amongst these approaches to ideas, there is a 
common thread that runs through them; namely, the concern with the relationship of 
ideas to interest, institutions and institutional change. Further classification of idea in 
Table 3.4 helps clarify the relationships. 
3.5.2.2. Newness of ideas 
Drawing on perspectives from mainstream ideational research, Carstensen (2010: 850-
1) stresses three characteristics of ideas: their “path-dependency”, the “interrelation” 
among ideas that cause practical impacts, and the “open and fluid boundaries of ideas”. 
Ideas, however novel they might be, are formed on the basis of past collective 
memories; that an idea is added or removed from the latter has a considerable 
influence “on the meaning of the idea in question and on the meaning of the 
components of the already existing network of ideas.” In addition, ideas have a 
tendency to be “semantically” coupled with some particular ideas rather than with 
other ones. From this historical-institutionalist perspective, new ideas are by no means 
entirely new. Similarly, GOC (2010: no page) notes that “social innovations entail 
novel applications of ideas, the ideas themselves need not necessarily be new: the 
process often involves novel adaptation (or recommendations) of existing ideas and/or 
their application to new areas.” Yet, only if we have a grasp of the ontology of ideas, 
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can we answer the question as to how ideas change, through what processes, by whose 
participation and for what reasons. 
3.5.2.3. Different types and components of ideas in politics 
Sociologists and political scientists classify ideas according to two broad schemas 
(Campbell, 1998, Schmidt, 2008, Schmidt, 2010); the first differentiates cognitive 
(causal) ideas and normative ideas, while the second contrasts foreground ideas and 
background ideas (see Table 3.4). Some theorists, if not all, divide foreground ideas 
into policy and programmatic ideas (see, for example Campbell, 1998). Background 
ideas consist of a set of philosophical assumptions. As explained in Table 3.4, 
normative ideas such as values, norms and identities not only define if given policies 
fulfill “the aspirations and ideals of the general public”, but also make different levels 
of cognitive ideas accorded with each other (Schmidt, 2008: 307).  
 
Table 3.4. Different types of ideas  




Foreground ideas  
(regularly debated and contested) 
Background ideas 
(rarely questioned 
except times of shocks 
and crises) 
Policy level Programmatic level 
Cognitive 
ideas 
Elite policy prescriptions 
that define a specific 
course of action, recipes, 
guidelines, or maps for 







frames of reference, a 
plank of policy, the 
philosophy of science 
(e.g. Thomas Kuhn’s the 
structure of scientific 
revolutions) 
Philosophical ideas, 




Values, norms, identities, principled beliefs, and etiquette that are collectively 
developed and enshrined expectations. These normative ideas also check and 
monitor if different levels of cognitive ideas are matched with each other. 
Source: Adopted from Black et al. (2005), Campbell (1998), Mehta (2011), and Schmidt 
(2008). 
 
Table 3.4. helps understand the nature of ideas, and hence how social innovation 
springs from the mismatch between social reality and social needs. The complexity of 
the different levels and types of ideas and their interactions indicates that it is 
problematic to claim any new idea to be entirely new. Moreover, the complexity 
clarifies why similar policy ideas are unevenly successful across place and time. For 
example, if policy level, foreground ideas are introduced in countries with different 
background and normative ideas, or in which the relationships between these types of 
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ideas differ, then the outcome is likely to vary considerably and will not be the same in 
each case.  
3.5.2.4. Diffusion/transfer of policy ideas 
The spatial movement of (policy) ideas across countries is of increasing concern in 
policy studies and international relations. The diffusion of similar policy ideas might 
bring about different outcomes in the adopting countries due to the different set of 
mechanisms, such as “learning, competition, coercion, mimicry” (Marsh and Sharman, 
2009: 271). For example, “[n]eo-liberalism emerged out of an ‘unholy alliance’ 
between neo-classical economics, which provided most of the analytical tools – 
[cognitive ideas], and what we may call the Australian-libertarian traditions, which 
provided the political and moral philosophy” – [normative ideas] (Chang, 2002a: 
parenthesis added). When the cultural, discursive, and academic background of 
importing countries differs from that of the countries from which the neo-liberal ideas 
emerged, we should seriously consider the different ramifications of the diffusion of 
ideas on the importing countries. The receiving countries often lack the notion of 
individual freedom, social security nets, infrastructure and fair access to education, as 
well as strong civil society (e.g. the western type of NGOs). These assets are relatively 
well established in those developed countries that support of neo-liberalism. Without 
(the assumption of) self-interested individuals and without the set of the ideas present 
in rich countries, how can the notion of liberalism possibly work in the way that its 
supporters might expect in less developed societies? Often, however, policy makers in 
the adopting countries assign more normative value to the practices and ideas of the 
so-called developed countries, although they know that they are not technically and 
rationally feasible in their own countries (Marsh and Sharman, 2009). 
 
By the same token, Pol and Ville (2009)’s aforementioned definition of social 
innovation does not do justice to the complex process by which different types and 
levels of ideas are interlinked; not to the way in which new ideas are contested, 
interpreted and adopted in relation to a group of already existing ideas. We do not 
argue that a definition of an object must fully represent the entire characteristics of the 
object. Yet, when it comes to actual use for research, we must seek to deeply 
understand the integral parts of the definition. This also leads to a matter of choosing 
indicators that stand for the concept. This idea leads to acquiring a better 
understanding how different ideas work and interrelate to (fail to) produce actual 
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impacts on life or politics; and also who takes a major role in projecting ideas to the 
centre of politics and policy construction. For this reason, we turn our attention to the 
debate upon if discourse is more than a set of ideas; and if that discourse is important 
for the success of social innovation. 
3.5.3. Discourse as more than a set of ideas 
Some social scientists seem to discard the term discourse from their research, in the 
mistaken belief that discourse is the exclusive property of post-modernism/post-
structuralism. Critiquing the belief, Schmidt (2008: 305) defines discourse: 
 
“Discourse, as defined herein, is stripped of post-modernist baggage to 
serve as a more generic term that encompasses not only the substantive 
content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are 
conveyed. Discourse is not just ideas or “text” [what is said] but also 
context [where, when, how, and why it was said]. The term refers not only 
to structure [what is said, or where and how] but also to agency [who said 
what to whom]” (parentheses added). 
 
In this regard, discourse refers to the manner in which a variety of ideas and beliefs 
unfold, with the potential to have practical impacts, at the intersection between 
structure and agency. Drawing on the Habermasian notion of the public sphere, 
Schmidt goes further to divide “coordinative discourse” in the public sphere and the 
“communicative discourse” in the political sphere (ibid: 310).  
 
Coordinative discourse involves the area of policy construction, to which various 
agents such as civil servants, elected officials, academics, organized interests, think 
tanks, INGOs, and advisory boards might contribute. These actors have shared beliefs 
that consist of a set of cognitive and normative ideas. Cases in point are communities 
of practice in climate change adaptation (Pelling and High, 2005) and organizational 
learning (Wenger, 2000); epistemic communities such as the Resilience Alliance (see 
http://www.resalliance.org) (Haas, cited in Schmidt, 2008); advocacy coalitions in 
policy change and learning as response to natural disasters (Albright, 2011); policy 
community (Smith, 1991). They are not always open, though. For example, the British 
agricultural community in the post-war period was closed, compared to the food policy 
community of that time. Before the 1990s, food policies were treated as a site for 
“routine technical decisions” without room for wider political decision-making (ibid: 
235). The initiatory stage when the issues of the link between Salmonella and eggs, 
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Listeria and BSE were brought forwarded well illuminates the closeness of the 
agricultural community, which continued to prevent food from becoming a political 
issue. This is an example of how a closed and exclusive circumstance of policy 
construction and existing power relations hinder a political innovation process.  
 
Communicative discourse penetrates through the political sphere (Schmidt, 2008: 310). 
Actively engaged in policy forums, broadcast discussions, and conferences, the 
involved individuals and groups present, deliberate, and legitimize policy and 
programmatic ideas to “the general public”(ibid.). The scope of participants here is 
wider than that of the public sphere, and includes “members of opposition parties, the 
media, pundits, community leaders, social activists, public intellectuals, experts, think-
tanks, organized interests, and social movement” (ibid.). The general public can also 
give political actors feedback on their policy ideas through their participation in the 
electoral process. 
 
The relationship between the two spheres of discourse is rather complex in reality, and 
shapes the nature of the whole (adaptive) governance. When ideas are produced in 
either of the two spheres, the direction of their movement and/or influence is not fixed, 
but unpredictable: e.g. the top down, bottom up, or stasis within the originating place. 
In short, the key point is that discourse is the environment through which ideas interact 
and policy gets formed; therefore, it influences the way social innovation arises.  
 
In what way could the debate on ideas and discourse help refine the model of 
institutional change, and inform the current research? First, the discussion about idea 
helps further elaborate the account of agency within the model. Particularly it goes 
beyond a narrow, interest-centered explanation of agency manifestation. Interest is but 
one of many ideational factors to cause changes in human action. Second, it is 
important to discuss two spheres of discourse and the internal power relations. Who 
can participate in each sphere of discourse? Who are intentionally/accidently 
marginalised from either sphere of discourse? It seems clear that the way in which 
certain ideas gain more legitimacy over others is not straightforward, but very complex. 
Along with the debate on social capital, the two discursive spheres can be taken to 
further elaborate the mechanism of praxis in terms of political contestation and 
negotiation (see Figure 3.3). 
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3.6: Conclusion: the multifocal analytical framework  
Sociopolitical response to hazard risk such as CCA and DRR is a (combination of) 
complex and multifaceted social process(es). Cooperation, conflict, differentiation, 
integration, inclusion, exclusion, marginalisation, and many other social processes 
need be considered together when researching CCA. Perhaps, less highlighted is the 
seriousness of knowledge gaps regarding CCA stemming from the lack of applying 
diverse angles from which to study CCA. For this reason, this chapter delved into the 
complexity of social reality by closely reviewing several key analytical frames such as 
expectation, institution, innovation and social capital.  
 
In the context of fostering CCA and DRR, an increasing number of studies have tried 
to scrutinise the ontological nature, roles and necessity of institution and institutional 
change. It is extremely important to understand what institutions are and how and why 
they change, if this research is to properly examine the process by which disaster risk 
becomes a political issue in Korea. A closer look at social capital allowed deeper 
understanding of how collective action can channel critical consciousness into social 
innovation while inquiries into social innovation shed light on the importance of ideas 
and discourse in political spheres of disaster. It is argued that CCA in Korea to a large 
extent involves dealing with dually structured risk of environmental hazards (see 
Chapter two). This research built upon various concepts introduced in this chapter to 
inspect varied political reflections on urban risk and social construction of impending 
risk regarding construction of the naval base.  
 
How can the multifocal analytical framework inform the rest of the current research? 
The analytical framework allows examining how ideas and institutions evolve in the 
realms of disaster politics and CCA; not just their existence but also their modus 
operandi. In this sense, not only the extent of change (e.g. no change, marginal change 
and transformative change) but also the wider nature and aspects of change should be 
taken into consideration when talking about CCA. The multi-focal analytical 





Chapter 4: Researching the disaster politics of dual-risk 
4.1: Introduction 
As Blaikie (2007: 1) argues, social scientists need to confront “a range of choices and 
dilemmas that lead to the use of fundamentally different research strategies” that 
possibly result in very different research findings. Acknowledging this point, the 
ontological and epistemological conceptualisation described in this chapter was 
prepared pre-field work and revised upon its completion. It was particularly 
challenging when the philosophy of complexity was introduced to the research in its 
early stage (e.g. Duit and Galaz, 2008, Reed and Harvey, 1992, Walby, 2007).  
 
At many points during the period of fieldwork, being able to apply complexity 
thinking allowed for a more multilayered analytical approach. This was because it 
fostered seeing the possibility of the social reality under inquiry, which in this case 
was the political reflection on dual-risk in Korea, to be interlocked with many other 
variables and events in numerous ways. On the positive side, it kept the fieldwork open 
to contingent events, informal processes, and new informants that helped situate the 
thesis author at critical phases in which political reflections were formed.  
 
The first part of this chapter discusses how metaphysical conceptualisation informed 
and fostered the research process. The research finds critical realism and complexity 
philosophy useful in overcoming the simplistic causal belief of social change that is 
frequently found in more positivism-informed studies of adaptation and disaster risk.  
 
The second half of the chapter, in more detail, deals with methodological and 
analytical concerns raised during and after fieldwork. The challenges are related to 
case selection, recruiting research participants and data collection in the practical 
conduct of fieldwork. Then, it is important to show if changes or additions were made 
to the techniques for data collection to achieve the research objectives. Last, the 
analytical difficulties raised during writing-up of this thesis (e.g. translation from 
English to Korean) will be considered. The issue of translation is particularly 
important. Certainly, there are not always proper English terms to express the 
meanings, feelings, roles and events that are exclusively found in Korean culture.  
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4.2: Ontology and Epistemology 
A few researchers might undertake their research projects without theoretical 
underpinnings (Grix, 2004). Yet one should be cautious about using the term theory. 
Theory can be differently categorized depending on its “degree of abstraction and 
scope” and the way of reasoning: 1) meta-theory (ontology and epistemology), 
grand/formal theory (e.g. structuralism, functionalism), middle-range theory (e.g. 
theory of institutional change) and grounded theory; and 2) inductive, deductive, 
“retroductive” and “abductive” theory (ibid: 109~113, Blaikie, 2007). This section 
illustrates how ontological and epistemological conceptualisation not only restricted 
but also underpinned the application of the research strategy throughout fieldwork. 
4.2.1. Philosophical underpinning 
It is argued that ontological and epistemological issues revolve around almost every 
inquiry into social reality (Blaikie, 2007). As noted before, the research made a huge 
effort to integrate complexity theory with the methodological framework, without 
aiming to elaborate the former itself. Rather, it provided the research with the 
phronesis to dig into the complex reality of the politics of disaster (e.g. discursive and 
material interactions, interwoven sources of conflict, any causal powers of a political 
change). Much attention was paid to the occurrence of disaster under which ideas and 
beliefs (even ephemeral) were employed to reflect on institutions, power relations, and 
ideational/material impacts of these throughout fieldwork (for example, via newspaper 
articles). 
 
Before embarking on fieldwork, a simple question was raised: is climate change a 
single causal force of the increasing number of natural disasters reported (Adger and 
Brooks, 2003)? Or is it nothing else than socially constructed fear or worry(Demeritt, 
2002)? As Sayer (1992: 67) once put it, however, “[l]ike naïve objectivism, idealism 
collapses thought and its objects together, only the direction of the reduction is 
different.” It is also argued in this thesis that the underlying reality of climate change 
risks emerges at multiple spatiotemporal scales (Manson, 2008). As one interviewee 
claimed, however: 
 
“How the anthropogenic causes and aspect of disasters triggered by 
a natural event are socially revealed depends on if a critical 
actor/group is present at the moment and the place where the 
disasters occur. Otherwise, catastrophes particularly in rural areas 
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can be concealed. This is why social movement is critical” (NI 2, 
2011†)20.  
 
This interview gave a hint through which to utilise the ontological and epistemological 
conceptualisations for undertaking fieldwork. 
4.2.2. Idealism 
The central idea of idealist ontology can be traced back to Plato, Kant, and presently 
Foucault and Derrida. Its adherents believe that the significance of ideas precedes that 
of materials. They argue that there is no external reality. Castree and Braun (2001: 15-
6) persuasively argues that “societies physically reconstitute nature.” It is 
acknowledged that many differing realities of climate change risk are constructed by 
socio-cultural meaning-giving works, relying on societal categories of class, gender, 
age, ethnicity and other cultural factors (Blaikie, 2007, Manson, 2008). The point is 
that reality always needs human interpretation and valuation to become valued. Yet, it 
is worth noting that “[g]iven that material processes are distinct from our beliefs about 
them, it shouldn’t be surprising to find cases where two or more radically different and 
indeed incommensurable sets of beliefs have equal practical adequacy” (Sayer, 1992: 
79). This argument became relevant during fieldwork. It was witnessed that groups 
with a different set of rationales and beliefs (see Chapter seven) made one united voice 
to refute the inadequacy of the naval base construction. Yet, fuller interview access to 
the groups was sometimes very limited because they were in a tense situation that they 
could be arrested by the police or the stressed local residents refused to participate in 
this research (see Section 7.4.1). This meant that the researcher’s recognition of a 
critical moment or event does not always entail full access to the reality. In this case, 
sources of alternative data, such as local newspapers, were analysed to provide a basis 
for interpreting the perceptions of local actors in terms of the naval base construction. 
 
Critical realists might argue that the epistemic fallacy forces idealists to fail to 
recognise the difference between (material) production/social facts and (ideational) 
social construction (Woodgate and Redclift, 1998, Metzner-Szigeth, 2009). Indeed, 
few social constructionists might entirely deny the existence of material reality 
although retaining anti-foundationalist epistemology. They can be called as soft or 
weak social constructivists (Robbins, 2004: 113-6). According to Demeritt (2002), 
                                                
20 Hereafter, †= translated by the thesis author 
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heterogeneous constructionism enables an understanding of how climate change 
emerges as experienced reality through social activities which include, but are not 
limited to, natural science without denying the existence of the material reality.21 This 
reading borrows ideas from a variety of constructionism and the Heideggerian 
perspective, a combination of realist ontology and anti-realist epistemology (ibid.). It 
can be otherwise called “agnostic” idealism on the ground that it has less interest in 
ontological debates than in epistemological ones (Blaikie, 2007: 17). That is to say, 
climate change is meaningful only in the ways that interpreters (or meaning generators) 
perceive of it as real through inter-subjective societal activities such as communication 
or social meaning-giving work within social relations. For instance, both Piers Blaikie 
and Ulrich Beck maintain the soft version of social constructionism for looking into 
the issue of disaster risk (see Wisner et al., 2004). 
4.2.3. Post-realism 
It is argued by critical realists that naïve realist ontology-informed positivists fail to 
recognize the unobservable reality of climate change. They seem to consider only 
empirical reality as a legitimate research dimension. As alike, the dominance of 
positivism in Korean academic culture was observed by the research. 
 
Apart from empirical and actual realties, however, causal reality is seldom directly 
observable by using human senses and reasoning (rationality), yet has significant 
structural mechanisms that instigate empirical events and social phenomena (Sayer, 
1992). For this reason, “a logic of discovery” is emphasized by critical realism in 
anticipating the deep structures that intangibly exist (Blaikie, 2007: 83). The concept 
of three levels of reality was developed in A Realist Theory of Science by Bhaskar 
(2008), but has been further elaborated upon into societal rendering of the same idea, 
the so-called “critical realism” (Reed and Harvey, 1992, Sayer, 1992, Yeung, 1997).22  
                                                
21 The concept of social construction of nature is slippery to grasp, and often too narrowly understood. 
Construction means different to those who intend to use it for their own purposes – either to “refute 
taken-for-granted-beliefs” or make metaphysical critiques (Demeritt, 2002: 769). In terms of the former 
case, positivists, critical realists, feminists and Marxists enthusiastically use construction talk. The latter 
is generally resorted to by social constructionists to raise ontological and epistemological critiques. 
Hence the term social construction does not simply bring itself to the universally ontological and 
epistemological conclusion. Differing ideas in various constructionist schools of thought illuminate this 
point – e.g. phenomenologist, discursive theory, sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and Actor-
Network Theory (ANT). 
22 Rather than simply epistemological and methodological level, Yeung (1997) argues, it is the 
ontological level at which critical realism makes its strongest claim. However, it is often misunderstood, 
even by adherents of it, simply as epistemology or methodology that might result in unnecessary 
critique “on the basis that it is calling for an ultimate truth or theory” (ibid: 54). The term epistemic 
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There is, however, unease at the prospect of applying the philosophy of realist science 
to the loci of societal inquiry. It is necessary to understand that the term critical realism 
is not invented by Roy Bhaskar, but a combined term of “transcendental realism” and 
“critical naturalism” (Yeung, 1997: 52). The former transcendental realism is 
philosophy of science that attempts to scrutinize the complex characteristic of the 
external world (Blaikie, 2007: 146-9). On the other hand, critical naturalism argues 
that social problems can be “scientifically” researched – somewhat different from 
another version of naturalism, that is, positivism, developed by Durkheim or Comte 
(see Baert, 1996). To apply philosophy of science in social inquiry, critical realism 
points out the difference between “transitive” (concepts, theories and models) and 
“intransitive” (real entities) objects (Blaikie, 2007: 146-9). Put differently, critical 
realism acknowledges the difference between natural and social reality by highlighting 
three exceptions that are exclusively found in social world: “activity dependence”, 
“concept dependent” and “spatio-temporally dependent” (Harvey, 2002: 170). Greater 
accounts of these may be necessary. Yet the gist of the argument is that critical realism 
hopes to scrutinize the underlying structures that cause social events by importing the 
ontological perspective from transcendental realism (Blaikie, 2007). 
 
An argument as to whether the reality of climate change is either exclusively fixed or 
untied to the human interpretation gets easily untenable, due mainly to their extremist 
positions. Surely a few researchers might support such extremist points of view. This 
point became clearer during fieldwork when even a hydrologist (RAI 8, 2011) stressed 
the greater necessity of looking at traditional discourse on water in Jeju for CCA.  
4.2.4. Emergent reality 
Between material changes in climate and societal changes such as globalization, 
technical revolution, change in forms of energy, social institutions and (global) 
population growth (Adger and Brooks, 2003), countless “internal/necessary” and 
“contingent/external” relationships coexist.23 Admittedly, the relationship between the 
mechanisms of climate-change and social system per se is not dualistic but 
                                                                                                                                        
fallacy comes from Bhaskar’s critique of some social scientists confusing ontology with epistemology 
(ibid.). 
 
23 The concept of internal/necessary and contingent/external relationship (here, “this sense of contingent 
is quite different from that common in every day uses where “contingent upon” means “dependent 
upon””) is developed by Sayer (1992: 89). In the internal relationship, entities, objects and events 
presuppose each other’s existence whereas in the contingent relationship they can independently exist. 
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internal/necessary insofar as society cannot exist in isolation from nature, and vice 
versa (Woodgate and Redclift, 1998). Some negativist scholars (e.g. Weberian social 
scientists) might go even further to argue that physical scientist’s wish to be purely 
objective when studying the closed system cannot be wholly met (Blaikie, 2007: 33). 
This is so because “experimental closure” is not always possible even in the natural 
sciences (ibid: 193). 
 
The quantitatively and linearly generalised truth becomes invalid as it fails to see 
qualitative changes at the level of ontology. While considering environmental or 
climate change to be a real issue, this research sees reality as spatiotemporally 
emerging, as a result of the workings of the complex system on various strata of the 
material, physical, biological and social. 
 
The above ideas informed this research in an important way that complicates the social 
reality under inquiry, which is the political reflection on disaster. For instance, the 
ontological condition of conflict or political tension was always put into question: e.g. 
what entities, be they visible or not, might exist to make the event/subject interpreted 
as conflict. For example, will the existence of North Korea constitute future local 
disasters in South Korea? This is just a contextual question. Yet, raising this kind of 
question was helpful in preventing the research from drawing any conclusions from 
just what was seen, heard and informed.  
4.2.5. Practical adequacy of provisional knowledge: epistemology 
Ontological perspectives do not necessarily determine, albeit they may to some extent 
influence, epistemological positions (Blaikie, 2007). Differently put, the intellectual 
propensity exists in a way that compatible philosophies are integrated into certain 
research paradigms – e.g. Positivism (shallow realism and empiricism) and 
Hermeneutics (idealism and constructionism) (ibid: 26).  
 
This research saw deep realism as an ontological basis of complexity theory (Blaikie, 
2007, Harvey, 2002). What is then the epistemological foundation of complexity 
theory? 24 Most importantly, the existence of essences does not necessarily require 
                                                
24 Complexity theory is believed to give more ontological foundations to the social sciences than those 
of epistemology and methodology (Manson, 2009). However, it is possible, if not simple, to outline 
fundamental epistemological ideas, drawing on literature based on neo-realism and soft version of 
constructionism. 
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foundationalism, yet essentialism (Sayer, 1997).. It is argued that complexity theory 
can be informed by social constructionism, embracing both “[modified] causal 
explanation and interpretive understanding” (Archer, cited in Sayer, 2005: 5, 
Fairclough, 2003: 26). 
 
Critical realist epistemology does not totally abandon the empiricist mode of inquiry, 
yet develops it by employing hermeneutic abstraction so as to reflect the “stratified” 
world.25 Among other critical realists, Sayer (1992: 13) points out a couple of dubious 
beliefs (held mainly by positivists) about the nature of knowledge: 
A. Observation or contemplation is the best way to gain knowledge; 
B. It is unproblematic to reduce from seeing, knowing to saying; 
C. Production and use of knowledge is insignificant; and  
D. Scientific knowledge is more important than other types of knowledge such as those 
upheld by local and traditional institutions.  
 
The fallacy of A and B were briefly explained in the last section. Scientific knowledge 
of climate change itself is produced, disseminated and consumed through inter-
subjective social activities (Demeritt, 2002, Sayer, 1997). Therefore, scientific 
knowledge is but one of many different kinds of knowledge that can be tailored for 
different purposes (Sayer, 1992: 17). He also struggles with C by accentuating that 
social practices and knowledge are inseparable (ibid: 43). It is termed as “practical 
adequacy” or “reciprocal confirmation” between social practices, materially 
constructed entities and systems of meanings (ibid: 33). Extensive comprehension of 
divergent social meanings with regard to climate change (e.g. how climate change risk 
differently means relying on gender, age, culture and religion) serves for nothing 
unless material realities are together addressed. By the same token, material reality 
might be less important without social interpretations.  
 
At the beginning of fieldwork, the production of knowledge for climate change and 
disaster risk in Korea was found heavily premised on the above-critiqued four beliefs – 
particularly, D (e.g. in the national master plan and the debates at public spheres such 
                                                                                                                                        
 
25 It is also worth understanding the transition in “practice of theorization” from the quantitative to 
interpretive approach in economic geography (Barnes, 2001: 546). By theorization, it means molding 
“the very idea of theory”, namely “a series of persuasive, novel re-descriptions” (ibid: 548). While the 
empiricist mode of theorizing tries to deploy “scrupulous” vocabularies and “ocular metaphors” in order 
to mirror the external world, the hermeneutic mode of theorization adopts “open-ended interpretation” 
that does not seek to find out the final, absolute knowledge (ibid.). 
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as the 3rd International Symposium on CCA in Seoul in 2011 or Water Forum in Seoul 
in 2012). The member of staff of the UKCIP invited to the International Symposium 
on Climate Change Adaptation said that the policy and discursive construction in the 
UK a decade ago also largely hinged on economic and material impacts as Korea do 
now (personal communication, ISCCA, 2011). Recognising this point made the thesis 
author reluctant to conduct interviews with the so-called experts in the field.  
 
Second, the central plank of practical adequacy of knowledge is that critical realism 
does not deny relativism in its epistemological claim even though strong relativism is 
always skirted (Proctor, 1998). This indicates that critical realists see knowledge of 
reality as fallible and incomplete (ibid.). The concept of practical adequacy serves as 
an experimental leverage for producing more suitable accounts of entities (ibid.). 
Hermeneutics also denies “the arrogance of certainty and self-sufficient knowledge” of 
positivism (Cilliers, 2005 cited in Blaikie, 2007: 212). It is significant to grasp “the 
role of society in constructing and manipulating knowledge, space, nature, and scale” 
(Manson, 2008: 778). Consequently, social constructionists argue, “knowledge of 
complexity is always provisional” (Cilliers, 2005: 259). Interestingly, critical realism 
and hermeneutics consent that arguing for ultimate truth is untenable. 
 
The two epistemological stances allow complexity theory to enjoy “an epistemological 
scale continuum”, which means that there are various temporal and geographical scales 
for risks from the impacts of climate change to be dissimilarly analysed (Manson, 2008: 
776). Without understanding of a range of scales at which proactive and responsive 
adaptation to climate change become effective, it might be meaningless to discuss 
vulnerability to the risk of climate change (Adger et al., 2005, Birkmann and Teichman, 
2010, Burton et al., 2012, Neumann, 2008). This idea allowed fieldwork to pay more 
attention to multiple levels of politics at which various claims were made, challenged 
and mediated of material and constructed disaster risk. 
 
Complexity theory owes its conceptual richness to many hitherto perspectives: the 
concept of synergy effect from Aristotle, self-organization from philosophy of 
organism, concept of feedbacks from cybernetics, and flows of entities from systems 
theory (Manson, 2008: 72). Yet, this is both a strong and a weak point of complexity 
theory. The challenge is to transcend the sum of its theoretical parts without losing the 
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logical power of each. One of possible tasks to take is to avoid extremist claims of 
reality and knowledge of it (McLaughlin and Dietz, 2008). Manson (2008: 785) also 
points to the importance of “communication among differing epistemological positions” 
in search of “a balance between accepting seemingly apparent scales of observation 
and explanation and recognizing their purposeful construction of social, economic, and 
political ends”. In addition, “modest” rather than “self-confident or assertive” accounts 
of the nature of knowledge are argued to be helpful to understand the complex world 
(Cilliers, 2005: 256).  
 
The above claims, however, need be considered in local contexts. For example, 
communication among different epistemological positions is less easy for society 
where the construction of policy and policy-making processes are closed and 
centralised towards a small group (NI5, 2012). Some initial interviewees who were 
expected to play a key role in the field of CCA were reluctant to express any political 
view, and strongly required to remain anonymous in this research, refusing to have 
their interviews recorded. This was a constraint on the quality and type of data that 
could be collected. In addition, as some informants insisted (NI 5, 2012), researchers 
working for government-affiliated research institutes tend to be reluctant to share 
information if these have the potential to induce a controversy. This also made 
fieldwork challenging as explained in the following section. 
4.3: Methodology 
This section accounts for the design of research methods and the implementation 
process from which key implications for further research of disaster politics can be 
drawn. It is also important to spell out the gap between initial aspirations of the 
research and the challenges of data collection faced during fieldwork, and how it was 
overcome. Then explanation of how the data were analysed follows. This section 
concludes by discussing the issue of research ethics. 
4.3.1. Contingency in the lack of contextualised information 
This research is among the first academic endeavors to scrutinize the theoretical and 
empirical linkages amongst politics and disaster risk in the context of the post-
developmental Korean state. As can be seen in previous chapters, no academic 
research (to the thesis author’s knowledge) has examined the case of Korea for the 
given themes with a historical and integrative perspective. In this regard, a research 
site needed to be carefully chosen. 
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This research chose Seoul and Jeju as a research site. As a matter of fact, until the 
upgrade examination in 2010, the research had paid less attention to the case of Seoul. 
The pilot study (based on reviews of grey literature and Internet searched materials) 
indicated that Jeju seemed very vulnerable to the risk of climate change and hazards. 
As the examiner for the upgrade exam rightly pointed out, however, limiting a research 
site to Jeju had problems. On one hand, the island has been relatively outside of the 
core current of compressed development, thereby offering a weaker rationale for 
examining dual-risk and compressed development. On the other hand, the existing 
literature indicated Seoul as a more suitable research site for examining risk 
implications of development, due to the greater extent of urbanization and the hyper-
centralisation phenomenon in political, economic, educational terms (Choi, 2010).  
 
Lacking background knowledge and contextualised information of the themes in Korea, 
the research immediately confronted another question. Can public awareness of the 
themes in particular localities (for example, on newspaper articles or by local 
governments) be used as evidence to judge the potential availability of empirical 
evidence and data? A possibly plausible answer to this question was offered during 
fieldwork: it was critical to recognize the context in which such a claim of greater 
awareness of climate change risk had been made. The hidden motives behind such a 
claim can be identified within both discursive and empirical space, in which different 
groups embody their core ideas such as development visions, ideology and worldviews 
(see the section for social innovation in Chapter four). A typical example is the FRRP 
for which the uncertainty of climate change was certainly emphasised to reinforce the 
vested rights rather than address local vulnerability to risk and hazards, as 
demonstrated in Chapter five. 
 
In addition, fieldwork enabled the capturing of the significance of previously 
unexpected, emergent events. The fieldwork plan did not anticipate the occurrence of 
the MT Woomyeon landslides crisis and the change of a mayor in Seoul in 2011. It was 
also unforeseen that the research focus would be directed towards the naval base 
construction in Jeju. The latter case accidently happened as a result of carrying out 
interviews with local informants as the snowballing sampling technique anticipated 
(NI 11, 2011, NI14, 2011). 
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4.3.2. Searching for locally contextualised inquiries to disaster risk 
Certainly, the issue of climate change is new to public debates in Korean society; yet 
there is another reason for the lack of contexualised information on the issue of CCA 
and DRR in Korea. It is the ways in which research on an unfamiliar issue almost 
exclusively rely on Western scholarship. 
 
Among others, Kang (2004: 253) claims that “[t]here is no South Korea in South 
Korean Cultural Studies”, due to “the colonial condition of knowledge production.” 
This is a bit of an exaggerated claim; yet it is true that a majority of research on 
climate change and disaster risk in Korea tends to “import” theories, concepts and 
research approaches directly from Western scholarship (Kim, 1989, Kim, 1994, Ho et 
al., 2003, Chung, 2004, Kang et al., 2009). Informed by positivist and functionalist 
theory, these studies assume that the issues of climate change and disaster risk are 
simply apolitical. 
 
Of course, the current research is not wholly free from this criticism, given that it 
employed Western derived concepts and theories such as resilience, social innovation, 
and most apparently the Risk Society thesis (see Chapter two). The point is that the 
research tried to elaborate the preliminary research questions further in light of the 
local context, yet this was very challenging. Partly because of the marginality of 
disaster risk policy in public discourse (see Chapter five). Grappling with this situation, 
fieldwork spent far longer (six months) searching for materials in national and local 
libraries, in pursuit of understanding the history of disaster in Korea. It is necessary to 
note how the preliminary research questions made pre-fieldwork were modified. These 
were: 
A. How have changes in the key institutions since the financial crisis shaped social 
vulnerability and adaptive capacity for CCA? 
 
To fully answer this question, it was divided into following sub-questions. 
 
a-1. How have the roles, responsibilities and political power of the state, NGOs and 
Chaebols changed in addressing natural hazard and climate risk over the last decade? 
 
a-2. What is the underlying logic behind the recently proclaimed paradigm “Low 
Carbon Green Growth”? 
 
c-1. Did typhoons Rusa in 2002 and Maemi in 2003 lead to any “critical junctures” 




B. How do social organizations strike the balance between coping ranges (exploitation) 
and social learning (exploration) for CCA and HRR (Hazard Risk Reduction) in Jeju? 
 
b-1. What factors are perceived to be crucial by stakeholders for dealing with 
vulnerability to the risk of climate change and natural hazards? 
 
These questions have not completely changed since the research has still dealt with the 
interlocked relationship between politics and disaster. The critical moments for the 
research came when the occurrence of: 1) the landslides crisis and following political 
change coincided with the interview with the environmental activist who was deeply 
involved in the aftermath of the landslides crisis (NI2, 2012); and 2) the interview with 
N 11 (2011), due in part to the cancellation of planned interview with a potential 
informant who was imprisoned on the day for the interview (see Section 4.3.1 and 7.4).  
 
In particular, the MT Woomyeon landslides crisis enabled the research to reconsider 
question A.  Of course, no assumption was previously made that rich groups would be 
less vulnerable to disaster risk. Yet, the impacted areas were one of richest Gangnam 
in Seoul. In addition, more visible than in other urban disaster cases was the somewhat 
serious claim made to associate the cause of the disaster to the incumbent local 
authority’s maladministration, such as a sharp cut in the budget for disaster reduction 
and the preceding year as a missed opportunity to prepare for potential crisis (see 
Chapter six). Accordingly, the focus of this aspect of the research was changed, from 
the shaping of vulnerability to political reflections on disaster. In addition, the question 
c-1 was replaced to look into the MT. Woomyeon landslides, as access to data of 
political reaction to the typhoons Rusa and Maemi was very limited. 
 
Throughout fieldwork, it was apparent that the ways of positioning the researcher in a 
research site lead to very different outcomes. To closely observe the situation of Gang-
jeong village and the oppositional camp (see Chapter seven), one of my interviewees 
suggested the researcher provide labour by helping to prepare meals and washing 
dishes for recruiting potential interviewees for a day. This suggestion was helpful in 
making a sense of closeness with the oppositional groups and more deeply 
understanding their various reasons for opposing to the naval base construction. 
Together with the issue of contingency (Section 4.3.1), it confirmed that this research 
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was a result of continuous interactions between the researcher and the researched (as 
well as the observed), and the theoretical framework and empirical evidence. 
4.3.3. The implementation of a multiple-case study 
It was inferred that a multiple-case study would help elaborate the dual-risk thesis in 
terms of disaster triggered by natural hazards. Then what is the rationale for a 
multiple-case study in different local contexts within a country? It was never intended 
to make any universal explanation of dual-risk for which quantitative comparative 
strategies might better serve. In addition to this, Hopkins (2002: 254) emphasises 
another reason for conducting a case study, which is to “assess the validity of our 
interpretations of specific or even unique political phenomena.” 
 
The aim of the research was not to simply compare two cases – Seoul and Jeju – but to 
elaborate the dual-risk thesis that was previously applied to only national politics in 
terms of manufactured risk (Han and Shim, 2010, Kim, 1998). This research intended 
to infer and explicate the dual-risk thesis, in terms of political responses and social 
construction of risk of disaster triggered by natural hazards at the sub-national level. In 
other words, to question how the previously apolitical issue (natural disaster/climate 
change) had become political in Korea. Doing this required the further 
problematisation of the localisation of dual-risk, in light of their particular social fabric, 
political relations, discourses, and local history. Indeed, this is exactly why the 
approach to carrying out a multiple case study takes “holism” (Ragin, cited in Hopkins: 
261). It also scrutinises the social reality under inquiry, “within their contexts, looking 
at the cases as “wholes” (complex combinations of variables)” (ibid.).  
 
With the above comments in mind, this research employed “retroduction” as the 
primary research strategy (Blaikie, 2007: 83). This is a cyclical process that directs 
research to examine objects, structures (or causal mechanisms of political reflections) 
that are initially presumed to exist as well as how they are understood and interpreted 
by social actors (ibid.). Retroduction is made up of two processes: 1) the building up of 
a hypothetical model of structures and causal mechanisms by iterative abstraction, this 
research achieved this by borrowing from existing research and theory (Kim, 1998, 
Han, 1998, Han and Shim, 2010); 2) to verify or refute the hypothetical models 
validity. This two-way thinking continued during the whole process of the research.  
 
121  
In the context of this research, a model means more than “an integrated set of 
propositions that state relationships between various concepts” (Blaikie, 2007: 83). 
Instead, as Harré (cited in Blaikie, 2007: 84) puts it, “models are pictures and images 
that are intended to represent an explanatory mechanism.” Although retroduction can 
generally be started by “a logic of discovery” (ibid.), this research did not intend to 
explore new structures. It was still meaningful to “exhaust the explanatory capacity of 
known types of structures and mechanisms before launching too far into the difficult 
territory of discovering new ones” (ibid.). The thesis borrowed complex, multiple 
accounts of such structures (dual-risk thesis, the theory of institutional change, social 
capital and environmental risk). The main task was then not only to identify such 
theoretical positions but also to integrate these in a meaningful way in order to help 
better examine how groups with different ideas, logics and values compete to either 
maintain or transform the dual-risk structures accounted for by the theories.  
 
A case study itself is not a research method. Rather, it is a strategy for developing in-
depth knowledge about one or a small number of cases by employing a range of 
research methods (Robson, 2000: 40). The methods employed for this research include 
observation, interviews (and transcripts) and document analysis. What combination of 
methods helped examining the cases chosen for this research? This question is 
inevitably linked to the aims and research problems – amongst descriptive, exploratory, 
and explanatory – of the research (Yin, cited in Grix, 2004). Given that the main 
intention was to explore the process of political and discursive changes under disaster 
risk, key informant interviews, reviews of secondary sources and archival research 
were the primary data collection methods. Thus this qualitative research searches for 
the depth and difference of ideas, feelings and experiences of human beings to the 
given issue, rather than merely looking for regularity or generalisation of social 
phenomena. The latter in this research is simply a starting point, to accept the existence 
of dually structured risk, and then study the various ways in which dual-risk is felt, 
understood, experienced and critiqued. 
 
At an early stage, the fieldwork took semi-structured interviews and document analysis 
as the main method techniques to collect data to reveal informants’ ideas, values, 
relationships, experiences, roles and information regarding the issue of DRR and CCA 
(see the preliminary research questions in Section 4.3.2). As explained before and in 
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Chapter six, most respondents were reluctant to express strong views to the issue of 
climate change and hazards. This problem led to a change in interviewing strategy with 
greater use of unstructured interviews (with less emphasis on the issue of CCA) to 
assure the informants of the uniqueness and worthiness of their expressions and 
opinions.  
 
Sampling is essential for any research. The population from which samples can be 
selected are people, but also situations, events, time and any combination of these. 
Since this research did not seek to produce universal laws, the research applied non-
probability sampling. In particular, a purposive snowball-sampling tactic was 
employed. This was especially because social organisations at the local level were less 
visible than those at the national level. The criteria for sampling were clear (relevance 
to the social reality under inquiry, for example in the case of people their occupation, 
academic interest, residential area and experience of disasters). After the research 
focus changed (see 4.3.2), snowballing sampling became more useful because of 
previously developed relationships with the informants (particularly in Jeju). 
Silverman (2010) poses a question as to how many interviews might be sufficient for 
PhD research. He then goes to note that:  
 
[it] depends upon your research problem…many qualitative researchers use 
purposive sampling to choose a case because it illustrates some feature or process 
in which we are interested. This does not provide a simple approval for any case 
we happen to choose. Rather, purposive sampling demands that we think 
critically about the parameters of the population we are studying and choose our 
sample carefully on this basis” (ibid: 193) 
 
Indeed, it is up to the researcher to judge a saturation point at which no more data are 
beneficial for addressing the research problem. The current research probes into three 
cases of discursive space, in which often implicit and conflicting ideas and responses 
to risk coexist. The point of data saturation came when the researcher was no longer 
gaining new information about the tension between the status quo and critical 
consciousness in the three arenas of disaster politics.  
 
In addition, there were few interviewees with whom the researcher was able to discuss 
the issue of climate change. For this reason, a decision was made avoid using jargons 
or technical terms regarding the issue of climate change for an interview; yet more 
123  
familiar terms. The identity of interviewees remained anonymous in this research. This 
was to protect the informants from any possible disadvantage that might be incurred by 
the research. Instead, their organizations, main roles and speciality are noted in the 
following table. Sometimes, they were found to take more than one role, for example it 
was usual for academics to join NGO activities. In this case a respondents main source 
of income has been selected to make their abbreviations. 
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Location and time 
for the interviews 
Specialty/main 
activities 
1. NI 1  
 
The RCK (Gyeong-gi) Suwon, 
21/July/2011 
Disaster relief and 
humanities 
2. RAI 1  
 
Former staff of the RCK 






3. RAI 2 
 
The Korean Adaptation 






4. NI 2 
 






issues in general 
5. RAI 3  
 





6. BI 1  LIG insurance Seoul Car insurance 
7. NI 3  Young Foundation, former 





8. NI 4  
 





9. NI 5 
 
Institute for Climate 
Change Action (ICCA) 
Seoul, 
10, 23/April, 2012 
Climate change 
10. NI 6 
 
The Hope Institute Seoul, 
07/June/2012 
Civil participation 
11. NI 7 
 
The Hope Institute Seoul, 
07/June/2012 
Civil participation 
and climate change  
12. GI 1 
 







13. NI 8 
 
The Loving Centre for 
Disaster Victims (LCDV) 
Seoul, 
25/September/2011 
Disaster relief  




15. LGI 2 Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul 
23/06/2012 
Migrants 
16. RAI 4 
 






17. LGI 3 Officer in charge of 
adaptation to climate 
change (Seoul government) 
Seoul Climate change 
adaptation 
18. RAI 5 
 
Professor of Senile Welfare Yong-in, 
09/April/2012 
Welfare 
19. RAI 6 
 





20. NI 9 
 
The RCK (Jeju) Jeju, 
31/08/2011 
Disaster rileif 







issues in general 







Notes: Government: GI; Local Government: LGI; NGOs (both national and local): NI; 
Research institutes and academics: RAI; Business: BI; Local Residents and community-based 
organizations: LRI; Migrant workers and marriage migrant women: MI. 
 
Official and grey documents such as white papers, research reports, newspaper 
(including online newspaper), and minutes of public hearings were also collected to 
later crosscheck the findings of the interviews. For example, when some local 
23. LRI 1 
 
Gangjeong village Jeju, 
04/October/2011 
 
24. RAI 7 
 




25. RAI 8 
 
Jeju Development Institute Jeju, 
02/Sep/2011 
Water resource 
26. NI 12 
 
The RCK Jeju Jeju, 
09/September.2011 
Disaster relief and 
volunteering 
27. RAI 9 
 
Professor of architecture Email, 12/Feb/2012 Urbanization 
28. RAI 10 
 






29. NI 13 
 
Asia Climate Change 




30. NI 14 
 










32. LGI 4 
 
Disaster and Safety 





33. LGI 5 
 
Disaster and Safety 





34. LGI 6 
 






35. LRI 2 
 
Female diver at Jeju Jeju, 
03/Sep/2011 
Diver 
36. NI 15 
 
 






37. AKSHM The 10th Anniversary of the 
Korean Society of Hazard 
Mitigation 
Seoul 
26 November 2011 
Hazard mitigation 




Opposing to the 
naval base 
construction 
39. DRCSGS Disaster Relief, Civil 
Society and Global 
Solidarity 
Seoul 
13~14 July 2011 
 
Disaster relief 




41. ISCCA The 3rd International 













informants claimed that their community was not prone to natural hazards (which was 
the case in Jeju), this claim needed to be checked with statistical data or news articles 
of the trends, losses and damages from disaster. In addition, newspapers’ comments on 
the same issue (e.g. the FRRP) were not the same in tenor (e.g. conservative versus 
progressive).  
 
It was difficult to get access to the victims and their families of the urban landslides or 
the villagers at Gang-jeong. Alternatively, TV documentaries on the issues (Chung, 
2011, Gangjeong naval base crisis) and interviews with activists provided descriptions 
of the severe situations of the crises. Instead, fieldwork focused on finding out about 
any evidence showing that disaster risk was taken as part of the rationale of opposition 
to the naval base in the case of Jeju. It was also considered that theory-neutral 
observation was not possible (Bryman, 2012). At the same time, however, during 
either interviews or observation fieldwork was always in pursuit of looking for new 
information or novel interpretation of the social reality beyond the prepared theoretical 
framework. For instance, drawing attention to the case of naval base was an outcome 
of taking this approach.  
 
Almost every interview was recorded and fully transcribed. A smartphone was used to 
record all the interviews. A record of one interviewee was accidently deleted; in this 
case immediate transcription with the help of memos made during the interview was 
done. 
4.3.4. Analytical problems 
Primary data from interviews, documents, news articles (clipped), field notes and TV 
programmes was collected during the first fieldwork trip in October 2011. After this 
data had been coded for analysis, it became clear that the data collected was 
insufficient to achieve the research objectives, and this led to a second fieldwork 
period of three months from April, 2012. 
 
After the second fieldwork, data were coded for analysis again. The scripts were not 
cut and paste. Instead, different colored pens were used to mark important 
concepts/sub-themes (e.g. theme: critical consciousness of disaster, red: local authority 
critique, blue: Law critique, yellow: culture critique, and green: hazard critique). When 
searching for themes, particular attention was paid to Bernard’s (2003, cited in Bryman, 
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2012: 555) recommendations about what to look for. These include; “repetition” of 
similar topics, “indigenous typologies” (local expression), the use of “metaphors”, 
“similarities and differences” (interviewees’ ways of debating a topic), “linguistic 
connectors” (because or since), “missing data”, and “theory-related material.” 
Meanwhile, it was very important to remember the logic of “retroduction” (see Section 
4.3.3) to verify and refute the theoretical framework of the current research. For 
example, the thesis author continued to read both coded data against the literature 
review of the thesis and new journal articles. In addition, it was possible to contact the 
interviewees quickly and ask them about any uncertain meanings or expressions via 
Facebook or Social Network Service (SNS). Some interviewees offered new 
information about a local government initiative to foster DRR, for example, discussing 
the new life risk governance programme that was being debated at the time (RAI 1, 
2011). 
4.3.5. Translation and Romanisation problems 
During fieldwork and writing-up, the issue of translation or semantic compatibility 
between Korean and English terms was often non-trivial. Jeju people use their own 
dialect between themselves, and the difference between their accent and local idiom 
and that of standard Korean is probably far larger than, for example, that between 
standard British English and Scottish English. Nevertheless, all interviewees from Jeju 
are familiar with standard Korean and they all used it during interviews, so there were 
no issues with inter-dialectical translation. Importantly, there were several issues 
relating to translation between Korean and English concepts that arose during 
interviews and analysis. This was by no means surprising given the different histories, 
cultures, and institutions in English speaking countries and Korea. Some examples 
should be discussed below. 
 
First, interviews with some local activists indicated that the use of the term 
‘development’ is not straightforward in Korea, where the term development has a 
particular historically contexualised meaning, especially to progressive activists and 
opposition parties, and this has to do with the history of compressed development led 
by authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the term ‘development’ is often combined 
with or used in conjunction with ‘dictatorship’; in ‘development dictatorship.’ Thus, 
for many of the activists and members of the opposition interviewed, as for many 
others in Korea, ‘development’ is likely to evoke negative connotations related to the 
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country’s previous dictatorships, unless it is qualified by a specific modifier. This issue 
did not have a significant impact on the interview processes, although it sometimes 
upset some interviewees requiring a delicate interview technique (NI 11, 2011, NI 14, 
2011). 
 
Another issue was that of Romanisation. The Internet-based Romanization tool 
produced by Pusan University was as used (http://roman.cs.pusan.ac.kr) when Korean 
terms needed be to Romanised: for example, the names of people, places, political 
parties and so on, as well as the titles of Korean materials in the reference list of this 
thesis. 
 
The third issue here is related to the first, but was more profound. Simply, it is often 
not possible to provide a simple English term that accurately captures particular 
meanings, expressions, positions in organizations, social relations (for Gwon-dang, see 
Chapter seven) and many other terms that are only meaningful in Korean or even sub-
national local contexts. This issue is more noticeable in interviews with Jeju people. 
For example, the term Sindang was translated to a shaman temple for worshipping 
local gods in Section 7.3, but it would take a number of English words or even a 
paragraph to properly describe the Korean term. This issue was even more complex for 
the Jeju term Gwon-dang. However, simply using the translation ‘shamanistic temple’ 
is not completely accurate, because Sindangs exist in hundreds forms and for 
numerous purposes in rural areas of Korea. Consequently, translation is neither easy 
nor completely accurate.  
 
Similar problems exist when translating some English terms into Korean. An 
important issue here was that of how to translate ‘hazard’, which is one of most 
important terms for this project. The definition of hazard employed in this thesis is 
discussed in Box 2.1, however, if defined in this way there is no proper Korean term 
for hazard, strictly speaking. Typhoons, earthquakes, and heavy rains can be called 
hazards in English because they all have the potential to harm individuals (Pelling, 
2003c). According to the Oxford dictionary, the first enumerated definition of hazard 
is ‘a danger or risk’, yet with a sub-definition of ‘a potential source of danger’ as in 
Box 2.1 (see http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/hazard?q=hazard).  
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Although the Korean term (Jaenan) for ‘typhoon’ comes close to this definition of 
‘hazard’, as meaning a natural event or phenomenon, there is no common or generic 
Korean term that can be routinely employed to denote the potential to harm. In fact, 
among experts of disaster and crisis in Korea, the difference between hazard (potential) 
and disaster (outcome) is made and informed (RAI 3, 2011). Yet, these two Korean 
terms have been used rather interchangeably to indicate the outcome of hazard (Jaenan 
and Jaehae). According to the National Institute of the Korean Language, Jaenan 
means an ‘unexpectedly occurred calamity and hardship’, while Jaehae means ‘harm 
resulting from calamity; harm resulting from earthquake, typhoon, flood, draught, 
tsunami, fire, and infectious disease’ (http://stdweb2.korean.go.kr/search/List_dic.jsp†). 
Both refer to the outcome; the criterion to divide them is not the potential but the 
predictability (actor-driven).  
 
Based on the division, natural and man-made Jaehae makes sense in a similar way to 
that in which ‘disaster’ does in English (harm caused by both natural and technical 
factors). Yet, can Jaenan be translated into ‘hazard’ without modification?  
 
The answer is no; because Jaenan refers to an outcome, not a potential. It should be 
noted that if we want to convey the original meaning of hazard in translation into 
Korean, it is better to use the term ‘natural phenomena with potential harm’. At least 
until Jaenan is both routinely and institutionally used as meaning potential harm. 
There is not enough space for a fuller debate on this issue. However, there was much 
debate about this issue in Korea, because the confused use of the terms had led 
practical problems, for example, the inadequate separation of organizational 
responsibility for natural and man-made disasters. This is summed up by one of my 
interviewees:  
 
“in the past it was far harder for government officials to cooperate. “That is 
a natural disaster, so it’s your duty!”, or visa versa. So funds remaining in 
one side could not be used for the other…Arriving in the 2000s, many 
scholars demurred and in 2003 hot debate arose. Then, I also strongly 
argued, [but] there are scholars who argue for the unity of term to natural 
Jaehae. They used to manage natural Jaehae and Jaenan [man-made] 
management in the past, their claim is also plausible. Looking at one side 
of the issue, according to the sixth clause of Article 34 of the Constitution, 
“the nation should prevent Jaehae and protect the life and property of the 
people from Jaehae.” [They argue] “you know it is Jaehae in the 
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Constitution?” Well [my] refutation of this is that “then did those who 
enacted the Constitution believe that we can prevent typhoon itself?”, isn’t 
it? How can we prevent the occurrence of typhoon? Saying “what the 
lawmaker meant was to prevent harm from natural Jaenan, not natural 
Jaehae – the physical phenomenon - itself”, we persuaded them. And 
instead, we proposed to call physical phenomena as Jaenan and define the 
outcome of Jaenan as Jaehae…so when establishing the Basic Act on 
Jaenan and Safety management, this proposal was accepted” (RAI 3, 2011, 
parentheses added†). 
 
Consulting the Basic Act on Jaean and Safety Management, it is clear that this account 
of the terms is partially true. Jaenan is defined as “what harms or is likely to harm the 
life, body, property and the country” (see http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=129 
310&efYd=20130423#0000†). At the same time, however, the three sub-definitions of 
Jaenan still include ‘harm’ (as outcome) or even Jaehae. Jaenan means: 
 
A. Jaehae that results from natural phenomena such as typhoon, flood… 
B. Damage that results from fire, collapse… 
C. Damage that results from energy, communication… 
 
Clearly, the use of terms in the law is rather complicated. According to the Natural 
Disaster Countermeasures Act, Jaehae is ‘harm or damage resulting from Jaenan’ (see 
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=129308&efYd=20130423#0000). 
 
This research project argues that this complexity in the use of terms stems from the 
dilemma produced by the coexistence of old and new perspectives in the discourse of 
disaster. Here the traditional perspective is premised on the strong belief that denies 
human and social contribution to so-called Natural disaster. On the other hand, the 
new perspective (also see the above passage) acknowledges that the outcome of 
disaster can result from both natural and man-made elements. This research project 
takes the view that the socionature thesis and dual-risk thesis together can help ease 
this dilemma. In addition, this dilemma is exactly where the two theses can meet to 
mutually learn from each other. However, given space restrictions, this debate is put 
aside to Chapter eight. The point is that there is not a wholly satisfactory term in 
Korean to convey the ‘potentiality’ or ‘not-yet-happened harm’ aspects of ‘hazard’. 
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The reason why much space is devoted to description of culture, history and politics of 
Korea in the empirical chapters is also partly to articulate “the contextual uniqueness 
and significance of the aspect of” Korea by which to question the “transferability” of 
the findings of this research to other milieus (Bryman, 2012: 378). As Searle argues 
(1995, cited in Hodgson, 2006: 13), “language is the basic social institution in the 
sense that all others [other institutions] presuppose language, but language does not 
presuppose the others.” This means that translation of what is uttered, said, and argued 
in Korean into other languages requires extra caution and care. Methods and 
methodology textbooks rarely point out this. Moreover, the final issue at stake in 
translation relates to the English proficiency of the researcher. Therefore, rather than 
merely relying on dictionaries, the researcher discussed important questions of 
translation with bilingual Korean British in London in order to make sure translations 
were accurate. 
4.3.6. The relationship of the author with the researched: mutual influence?  
In Blaikie (2007: 11-12)’s term, during the whole process of data collection the 
researcher  was in general  an “outsider”, an evolving “learner”, and “on people” that 
means that the interviewees remained as “respondents” rather than  becoming “clients” 
or “partners”. At some points, the researcher happened to build close relationships with 
research subjects, for example when more than one interview was conducted with the 
same interviewee or when the researcher joined in events such as a local cultural 
festival (see Table 4.1, 38). Blaikie also claims that the researcher can contribute to 
“the emancipation of oppressed groups” (ibid: 12). This research did not aim at this, 
although it is hard to know precisely what impact the data collection process in general 
had on the interviewees. After the interview with RAI 3 (2011), the author was invited 
to the conference on national crisis management, and presented a short paper written in 
Korean. This may have had a bearing on the participants in the conference. 
 
A Jeju provincial government official in charge of planning for the provincial CCA 
plan refused an interview request because she believed her interview would not help 
the research. When introduced to the topic of the research, she replied, “Why is Jeju 
vulnerable to climate change!?” Except for refusing to be interviewed, she was willing 
to help with the provision of official documents through the Korean Public Disclosure 
System (https://www.open.go.kr/pa/html/eng_main.htm). In general, interviewees 
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contacted for an interview were generous, although they were reluctant to believe that 
the interviews could be helpful. 
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4.4: Research ethics 
Two ethical approvals were secured before each fieldwork trip; therefore the 
researcher understood the aspects of ethics essential for interviewing people. Four 
points are underlined in this section; harm to participants, informed consent, invasion 
of privacy and deception (Bryman, 2012: 118). 
 
Potential harm, not only to those interviewed but also to the researcher, was carefully 
considered before the interviews. In almost every case, the interviews were carried out 
in a public place during the day. Particularly during the fieldwork in Jeju, the tense 
atmosphere that resulted from the police staying in Gang-jeong village made the 
researcher slightly worried, but no serious conflict or violence occured except for some 
tussles between the police and demonstrators. 
 
Informed consent is the most important part of social science research ethics. Before 
commencing the fieldwork, business cards were made. This was one of the efforts 
made to provide the participants in interview with as much information about the 
researcher as possible. In addition, information about the current research (objective, 
aims, rationale, the expected completion date, etc.) was offered to them. The 
researcher never forced or pestered potential interviewees to participate in the research. 
Nor was any monetary compensation promised for participation or disadvantage 
intimated for refusal of participation. Some government or government-affiliated 
researchers did permit their interviews to be recorded, in which case the smartphone 
used for recording was turned off. Instead, fieldwork notes were taken. It was possible 
that emerging data could contain sensitive information, in which case the issue was to 
ensure that potential impacts on the participants could be removed. Therefore, all 
participants remained anonymous in this research to avoid the possibility of potential 
harm. All consent was acquired via verbal consent. Every effort was made not to 
commit invasion of privacy (covert method) and deception. However, it was not 
possible to for researchers to fully avoid this issue. For example, even with the 
acquisition of consent it does not necessarily follow that there will be absolutely no 
invasion of privacy (Bryman, 2012: 124). Deception occurs when the researched is 




In this chapter, the ontological, epistemological, methodological and analytical 
concerns were discussed. Informed by a realist ontology and a constructivist 
epistemology, this chapter has shown how and why the research methodology 
(qualitative + retroduction) was been applied to achieve the research objectives. Non-
trivial challenges as well as new opportunities arose during fieldwork.  
 
The gap between initial aspirations pre-field work, and the reality during and after 
fieldwork was wider than expected. This was only natural since a lot of new data – 
more precisely unanticipated disaster events – occurred during fieldwork. In the case 
of Jeju, the pilot study identified an increasing awareness of climate change risk in 
public discourse, mainly through the review of Internet news articles. Again, it was 
found that NGOs and the local government in Jeju were less interested in or aware of 
the given issue than the pilot research assumed. Instead, the researcher decided to draw 
the implications of the naval base construction – the issue that captured local 
governance stakeholders’ concern and interest – for local vulnerability to dual-risk. 
Another contingency issue came during fieldwork in Seoul when the Mt. Woomyeon 
landslides occurred. One of most important findings is that researchers of disaster, 
particularly those who examine the structure-agency and disaster nexus, should be 
open to naturally occurring data. 
 
In addition, this chapter has thoroughly discussed how translation from Korean to 
English challenged the researcher from the beginning of fieldwork to the analysis of 
the data. The chapter has also addressed in more detail the sampling tactics, tools for 
coding data and generating themes, and the positionality of the research. Finally, the 
chapter addressed the issue of research ethics. Future research into emerging risk and 
hazard will require applying a combination of diverse logics of discovery and research 
methods. This is because the unfolding aspect of risk in contemporary society becomes 
more complex as social responses evolve. 
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Chapter 5: The post-developmental state as dual-risk society 
5.1: Introduction  
This chapter critically reviews how the recent development paradigm in Korea (the 
Low Carbon, Green Growth strategy, hereafter LCCG) and its subset projects (e.g. the 
Four Rivers Restoration Project, hereafter FRRP) exploited the perceptual importance 
of nature as a source of future risk in order to maintain the status quo. At first, the 
government initiatives prevented experimental/critical thoughts from emerging in a 
bottom-up fashion in various ways. One of the main points here is that as a 
consequence of the Cold War, ideological enmity has had a significant impact on the 
health of the public sphere in Korea. While not entirely suppressed, the public sphere 
curtailed to the extent that it might not function as a space through which the generic 
level of resilience attained throughout compressed development can be transformed to 
hazard-specific resilience. Little is known of how discursive distortion influences the 
potential of social innovation for environmental risk reduction. Informed by the 
theoretical framework in Chapter three, this chapter synthesises various ideas and 
discourses on development and risk. 
 
In Section 5.3, this chapter discusses how changing risk perception has been dealt with 
in the governance space of the government and NGOs. The wide perception and reality 
gap will be also pointed out. Section 5.4 looks closely at the narrative competition over 
redirecting the developmental path of the country. In particular the discursive 
distortion and the use of ideological tension for keeping disaster events apolitical will 
be discussed. The ideational competition over the issue of FRRP that occurs at various 
levels of ideas will also be discussed. In conclusion, it will be made clear that the idea 
of dual-risk needs be applied to various types of risk, including the risk of disaster 




5.2: The increasing perceptual importance of nature as a source of risk 
Risk perception in Korea is argued to have changed over the decades – particularly 
after the incidence of then unexpected urban catastrophes such as the collapse of 
Sampoong Department Store in 1995 (killed 502) and Sŏngsu Bridge over the River 
Han in 1994 (killed 32) in Seoul (Han and Shim, 2010). These urban disasters were 
enough to damage the self-confidence the country had had in the Miracle on the Han 
River – rapid industrialization and urbanization from 1960s until that point. 
5.2.1. Risks perception 
Two nationwide surveys conducted in 1999 and 2007 probe the perception of public 
risk in Korea (ibid.). The questions and ways of asking them for the two surveys differ 
so that it should be cautious about jumping to a comparison about the changing risk 
perception as the authors acknowledged (ibid: 486). Nonetheless, the comparison of 
findings of the two surveys has significant implications for the current thesis. 
In the earlier survey, fraudulent construction, traffic accidents, and corruption were 
perceived to be the most serious risk threats to Korean society. This is hardly 
surprising, because the government’s post-disaster investigations into the above 
disasters revealed that bribery and corruption regarding the fraudulent construction of 
the collapsed buildings were the major causes. This is but one case illustrating how 
socio-political underdevelopment can cause catastrophic urban disasters in Korea. 
More than two decades on, as will be clearer later on this chapter, disaster risk 
resulting from this kind of endogenous governance failure in society is still prevalent. 
The 2007 survey suggests a different perception of public risk, as summarized in 
Figure 5.1. The horizontal and vertical axis refers to the intensity of the current 
perception of present risks and forward-looking perception of future risks respectively. 
The respondents believed economic (E2) and occupational risk (E3) to be the most 
threatening at that time (2007). Rather intriguing is that they expressed the risk of 
natural disaster (N-1), climate change (N-2) and environmental pollution (N-3) as 
being the most serious threats in ten years’ time (2017).  
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A-1: fire, A-2: building collapse 
A-3: traffic accident 
E-1: loss of credit, E-2: bank crisis 
E-3: unemployment 
F-1: family disintegration 
F-2: infiltration of privacy 
F-3: uncertainty of aged life 
H-1: epidemic disease 
H-2: new disease 
H-3: adult disease 
N-1: natural disaster 
N-2: climate change 
N-3: environmental pollution 
V-1: campus violence 
V-2: sexual crime 
V-3: violent crime 
Source: Adopted from Han (2008, cited in Han and Shim, 2010: 478) 
 
It is difficult to judge from the two surveys why public perception of risk has altered in 
this way over time; indeed, no single reason might be sufficient. What is clear from the 
surveys is, that the risk perception of the Koreans has changed to consider the natural 
environment as more an important factor in causing hazard risk than in the past. This 
perceptual change could be interpreted as implying that there will probably be greater 
public demand for addressing disasters triggered by natural forces in the future. 
 
It is worth noting that contemporary Korean society has encountered very different, 
“newer and newer” types of disaster crisis (RAI 3, 2012). For example, the No.1 
national treasure, 550 year-old Sungnyemun (commonly known as Namdaemun) gate 
was destroyed in February 2008. The criminal was a 70-year-old arsonist who had a 
grudge against the authorities over a land compensation issue (Kim, 2008a). This arson 
attack on cultural property, as means of expressing personal resentment, is a relatively 
new, previously unexpected type of risk; it is not listed in the surveys. As admitted by 
the authors themselves, the questionnaires and methods used in the two surveys are 
dissimilar so that extra caution is needed in interpreting the perceptual change over the 
last decade. Besides, as the East Japan tsunami-nuclear crisis in 2011 typified, the 
sources of natural and technical disaster risk are not precisely separable from each 
other in reality (Pelling, 2003c: 15). It should also be stressed that it is difficult to 
identify the characteristics of the respondents to the surveys (e.g. gender, income, 
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occupation, political view or age). For example, lay people and experts of the same age 
might have totally different risk perception (Savadori et al., 2004, Slovic, 1998). 
 
Despite all the above confounding issues, one vital point can be inferred from the 
above surveys. Nature – regardless of how it might be defined (for example, see 
Demeritt, 2002) – is being increasingly accepted as a major source of future risk and 
uncertainty in Korea. Perhaps this signifies public expression of the anxiety felt about 
the increasing symptoms of “dual” environmental risk, stemming from compressed 
development (Han and Shim, 2010). The symptoms of dual risk normally unfold to 
reflect the fact that the resilience achieved (through material/technical evolution and 
quantitative changes in society) is not buttressed by corresponding socio-
political/qualitative changes.  
 
A further question is whether the changing risk perception has been nothing more than 
a transient attitudinal change, or elicited concrete behavioral/institutional changes. The 
changing risks perception is “real”, if ideational, so must potentially be integrated with 
other priorities and values to lead to both discursive and material changes of many 
different kinds. For example, altered risk perception might lead to stricter building 
regulation, new budget allocations, and changes in governmental organization. At 
deeper levels, it can cause change in power relations, social contracts for natural 
disaster, and regime changes. 
5.2.2. The social contracts of natural disaster in Korea 
John Linton, who spent his childhood, and now works as a family practice doctor in 
Korea, contributed a column to a newspaper, critiquing the Korean social contract of 
hazard disasters (Linton, 2011). He looks back on his childhood when he asked his 
father about why local senior citizens in Korea blamed the mayor for the forest fire 
that occurred in his hometown. He quotes his father’s explanation that: 
 
“In Korean culture, someone must take the responsibility when terrible 
incidents occur; otherwise it would be very hard to settle and calm matters. 
Even if the events occurred due to the people or do not have obvious 
perpetrators, the culture compels those in official positions to take 
responsibility. This culture is hard to find in the West” (ibid: no page†). 
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Indeed, soon after that, the mayor acquiescently resigned. This passage accounts for 
the nature of social contracts that have long been maintained in Korea. The people 
accept the authority of government, but put unlimited responsibility on them, if 
necessary (Ha and Lee, 2011). Thus the democratic thinking that the people have used 
to curb government excesses has embedded in political culture. Probably this partly 
has to do with Confucian culture. In the era of the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1897), the 
last royal dynasty of Korea, natural disasters were regarded as a heaven-sent warning 
to kings failing to hold up their end [of the social contract] (Ha and Lee, 2011, Kim, 
2010a). The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty keep a record of Sejong the Great’s (1397-
1450, r. 1418-1450) remarks about severe calamities: 
 
“Rulers should have a mind to care for the people. The fire is a warning for 
me, exposing my misdeeds in the past and heralding what lies ahead. These 
days, the weather is truly unpredictable. The low precipitation may lead to a 
severe drought, which calls for public officials to help the farmers in earnest” 
(ibid: 298).  
 
Of course, it is hard to confirm if natural disasters led to the deposition of any king 
during the dynasty (perhaps not). It is also not argued in this thesis that environmental 
risk in Korea always brings about a regime change. The point is that while Confucian 
sentiment is influential upon the current social contract around disasters, the current 
governance system in Korea is totally different from that of the Joseon dynasty or 
authoritarian regimes. This point needs greater attention. Thus it can be assumed that 
environmental risk can fuel more political liquidity under current institutional 
arrangements (liberal democratic) than those of authoritarian regimes: thus the greater 
possibility that the failure of risk management might lead to a transfer of power. If we 
accept the likelihood that climate change will cause more intensified risk of 
environmental hazards in the future (IPCC, 2007), this hypothesis needs greater 
attention, not only from policymakers but also lay people who make a difference 
through political participation. 
5.3: The gap between perception and practice 
That said, the fieldwork of this research allowed the ongoing marginality of natural 
disaster and climate change risk in academic and public discourse to be observed. This 
is not to negate the increasing perception of environmental risk per se, but to highlight 
the strong tendency to subordinate it to other core objectives in public space. 
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5.3.1. Government 
In terms of the impacts of asymmetric power relations between ministries on 
cooperative CCA at the national level, RAI 2 (2011) asserts that: 
 
“It is extremely difficult for us [government-affiliated institute for CCA] to 
seek coordination with other powerful government agencies. For instance, 
the Ministry of Environment, with which our organization is affiliated, is 
probably the weakest ministry, so other agencies might not have any sense 
of obligation to join meetings we organize. If those organizations had been 
legally required to join the meetings or if there had been more incentives, it 
would be much easier to carry out our job of coordinating the adaptation 
works and networks” (parenthesis added†). 
 
Another interviewee points to the marginality of environmental risk in public discourse, 
with a reference to the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA): 
 
“The NEMA is even not a ministry. It was established as a result of the 
large-scale, organizational extension in 2004. We [NEMA] do not have 
enough power or rights. For example, firefighting is one of our core roles. 
Yet, in the case of a forest fire, the Korea Forest Service has almost all the 
power and resources. We only play a supportive role of bringing our 
equipment to the fire sites. In the case of larger-scale disasters, again they 
are beyond our capacity; probably the prime minister would lead the 
governmental response to them. I doubt about the capacity of the NEMA, 
if the scale and impacts amount to those of the East Japan tsunami crisis” 
(GI 1, 2011†). 
 
Arguably, their own members of staff see most environmental risk- and CCA-related 
government agencies as having least power, in terms of coordinating CCA and DRR 
activities at the national level (also, RAI 1, 2011). The above passages imply that when 
cross-governmental cooperation is required for CCA at wider levels, it might be hard 
for them to obtain timely cooperation. One NGO activist also acknowledges this point: 
 
“In fact, CCA at the national level has a variety of dimensions so 
coordination and cooperation are extremely important. Has the KCCCA 
been successful in satisfying those purposes so far? I don’t think so, and 
they [KCCCA] also admit it...I think that an organization with sufficient 
political power, say the Prime Minister’s Office, should take that role if 
national CCA is to succeed...the national adaptation plan might contain 
good ideas and plans. Yet implementing these requires a much stronger 
orchestrating organization than the KCCCA” (NI 5, 2012†). 
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In addition to power imbalance between ministries, RAI 2 (2011) also stresses 
different terms and knowledge their roles rely on, different focuses, and vertical 
relations with subordinate organizations that make cooperation difficult. For instance, 
when questioned about the lack of research into “social” vulnerability to climate 
change risk in her organization (CCA-focused governmental agency under Ministry of 
Environment), she noted that: 
 
“This is just my opinion. Well, that kind of research is a poor seller. We 
are in a position where we have to receive research funding from, say, the 
Ministry of Environment. Yet, they do not consider reduction of social 
vulnerability to climate change risk as their own responsibility, but that of 
the Ministry of Health and Welfare. I also agree with this view. The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare does not contact us for research into such 
issues, but the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs. For this reason, 
we [Ministry of Environment affiliated-research institutes] cannot carry 
out such research…some researchers in our organization might receive 
funding for such issues, but mainly personal [funding]” (parenthesis added, 
†). 
 
Of note is that the possibility of synergy-effects at organizational levels is rather 
limited, due to the rigid structure of sharing roles and responsibilities. In this situation, 
the marginality of environmental risk within government can continue, often with the 
issue subordinated to other “mainstream” issues. This is still a kind of mainstreaming 
of climate change risk within wider development issues, yet without any change in 
power relations or mutual learning. 
 
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that climate change is likely to lead to more 
situations for inter-governmental role conflict to erupt. RAI 8 (2011) introduces a real 
case that the National Weather Service and the Korea Water Resources Development 
Corporation came into conflict because of a failure to adapt to anticipated 
environmental change. He explains that: 
 
“For example, a couple of years ago, the National Weather Service forecast 
a typhoon with heavy rains. Following this forecast, the Korean Water 
Resources Development Corporation discharged the dams. Eventually, 
however, the anticipated typhoon did not come, and severe drought 
occurred. The impacted regions had problems because of a shortage of 
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drinking and agricultural water. In that case, who between the two 
organizations should take the responsibility?” (†)  
 
Similar kinds of conflict have been witnessed over numerous decisions where the 
removal of uncertainty is impossible, and an undesirable future event involves more 
than one stakeholder’s area of responsibility. Electric power supply, water resources, 
weather forecast, food security and the like are complexly interlinked with climate 
change, which creates new boundaries of roles and responsibilities. 
5.3.2. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
Despite the personal interest of the interviewees in environmental risk, their NGOs 
have not developed their own strategies, plans or social networks to address the current 
issues. Even a few NGOs and NPOs in Korea whose main goal is to deal with climate 
change risk focus exclusively on mitigation of climate change and energy security 
issues (NI 2, 2012, NI 4, 2012, NI 5, 2012).  
 
Noteworthy is one NGO’s attempt to tackle the marginality of environmental risk in 
public policy discourse. The climate change-related NGO had had a plan to exert their 
influence with the 2012 presidential election. The interviewee notes that: 
 
“Having the presidential election ahead at the end of this year, we have 
prepared a condensed policy report on the issue of climate change risk. The 
main goal is to make climate change issues more urgent and practical 
rather than abstract, so that lay people can consider them as issues for their 
lives. We hope this will help the electorate make their voting decision on 
the basis of the presidential candidates’ policy efforts and pledge to 
address climate change risk” (NI 4, 2012†).  
 
The outcome of this bottom-up approach to politicizing the issue of climate change is 
not easy to evaluate, yet it seems less influential than the intentions suggested. During 
the televised policy debates for the 2012 presidential election, for example, the invited 
candidates did not talk about environmental risk at all, despite the fact that one of the 
main topics of the second policy debate was the environment (NEBDC, 2012). Instead, 
the candidates spent all the given time arguing over the issues of social and economic 
risk, and national security (e.g. democratization of the economy, job creation and 
stability of employment, welfare policies, and the North Korea issue). Of course, 
broadly speaking, all these apparently non-climatic topics are germane to the debate on 
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the issue of CCA (NI 5, 2012), given their intimate relationships with the root causes 
of social vulnerability to environmental disaster risk (Wisner et al., 2004) and climate 
change risk (Adger, 1999, Adger, 2006). Yet any analysis of the policy debate 
confirms the serious marginality of environmental risk in public policy discourse, 
which is at odds with the findings of the 2007 survey mentioned above as well as the 
interviewees’ stated interest in climate change risk (NI 1, 2011). 
 
Again, when approached for interviews and introduced to the subject of this research 
(adaptation), many potential interviewees were reluctant to participate in this research. 
Additional time was always required to expand upon how their organizations’ works 
and experience could greatly inform this research. Most commonly, they believed they 
were lacking valuable knowledge and experience about the issue of CCA. They 
showed concern that their comments would be useless for this research. Yet, their 
shared concern is again at odds with the reality of their organizations: their existing 
roles and mission are already largely contributing to CCA and disaster risk reduction. 
Of course, this is partly a matter of how CCA is conceptualized and by whom. When 
questioned about why the Red Cross Korea (RCK) is reluctant to address the issue of 
climate change risk, NI 1 (2011) noted that: 
 
“Even existing roles and tasks are too much for us [the RCK]. For many 
reasons, to address climate change risk is way beyond our capacity. The 
uniqueness of the RCK is to have been audited and inspected by central 
government. It is technically an independent organization, but much 
supportive and supplementary of the government. It lacks funds and human 
resources. Individual staff of RCK might see climate change risk as an 
essential issue. Yet there is not an organizational effort or action…there is 
another issue regarding the identity of the RCK. Citizens probably see the 
primary mission of RCK as the blood donation business, not disaster relief 
and recovery or something” (parenthesis added†). 
 
This is but one anecdotal account of why the existing awareness of climate change risk 
has failed to translate into immediate action of an organization one of whose 
significant roles – disaster risk reduction – is closely related to CCA. There must be 
space for the existing roles and activities to be further advanced, in light of their own 
prospects of climate change risk. Another staff member answered the same question: 
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“So far as I know, the RCK might have had some sort of instructions from 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
(IFRC) – in line with Strategy 2020 – on our future roles in fighting 
climate change risk. Then the RCK’s headquarters would make a master 
plan with detailed action plans for local branches. Meanwhile, some 
mediation processes with central government would take place to clarify 
the roles of the RCK. For now there is no plan or guidelines regarding our 
roles in dealing with local climate change issues…probably all the staff 
from 14 branches of the RCK, I guess, would say that they have never 
thought of the issue of climate change risk before” (NI 9, 2011†). 
 
These two insider perspectives imply that the RCK has yet to realize their potential 
collective capacity to contribute to CCA at a local level.  
 
First, the identity of the RCK seems limited to that of a blood donation organization. 
This business is surely important but also confuses its own staff, in terms of their 
organization’s identity and main roles. It is also probable that their fund-raising 
capacity has been hampered by the false belief of the potential donors that their 
donation might be spent supporting North Korea; there is still strong anti-communist 
sentiment in South Korea. Indeed, inter-Korean Red Cross talks have been held over 
the last four decades to deal with such humanitarian issues as family reunions and 
disaster relief. Yet, the belief is obviously false, as the RCK fund is not used to aid 
North Korea: the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund under the Ministry of Unification. 
The restriction of organizational capacity by ideational/ideological distortion parallels 
how one liberal celebrity’s relief activities for flood victims can be denounced as 
political and pro-North Korean activity (see Section 5.4.).   
 
Second, and related to the above, the conservative, organizational culture of the RCK 
and its subordinate relations with the government hinder bottom-up organizational 
innovation (RAI 1, 2011). In fact, the organizational innovation, which would be 
required for CCA, need not be thought of as making something out of nothing. As 
mentioned earlier, their existing roles such as disaster relief, local volunteering 
activities, reduction of the economic vulnerability of marginalized groups, inter-
Korean affairs, and many other humanitarian activities can be integrated with adapting 
to the risk of climate change, without official authorization from the government. 
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Last but not least, one outsider’s perspective on the innate capacity of the RCK for the 
CCA of wider society is biased as a result of his narrow definition of CCA. When 
questioned about cooperative partnerships with other organizations for CCA – 
particularly the RCK - one interviewee answered “what’s the RCK got to do with 
climate change adaptation?” (RAI 4, 2011). This counter-question has one crucial 
point. The narrow and technical definition of CCA means that the public debate on the 
issue continues the exclusion of many other important groups’ capabilities and 
vulnerability to the risk of climate change from the public sphere. In this sense, the 
RCK should overcome not only its internal identity issue but also external bias, to 
engage in the governance space for climate change. The RCK might be but one of 
many organizations experiencing difficulty of mainstreaming climate change risk into 
their roles. 
5.4: Narrative competitions over redirecting the developmental path 
The post-developmental Korean state has recently been standing at the turning point of 
its history, in terms of pursuing the virtue of the long-ignored balance among differing 
values, objectives, and priorities. Indeed government, market and civic society in 
Korea also seem to have held on to this generic thinking despite their differing 
emphases and tactics. The major issues dealt with in the policy debates for the 18th 
presidential election (NEBDC, 2012) reflect the winds of change towards transforming 
the existing national developmental paradigm to be more inclusive of non-economic 
issues. It is argued in this thesis that the post-authoritarian developmental path can be 
depicted as constant narrative competitions over redressing the serious imbalance 
between differing values and priorities. The growing awareness of natural disaster and 
climate change risk should be understood within this context. Yet not only the 
marginality of environmental (climatic) risk in public discourse, but also the political 
biases and ideational distortion within the discourse of environmental risk, need to be 
seriously considered. 
 5.4.1. The climate change discourse as means to boost national competitiveness 
The Low Carbon, Green Growth strategy of the Lee Myung-bak administration is one 
such top-down narrative, emphasizing the need to strike a balance between different 
values and priorities. One triumph of the new development paradigm was the choice, 
in October 2012, of Songdo, Incheon Metropolitan City as the host city for the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF) headquarters. This fund was established at the sixteenth 
Conference Of Parties (COP) in Cancun, Mexico in 2010. It aims to support 
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developing countries’ mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. One interviewee 
working for a CCA-related research institute comments that: 
 
“After the hosting of GCF in Incheon was announced, I have been 
extremely busy because many more researchers and organizations have 
contacted me about sharing data and information about the issue of climate 
change adaptation. This is unprecedented concern with the issue of climate 
change adaptation [not mitigation] over the years” (RAI 2, 2011, 
parenthesis added†). 
 
Despite skepticism about the alleged benefits of the Fund to the locals, it has further 
heightened the public and academic awareness of climate change risk, if in a partial 
and ephemeral way. The media captured the then booming public attention to the 
potential impact of the GCF on the local property market of the Songdo area. The $35 
billion city Songdo, still under construction at the time of writing this chapter, is one of 
the new planned built-from-scratch cities in the world, in pursuit of “Ubiquitous Eco 
City” (Shwayri, 2013: 39). The Financial Times and the Urban Land Institute awarded 
the city the first Sustainable Cities Award in 2008. Yet, it is naturally ironic to refer to 
Songdo Eco City, not least because the area has been built on reclaimed wetland of 
about 6 km2 (ibid.). From the outset, this city has been claimed and designed to be an 
international business district, with the primary aim of attracting foreign capital. On 
the one hand, hosting the GCF in Songdo might have fulfilled that aim during the last 
decade of the city, when it experienced difficulty attracting foreign capital. On the 
other hand, the Fund has faced self-contradiction by undermining its own objective, 
that is, to help vulnerable groups in developing countries. The reclaimed land used to 
provide the coastal villages’ livelihood; e.g. a variety of marine products in the 
foreshore areas. 
 
Perhaps hosting the GCF in Songdo has reaffirmed the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration’s consistent commitment to the LCGG, too. Additionally, it seems to 
have gratified the government’s aspiration to take a leading role – as a mediator 
between developed and developing countries – in international negotiations on climate 
change risk. Many of these internally and externally directed initiatives of green 
growth have been undertaken by major ministries and newly established government 
agencies: e.g. the Presidential Committee on Green Growth (PCGG), the Global Green 
Growth Institute (GGGI), the Green Technology Centre (GTC), and the Korean 
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Adaptation Centre for Climate Change (KACCC). The United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP) also complimented Korea’s new development strategy, for its 
timeliness and the possibility of influencing other countries’ new development visions, 
in their report Overview of the Republic of Korea’s National Strategy for Green 
Growth (UNEP, 2010). Thus the recently increased awareness of climate change risk is 
partly a result of the government’s endeavour, and newly established internal and 
external partnerships. In addition, the governmental investment in green industry (e.g. 
green technologies, sustainable transport, energy) has significantly increased to reach 2 
per cent of the annual GDP. The government has also adopted a five-year plan (2009-
2013) that constitutes a variety of projects and programs on green growth, as 
demonstrated in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Five year plan for green growth of Korea (2009-2013) 
Strategies Policy directions Amount of 
investment  
(in billion US$) 
Total: 83.6 
Measures for climate 
change and securing 
energy independence 
Reduce carbon emissions 4.4 
Decrease energy dependence and enhance 
energy self-sufficiency 
11.6 
Support adaptation to climate change 
impacts 
28.3  
Creation of new growth 
engines 
Develop green technologies as future 
growth engines 
8.8 
Greening of industry 3.6 
Develop cutting-edge industries 8.5 
Set up policy infrastructure for green 
growth 
1.4 
Improving quality of 
life and strengthening 
the status of the 
Country 
Green city and green transport 19.7 
Green revolution in lifestyle 1.5 
Enhance global cooperation on green 
growth 
0.5 
Source: Adopted from UNEP (2010: 17). 
Note: In this plan, the Four River Restoration Project (17.3 billion US$) comes under the 
categorization of CCA. 
 
So far so good, but the above story of the GCF and the LCGG conceals the complex 
process by which the climate change discourse has been abused to maintain the status 
quo, rather than formed to tackle social vulnerability to climate change risk. In this 
way it has benefited a small group of winners from compressed development, such as 
the Chaebol construction companies.  
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The government has pressed ahead with grand scale national development projects and 
energy plans that have brought about harsh criticisms from the bottom-up (see Picture 
5.2). For instance, the FRRP and the government’s plan for building more nuclear and 
coal-fired thermal power plants at home and abroad have been critiqued as the 
antithesis of the core thrust of the LCGG itself. The $20 billion contract with the UAE 
in 2010 marked the first reactor export of Korea, which made her the sixth member in 
the league of global reactor exporters. The deepening anti-nuclear sentiment at the 
global level, in the wake of the 2011 Tohoku tsunami-nuclear accident, did not halt 
Korea’s nuclear energy expansion plan. Instead, six months after the Japanese nuclear 
crisis, President Lee Myung-Bak stressed the need for safer use of nuclear energy at 
the high-level United Nations meeting on nuclear safety: 
 
“The accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant last March 
dealt a hard blow to confidence in nuclear safety…However, I do not think 
that this accident should be a cause to renounce nuclear energy; on the 
contrary, this is a moment to seek ways to promote the safe use of nuclear 
energy based on scientific evidence…Yet the use of nuclear energy is 
inevitable as there still remain technical and economic limits for alternative 
energy to meet the rapidly rising global energy demand or to tackle the 
problem of climate change” (Ser, 2011: no page). 
 
This message might have come out of his unshakeable faith in the safety of “made-in-
Korea” reactors. Since then, however, Korea has witnessed several atomic incidents, 
such as the power glitch at the Kori nuclear power plant in March 2012, which was 
covered up for one month. In fact, environmental NGOs argue that nuclear power 
plants in Korea are extremely vulnerable to destructive natural hazards, as in the 2011 
Japanese tsunami-nuclear crisis (NI 2, 2012). It is worth noting the question of one 
unnamed participant, from one of the atomic energy-related institutes, during the 
debate on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) measures against Catastrophic Disasters in 
Korea, at the 10th anniversary conference of the Korean Society of Hazards Mitigation 
in 2010:  
 
“Are you [the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)] 
developing any governmental guide or institutions we [those working in 
the field of atomic energy] can rely on, before building or running nuclear 
power plants that can proactively mitigate the potential risk of catastrophic 
natural hazards?” (n/a, 2010, from a memo written during the conference†). 
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Perhaps, this question circuitously indicates that there had been no such 
institutional/legal guide for attending to the potential impacts of catastrophic natural 
events on nuclear power plants. The presenter responded that the NEMA had prepared 
such a guide. Yet, GI 1 (2011) notes that: 
 
“The NEMA plays supportive roles when large-scale disasters occur. 
Consider nuclear crises such as the East Japan tsunami crisis in particular. 
What can we [NEMA] do if they occur in Korea? We might not be able to 
do anything. We know nothing about the complex technologies and 
processes of nuclear reactors. They have to assure the safety of nuclear 
reactors. The difficulty of cooperation between different agencies comes 
from mutual ignorance of each other’s system and speciality” (†). 
 
This point is also confirmed by RAI 3 (2012) that “use of different terms in different 
groups can lead to not only difficulty in cooperation but also totally different policy 
outcomes.” After the Japanese tsunami disaster, the Korean government has applied 
several technical measures to assure the public of the safety of nuclear reactors in 
Korea. Yet, a Greenpeace report released in April 2012 reveals that many parts of 
Korea are still severely vulnerable to the risk of potential nuclear accident (Kim and 
Seo, 2012). This claim is based on the consideration of the gap between the large 
population density within a 30km radius of 21 nuclear power plants (4.04 million, that 
is, the third largest in the world) and the wholly insufficient medication and lack of 
evacuation drills in place. Civil society’s call to expand the range of the emergency 
zone up to 30km had yet to be accepted by the government, confirming the lack of 
public-private consensus. The recent nuclear scandal in 2013, in which it was revealed 
that parts for nuclear reactors with faked certificates have been supplied to Korean 
nuclear reactors with the connivance of the verification companies, is a reminder of 
how corruption can jeopardize society. While the cooperation required is so difficult 
for the above-mentioned reasons, it has been witnessed that a culture of partisan 
politics is prevalent, in the shape of the so-called nuclear reactors mafia – made up of 
the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC), the Korea Institute of Nuclear 
Safety (KINS) and the Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power company (KHNP). 
 
There is another concern that the issue of climate change risk will be pushed back 
down the policy priority list for the future governments. As the Director of the Institute 
for Climate Change Action notes: 
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“The Lee Myung-Bak government resembles, if not being exactly identical 
to, the past authoritarian regimes in their top-down approach to planning 
and implementing policies…however, its leadership has surpassed those of 
the previous governments in attempting to politicize the issue of climate 
change. The individual policies under the LCGG strategy, except for the 
FRRP and nuclear power plants plans, have not been bitterly controversial. 
What is worrying is how far the subsequent governments will inherit and 
develop further the positive aspects of the LCGG paradigm” (NI 5, 2012†). 
 
Yet another interviewee stressed that:  
 
“Even the essential tasks of CCA and DRR have failed to capture support 
and participation from wider civil society, not least because of the 
dogmatic and top-down approach that the government has taken to carry 
forward grand-scale engineering development works such as the FRRP” 
(NI 2, 2012†). 
 
Again, in Korea it has been the government who created the governance space for 
climate change risk to be addressed in the first place. The government has 
predominantly developed and directed the rationales, logics, strategies, and 
participation of stakeholders within the governance space. It is worth questioning how 
Korean society will retain the strong impetus to grapple with climate change risk when 
the leadership is replaced. Unlike this concern, however, a researcher from one of the 
aforesaid governmental agencies founded during the Lee Myung-bak administration 
notes that under the Park Geun-hye government (2013~2018) the basis of the LCGG 
strategy has been “quietly” maintained (RAI 6, 2012). Whether this view is accurate 
remains to be seen in the years to come. Rather worrisome is that the LCGG is in 
danger of continuing to ignore the intimate relationship between broader development 
issues and the vulnerability to the risk of climate change (particularly human 
vulnerability). 
5.4.2. Distorted discourses that impede wider understanding of DRR and CCA 
Social vulnerability to environmental risk has been least prioritized within the 
governance process of climate change risk. According to one interviewee (RAI 1, 
2011), in Korean society there is no legal concept of social vulnerability to disaster 
risk (let alone climate change risk), unlike in the U.S and Japan. Within the set of 
LCGG policies, there is little effort to reflect on the socio-political implications of 
 151 
environmental risk. Accounting for the recent advance in crisis management of Korea, 
an interviewee hints at the possible reason for this: 
 
“The Dae-Gu [city] underground arson caused 192 deaths in 2003. This 
was not accidental but incendiary given the arsonist’s hostility to society. 
Then, the Bu-Ahn bloodshed incident over the selection process of the 
nuclear waste repository site, the Truckers solidarity strike; thus, a series of 
totally new types of crisis have occurred that society never experienced 
before. So, the recent governments over the decade have focused on 
improving the crisis management system to embrace social and complex 
crises. But, the term SOCIAL, probably unlike in the U.K, has tremendous 
and exploding power in Korea. If they were termed SOCIAL crises, it 
would probably mean that the government is given legitimacy to repress 
the Truckers, opposition parties or the media in an attempt to manage and 
stabilize social disorder. The government was very cautious of using the 
term social. So, we searched for an alternative, value-neutral word to 
replace it – i.e. a national critical infrastructure crisis” (RAI 3, 2012†). 
 
What made it so difficult for the democratic regimes to term the risk problems with 
apparently social origins as “social” risk? One of the possible answers to this question 
is that Korea has only a brief history of democracy and political freedom (e.g. freedom 
of assembly and expression) in the wake of the bottom-up collapse of the paternalistic 
authoritarian regimes. The authoritarian regimes of Korea until 1987 did not hesitate to 
suppress social or democratic movements at the cost of political stability and stable 
provision of labour (You and Chang, 1993). This is the background to the democratic 
government’s (i.e. the Roh Moo-hyun government) effort to avoid any interpretative 
ambiguity by which government power (governmental authority?) could be abused or 
misused to suppress crises with “social” origins. An argument for addressing the social 
origins of climate change risk is relatively commonplace amongst global academics, as 
increasing attention has been paid to social vulnerability to hazard and climate change 
risk (Seneviratne et al., 2012). This seems much less the case in Korea.  
 
During fieldwork, it was observed that local authorities were using the term 
‘vulnerability’ in a dual sense. One is a very practical issue: that local government can 
exploit their ‘vulnerability’ to obtain more financial support from central government 
(NI 14, 2011). However, one potential interviewee expressed her disagreeability, when 
asked to take part in this research and she was told that the research is examining the 
‘vulnerability’ of “your region” (Jeju). In other local governments, such as Seoul and 
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Daegu, officials in charge of CCA react very unpleasantly to research on ranking the 
vulnerability of the localities to the risk of climate change (RAI 2, 2011). RAI 2 (2011) 
goes further to explain that: 
 
“Last year, together with Dong-Ah Daily, we conducted, developed and 
announced the Vulnerability Index for climate change risk, to compare 
different local governments’ vulnerability to the risk of climate change. 
The vulnerability of Seoul was estimated to be a bit high, not the highest, 
amongst other metropolises and provinces. Then the Seoul government 
contacted us and said with doubt about the index, “we cannot agree with 
the result of your index. Give us the data used. We are going to apply the 
data on our own.” But, you know, the result of the research can differ 
depending on how you weight each variable…they strongly requested us to 
correct our results. But they stopped such complaints when the 
Gwanghwamun [see Figure 6.3] got so heavily inundated that the 
vulnerability of Seoul was widely uncovered” (parenthesis added†). 
 
Perhaps, this episode indicates the sensitivity of government (more exactly, those 
officials in charge of CCA) to external evaluation of their responsibilities. More 
importantly, however, it is highly probable that to cope with such issues as 
vulnerability to the risk of climate change tends to be largely reduced to the duty of 
central government in Korea. This interpretation will gain further validity in 
connection with the social contracts of disaster in Korea (see, Section 5.2.2). 
 
A famed Korean comedian Kim Jae-dong, with a progressive political view, satirized 
Korean society’s distorted discursive system, at the concert for supporting the strike of 
Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC): 
 
“So, I’ve thought about that. Am I really lefty? Commie? Whatever I do, 
they call me lefty. Commie. If I say that school fees in Korea are expensive, 
they call me lefty and commie. If I argue that we should secure 
independence of the media, they call me lefty and commie. Isn’t that 
strange? I went to Gu-ryong village [one of a few shanty towns in Seoul] 
to help the victims of flood, and then a stranger came call me commie. And 
one journalist there asked me; why do you continue to do political 
activities? I was doing post-disaster relief…I said back to him that I was 
hoeing up the ground, why is this political activity? Then he said that 
gathering is necessarily a political activity. So I said that politics 
politicians should quit comedy so that comedy comedians can quit politics” 
(Kim, 2012: no page†). 
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This satire expresses how those helping the victims of natural disasters (addressing 
social vulnerability to disaster risk) can be denounced as North Korean sympathizers. 
In fact, some progressive celebrities who have been involved in “such political 
activities” have left their broadcast programs. The National Security Law crafted to 
fight communism still exists, even if it has rarely been enforced recently, and it may 
infringe freedom of expression. It is worth noting the report by the UN Human Rights 
Council showing that the right to freedom of expression in Korea is in danger of 
regressing (Rue, 2010). The UN rapporteur Frank La Rue in the report notes his 
concern that: 
 
“[S]ince the candlelight demonstrations of 2008, there have been increased 
restrictions on individuals’ right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
primarily due to an increasing number of prosecutions, based on laws that 
are often not in conformity with international standards, of individuals who 
express views which are not in agreement with the position of the 
Government” (ibid: 1). 
 
The candlelight demonstrations were citizens’ voluntary gathering to express their 
opposition to the U.S beef import and the FTA with the U.S. Again, anecdotal rumours 
swirled that North Korean spies or North Korean sympathizers instigated the 
demonstrations. Again, this is how the social construction of the Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) risk was wrongly linked with espionage activities in 2008. 
Recent provocations by North Korea such as the bombardment on Yeonpyeong Island 
and the sinking of the Cheonan naval vessel (2010) have not helped lighten these deep 
feelings of hostility towards North Korea.  
 
The above cases also suggest how discourse on climate change risk (by which to 
address social vulnerability to environmental risk) would be contorted if it collided 
with the logic of anti-communism, strong national security and economic growth in 
Korea. This is one of the possible interpretations of how the ideological dichotomy 
might hinder the development of discursive diversity and ideational freedom of 
thought that are essential for encountering the dually structured environmental risk. 
That said, one further possibility might be considered. Is the ideological dichotomy 
really indestructible in the context of Korea being technically at war? Who will be the 
winners and losers if the ideological distortion disappears? Could an easing of the rigid, 
narrow ideological spectrum lead to institutional changes for the purpose of CCA and 
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disaster risk management? As a matter of fact, there are increasing signs of 
deconstruction of the ideological dichotomy in many parts of society; although this has 
so far had a limited influence on social innovation for environmental risk management.  
5.4.3. The FRRP and the bottom-up resistance 
The 2007 presidential election gave birth to the Lee Myung-Bak administration (the 
candidate of the then opposition party – the conservative Grand National Party (GNP)) 
as the successor to Roh Moo-Hyun’s Participatory government (the ruling, liberal Uri 
party – 2003-2008). Despite the resounding victory (48.67% of the vote) over the then 
ruling party candidate Chung Dong-Young (26.1%), President-elect Lee Myung-Bak 
had suffered from low political support even before his inauguration. This was also 
due in part to the lowest turnout (63%) in an election since the constitutional 
amendment to the direct election system in 1987. Simply put, the Lee government was 
supported by just over 30% of the whole electorate. Indeed, the lack of 
representativeness of Korean politics is argued to have worsened because of the 
widening gap between the conservatized representative system and underrepresented 
interests of the public (Han and Shim, 2010, Kim, 1998). Therefore, it was hardly 
surprising that one of the Lee government’s main campaign promises encountered 
severe opposition and criticism from the opposition, the grassroots, and religious 
groups such as Buddhists and Catholics.26 
 
As in Figure 5.2, three environmentalists illegally occupying I-Po Bridge against the 
“dam” (reservoir?) construction continued their campaign against the FRRP for 42 
days during the hot humid summer of 2010.  
                                                
26 At first, Lee pledged to build a Grand Canal that traversed the territory of Korea. Four months after 
his inauguration, however, his plan for the Grand Canal encountered severe opposition from opposition 
parties and environmental NGOs. The government modified and renamed the initial plan into the FRRP, 
maintaining major details of the plan such as dredging sediments, building 16 dams, and leisure 
development in the adjacent riversides.  
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Figure 5.2. Photos of occupied I-Po Bridge under construction at Han River 
 
Source: Adopted from “Activists on the first day of the sit-in site”, by You, Sung-ho, 2010, 
OhmyNews, at http://ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A000141986.  
 
In the end, the “illegal” occupation of the bridge was not able to stem the FRRP. Yet, it 
has offered a look at the crisis of “dual-risk” climate change facing Korean society. 
Before discussing this issue, it is important to have a general understanding of the 
FRRP. 
 
The FRRP is a national project worth approximately 17.3 billion USD (22.2 trillion 
Korean Won) on four major rivers of Korea: the Han River, Geum River, Nakdong 
River, and Yeongsan River. The goals of the project were dredging sediments, 
building reservoirs, leisure facilities and cycle paths, and restoring the riparian 
ecosystem. It was declared complete in October 2011. According to the government 
and the UNEP, the FRRP purported to be a cost-effective and timely project for 
prevention of floods, improvement of water quality, and security of water resources as 
well as the paradigm shift towards green growth. 
 
It is beyond the scope of the thesis to deal in great detail with how far the FRRP has 
produced the benefits that were promised. Yet, the anticipated environmental 
destruction and 22 fatalities resulting from the enforcement of the impractical 
construction plan are too important to overlook. The detail of the disturbances and side 
effects can be understood by referring to the Board of Audit and Inspection’s belated 
report (released in January 2013 when President Lee was still in power) on the FRRP. 
The governmental apparatus’s report concludes that the FRRP was “totally flawed” for 
copious reasons; e.g. water quality deterioration, unauthorized changes in the basic 
designs of the facilities, wrongful disposal of the dredged sand, exorbitant costs for 
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facility maintenance management, to name just a few. The Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime affairs immediately refuted the 
claims and contents of the investigation report. The then prime minister also buttressed 
the two ministries’ rebuttals to the report. Whose evaluation of the FRRP are more 
acceptable remains to be seen in years to come. One might also ask why such report 
came out at the very end of the Lee government’s term – the lame-duck phenomenon 
was worsening. This question is about how Korean society might be able to deal with 
internal critique of government, together with external critiques from civil society, to 
advance its governance system. Suffice it to say that the most harmful effects and the 
falsity of promised benefits were already couched in the precautionary principle-based 
expressions of the opponents of the FRRP outside formal politics.  
 
How did the FRRP continue despite the grassroots opposition? For one thing, it is the 
delay of dialectical development between older and newer values that has dwarfed the 
adaptive capacity of Korean society. To put it more precisely, in many parts of the 
society, the social capital to support old values simply overwhelms that to uphold new 
values. As one interviewee notes that: 
 
"It was relatively legitimate in Korea to retain an intimate coalition 
between strong government, the Chaebols, and pro-governmental groups 
for rapid economic growth and the development of essential infrastructure. 
Korea seriously lacked essential infrastructure in the past. Yet, the reality 
has now been reversed, so that such growth-centered material development 
is less important and feasible than before. Nonetheless, the coalition still 
heavily relies on, and strives to legitimize, superfluous development 
projects for their own survival. The FRRP is the archetypal case” (NI 2, 
2012†). 
 
This should not be seen, however, as meaning that the infrastructure built throughout 
and after the compressed development lacks problems. As a matter of fact, many of the 
urban hazard disasters in Korea are attributable to extremely rapid urbanization, 
deprived of vital concepts such as Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and safety culture. 
The gist of the above passage is that the hegemonic power that resists the call for 
fundamental change in the priority of values and power relations remains 
undiminished, focusing on a few old material values, while a few groups upholding 
other core values – one of these is hazards resilience – are politically weak or absent at 
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the national level of politics. The interviewee goes further to account for what is meant 
by the ‘intimate coalition’: 
 
“The Korean state has the Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime 
Affairs. A few countries might have such a ministry that orchestrates 
construction and development projects nationally. The bureaucracy 
constantly searches for new development projects that can legitimize the 
need for huge budgets. Members of Parliament are eager to become 
members of the Construction and Transportation committee in the 
Parliament so as to build a bridge or something for development in their 
constituencies. So again, the engineering-construction coalition has and 
exercises enormous power to manipulate the national budget for its own 
interest. Then construction companies, some scholars and media join in the 
power cartel. These five pillars of the coalition have interlocked to make 
up 17-18% of the national GNP” (NI 2, 2012†). 
 
It might be foolish to believe that the vulnerability of Korean society to the dual risk of 
climate change is increasing at this single source – the engineering-construction 
coalition. Other two known adverse social capitals are the “Mopia” (compound word 
of Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and Mafia) and the coalition of nuclear 
energy explained above. What they all have in common is that they were the pillars of 
the compressed development that are still exerting tremendous influence on the whole 
society. 
 
On the other hand, it is evident that the once required strong roles of the state and the 
three coalitions have not changed, despite the entirely different reality of which the 
need for qualitative change overwhelms that for material change. Even worse, it is to 
some extent true that the LCGG has been exploited by the old coalitional politics to 
maintain their power. The different reality might mean not only that Korean society 
might not need such excessive infrastructure development, but also that it is becoming 
more difficult for builders to make a profit from a large property development project. 
For instance, the largest-ever $29 billion urban development project in Yong-San, 
Seoul, has recently defaulted in the wake of an ongoing dissensus amongst the 
stakeholders of the project and failure to pay interest ($5.3 million). The prospects for 
other large urban development projects outside Seoul also look dim. The recently 
recurring emergency situation of the electricity supply and demand system, 
particularly during summers, highlights the limits of electricity policy hinging 
exclusively on the supply dimension. Most importantly, it is a fact that the country 
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cannot maintain as high a growth rate as it did during the period of compressed 
development; i.e. more than 8 percent of growth per year from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
Given all of these issues, where can the society start developing a developmental path 
that is compatible with the new realities? 
 
When asked about the legitimacy and implication of the FRRP, two interviewees point 
out that the FRRP project is one of the major pledges by President Lee, who was 
democratically elected, so that the project should have gone ahead anyway. One 
interviewee notes that: 
 
“Well, I don’t know much about the FRRP. But as public administration 
scholar I was opposed to it. Yet, I did not question the need for carrying 
out the FRRP itself. Because President Lee, Myung-Bak was chosen due to 
his pledges anyway, the voters chose him, and to push it forward is only 
natural in a democratic country. What I questioned was the procedural 
legitimacy - the project has flouted the essential laws and environmental 
regulations such as environmental effects evaluation…because it has been 
put forward in rough-and-ready ways, let alone failing to create the 
promised benefits like securing water resources, capability for DRR and 
job creation, it has been criticized for merely fattening up Chaebol 
construction companies” (RAI 3, 2012†). 
 
Another key interviewee, a former head of a CCA-related institute, gave a 
slightly different perspective: 
 
“Even the low turnout for the presidential election does not mean that the 
democratic outcome does not reflect public consensus. In addition, we do 
not have enough time. We cannot procrastinate for another two or three 
years evaluating possible side effects of the FRRP. It should be done 
within the period of the presidency, five years!” (RAI 4, 2011†). 
 
Whilst their views differ slightly, they are in agreement up to the point that these 
projects cannot be questioned because they have been created through a democratic 
process. This is a view that many laypersons might hold of the FRRP and LCGG. As 
many Korean political scientists and some interviewees point out, however, Korea 
needs to deal with many unresolved problems of democracy as well as a lack of social 
consensuses on various issues (NI5, 2012, NI2, 2012, and Choi, 2010). One could even 
go as far as to argue that a representative democracy is but one possible way of 
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fulfilling social values and expectations, and dealing with social conflicts, to be 
resilient against disaster risk; cf. deliberative/participatory democracy (Hartz-Karp and 
Meister, 2011). This point is extremely important for this thesis. After more than two 
decades of democracy, there is a tendency to take democracy for granted without 
questioning its contents, processes and anticipated ramifications, which is not always 
beneficial for society to maintain its hazard resilience. It sometimes covers the 
possibility that a handful of groups can gain political legitimacy by exploiting 
discursive distortion to fulfil their own interests against others’. Yet, together with the 
structural, adverse forces born out of compressed development, this tendency has 
provided a reason for alternative ideas to arise and compete with it.  
5.4.4. Narrative competition between development and democracy: a synergetic 
advance ahead? 
As was frequently stressed before, Korean society’s recent experience of encountering 
the greater awareness of climate change and disaster risk reveals a greater tendency to 
support the existing ideology, material interests, and power relations, than to reflect on 
the underlying causes of dual risk. The immediate, bottom-up reflections on the 
tendency found in various narrative competitions, as in the case of the FRRP, were 
seemingly weaker than the better-organized vested interests’ use of discourses and 
strong social capital. One interviewee accounted for this, “in Korean society, the 
conservatives have shown greater ability to stand together than progressive/opposition 
groups against any external power to possibly damage their endemic values and 
interest” (NI 14, 2011). This is also evident from the results of previous presidential 
and general elections: the lower the turnouts were (mainly because of the lower 
participation of the generation in their 20s and 30s), the more likely the candidates of 
the GNP (conservative party) were to be elected. Probably, this is due in part to the 
institutional memory of how the society has achieved such rapid growth in the past, 
based on what Evans (1996: 1119) calls the “state-society synergy” effect, whereby 
high levels of social capital mobilized civil society in Korea. Without looking at the 
older generation’s experience and sense of closeness to such collective reforms in the 
past, it is hard to properly understand the current political landscape of the society. The 
Lee administration used similar strategies to those of the past authoritarian regimes. 
An example is the way of planning and implementing new initiatives – as the national 
five-year rolling master plan for CCA is reminiscent of the five-year economic 
 160 
development plans of the authoritarian regimes – despite the completely different 
milieu because of the two terms of progressive government from 1998 to 2007. 
 
For the reasons above, the Lee government has accepted institutional changes to 
achieve CCA, to the extent that any new ideas and technologies do not harm the 
ideological foundation of conservatism. It should be stressed, however, that the 
marginal institutional change (e.g. the Basic Act on Low Carbon and Green Growth) 
has ended up producing a discursive space in which even antagonistic groups (e.g. 
environmental NGOs and critical scholars) can join to bring in totally different 
narratives of climate change risk. Equally, however, these groups had seldom been 
interested in the issue of climate change risk, particularly adaptation to environmental 
risk, before the Lee Myung-bak administration. In fact, this seems a parallel process to 
how the authoritarian regimes had succeeded with compressed development, by means 
of the very institutional structures of developmentalism upon which the bottom-up 
resistance of the 1980s built a democratic regime. The democratization of 1987 did not 
immediately uproot the authoritarian culture, orthodox worldviews, pre-existing social 
capital, aspiration for growth and other norms as well as codes of conduct. Rather, it 
has so far found a way to sometimes coexist/cooperate with or overcome/replace the 
old social structures embedded in the development path. Broadly speaking, this 
supports one of the core tenets of historical institutionalism, the so-called “path-
dependency” that is contextualized elsewhere with a reference to the evolutionary 
aspects of the power sphere for CCA in the context of Mexico (Redclift et al., 2011: 
118~141). Yet, as Schmidt (2008: 316) notes, equally critical is to shed light on “how 
the historically transmitted, path-dependent structures are reconstructed” through 
ideational and discursive properties stemming from human agency. 
 
Before embarking upon an analysis of the dynamics of political and environmental 
change in the case of the change of mayor in Seoul after the urban disasters, there are a 
couple of vital theoretical implications, in the light of what has been debated so far. 
The structural forces of Korean compressed development, such as the rigid governance 
relationships (strong bureaucracy, mobilized and compliant civil society, large 
conglomerates), ideological impetus (anti-communism), and authoritarianism are still 
influential in the making and implementing of public policies in the post-
developmental society. Although the level of governmental innovation to address the 
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increased awareness of environmental risk is marginal at best, it has unintentionally 
generated the discursive space in which critical ideas can emerge to create an 
alternative narrative of climate change risk. Yet, the level and kind of ideas required to 
compete with the dominant discourse of climate change are not only “cognitive” and 
“policy/programmatic” (Schmidt, 2008: 306). Instead, the opposition groups have had 
to fight against deeper levels of idea, including strong normative ideas. These are 
President Lee Myung-bak, scholars supporting government, the strongly allied groups, 
and lay people’s perspective of nature – based on instrumental rationality (scientific 
prediction) at the cost of communicative rationality (NI 5, 2012), government 
paternalism, the logic of compressed development (focus on rapidity and outcome 
rather than safety and process), the narrow ideological scope (Choi, 2010) and low 
civil participation. It is not argued that the national level political dynamics of 
environmental risk are replicated along the same lines at the city level. Instead, 
zooming in on city level politics allows us to grasp in greater detail the manifestation 
of political reflections upon the dual risk of climate change. 
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5.5: Conclusion 
This chapter had looked closely at the ways in which climate change and 
environmental risk have been perceived, and how this has fed into policy development 
and the national project process, such as the FRRP. It is hard to entirely deny that the 
existing hegemony, power relations and ideological rigidity have helped to eradicate 
poverty and fulfill other important material needs in the past. Moreover, it was pointed 
out that the need for political stability in Korea stems from the reality that the country 
is technically still at war with its Northern counterpart. If social needs, such as DRR, 
clash with mainstream values and vested interests, however, they tend to be 
discursively distorted in the political space of Korea. This mood seems to have been 
easing since the election of the first female president Park, Geun-hye (2013~2018, 
conservative Saenuri party, the daughter of the former authoritarian president, Park 
Jung-hee). She has made considerable efforts to improve the social safety net and has 
started to deal with a far greater range of non-material issues. This chapter has made 
two points.  
 
First, the chapter described how the government constructed and employed the 
discourse of climate change risk to maintain the status quo (allied groups). Although 
the LCGG paradigm can be considered to be an innovation at the policy level, the 
legacy of compressed development is still prevalent in the discourse of development. 
Ironically, this has led to the formation of new a governance space in which alternative 
ideas with different worldviews and causal beliefs compete with the mainstream in 
terms of climate change discourse. Second, debate on the existing dual-risk thesis has 
not included disaster triggered by natural hazards. This is because risk means only 
“manufactured” risk under the dual-risk thesis. Yet, it is extremely difficult to separate 
the source of modern disaster risk into technical and environmental elements, even if 
the disaster under consideration is triggered by natural phenomena. The compressed 
spatiotemporal reconstruction of modernity means that heterogeneous values, ideas, 
interests and power relations coexist in such a way that disaster risk becomes a 
political issue. As seen in this chapter, however, many social issues and needs such as 
DRR are kept apolitical by those who can benefit from ideological and political 
stability. As Choi (2010) stresses, Korean society is conservative, and has a narrow 
ideological spectrum and low levels of political participation. This claim is seriously 
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questioned in the next chapter, with reference to the change of the mayor of Seoul 
following the MT. Woomyeon landslides crisis. 
Chapter 6: Seoul, the mayoral change as political reflection on dual risk 
6.1: Introduction 
This chapter begins by considering the phenomenon of hyper-concentration in which 
social, economic, political and cultural assets are excessively concentrated towards the 
capital city, Seoul, in Korea. In this chapter, among other recent urban disasters, the 
MT. Woomyeon landslides crisis is seen as a symptom of dual-risk in Korea. However, 
the question of whether and how such urban disasters have opened up new governance 
space will also be discussed. The main focus of this thesis is upon the extent to which 
urban disasters impact on political change. In addition, this chapter considers the 
question of whether the change of mayor in Seoul in the wake of the landslides crisis 
in 2011 has had any impact on urban disaster-specific resilience. Therefore, this 
chapter will show how heterogeneous ideas, causal beliefs (e.g. causation of disaster) 
and other deeper level ideas compete to generate the different nature of urban 
resilience. 
 
In Section 6.2, this chapter describes Seoul as a typical city in which the ramifications 
of compressed development are easily seen. Section 6.3 will account for recent urban 
disasters in Korea, while section 6.4 takes up the main focus of this chapter in 
considering whether the change of mayor in 2011 should be seen as a political 
reflection of the urban disasters. In addition, evidence of the impacts of the political 
change on the ways in which disaster risk is prepared for is offered in Section 6.4.3.   
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6.2: Seoul as the archetype of compressed development 
 
Seoul was not simply Korea’s Largest Town; it was Korea. 
 
In his work Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, Gregory Henderson, American political 
scientist, made this passage half a century ago (Henderson, 1968, cited in Choi, 2010: 
87). He did not make this remark in the context of the debate upon the risk of urban 
hazard and climate change. Yet, the passage might be more applicable to contemporary 
Korean society, given the signs of increasing political, economic, and cultural 
concentration “towards” the Seoul metropolitan area (occupying 11.8% of the national 
territory) as well as “within” Seoul (0.6% of the territory) (Yim, 2003, Lee, 2005). Table 
6.1 illustrates quantitative aspects of the hyper-concentration towards the capital 
region. 
 
Table 6.1. Hyper-concentration (Seoul, Incheon and the province of Gyeong-Gi) 
Quantitative indicators of hyper concentration to the Seoul metropolitan area 
Intensifying concentration rate of infrastructures (%) 

















39.3 38.1 51.1 67.8 66.7 85.4 49.1 
Intensifying concentration rate of population and GDP (%) 
Year 1980 1990 1999 2004 2010 





35.7 43.9 44.6 47.7 47.8 
Sources: Adopted from, Choi (2010) E-national index (http://www.index.go.kr/egams/ 
index.jsp). 
Notes: This table is a combination of two different tables. Each figure in the first table 
accounts for the high concentration ratio of infrastructures and institutions in the Seoul 
metropolitan area against those of the entire country. The second table illustrates the increasing 
proportion of the population and GDP in the Seoul metropolitan area. 
 
Urban concentration within Seoul is serious enough to have entailed socio-spatial 
polarizations (Yim, 2003). This can be exemplified by the extremely high real estate 
value of the greater GANGNAM region (including three districts such as Gangnam-gu, 
Seocho-gu, and Songpa-gu out of 25 districts of Seoul, see Figure 6.1) in which the 
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high-income class, prestigious education infrastructure, headquarters of large 
conglomerates, and skyscrapers are concentrated.  
Figure 6.1. Map of 25 districts/boroughs (gu) of Seoul 
 
Source: The author 
Notes: The red-dotted area is the so-called GANGNAM. The Gangnam means south of the 
(Han) River in Korean. 
 
According to a report on the official land price from 2001 to 2011, the total land value 
of the three districts (about 365 trillion won) forms over 10% of the entire country’s 
land value (about 3535 trillion won) (Yoo, 2011). Other indicators of urban 
concentration and polarization can be added here; but of profound importance is what 
they might imply in the context of adapting to environmental disaster risk. 
First, three decades ago, urban research had already pointed out a set of inter-linked 
driving forces that account for the rapid urban (population) concentration in Korea: 
rapid industrialization (particularly the secondary sector), out-migration from rural 
areas to cities, and the strong role of the government itself (Smith et al., 1983). The 
first two factors are not unique in the history of urban concentration across the world. 
In the Korean context, however, the last factor – the strong role of the state – seems to 
have contributed particularly strongly to urban concentration. In fact, the 
developmental state of the 1970s already recognized the severity of urban 
 166 
concentration. Unexpectedly, however, the initiatives and policies for de-concentration 
ended up creating large urban centers in the Seoul metropolitan region and Southeast 
of Korea, in the second and third largest cities Busan and Daegu (ibid.). The 
government was eager to develop industrial complexes, amid the transition from the 
formative to technology-intensive industries, on the basis of which new export-
oriented industries could be accommodated (Bae and Sellers, 2007).  
 
The Presidential Committee on Balanced National Development (renamed as the 
Presidential Committee on Local Development as of 2009) was established in 2003 to 
address the hyper-concentration problem. The committee has undertaken several 
programs and initiatives such as the revitalization of local industries and the relocation 
of major public institutions to the administrative capital city of Sejong.  
 
Second, authors such as Henderson (2002: 89) go further, arguing that “some degree of 
urban concentration” helps reduce “inter- and intra-regional expenditures” at the early 
stage of urbanization. As NI 2 (2012) commented in interview, however, the 
excessively high degree of urban concentration in Korea is bound up with recurrent 
urban hazard disasters. He explains the historical linkage between rapid urban 
expansion (as a result of concentration) and the socio-spatial construction of hazard 
vulnerability: 
 
“Urban disasters in Seoul have social implication of different kinds. Before 
last year [2010], for example, the Gangseo and Yangcheon borough areas 
suffered serious inundations. This has affected almost 20,000 households. 
The floodplain area was incorporated into Seoul in the early 1960s when 
the latter was expanding rapidly. During the rapid urban expansion 
resulting from rapid industrialization, the city needed to quickly provide 
residential space, particularly for migrant workers from rural areas. Many 
of the semi-basement flats that normally lie lower than sewage pipes were 
built at that time. The economically and socially weak might have had to 
occupy the vulnerable places because of the cheap rent” (NI 2, 2012, 
parenthesis added†). 
 
This is a parallel process to the formation of hazard exposure through the 
colonization of low value and risky land by squatter communities in Asian and 
African cities; or in the U.S. context, the concentration of exposed population to 
disaster risk in low income districts and temporary accommodation (e.g. trailer 
parks). Yet, as will be clearer later, it is not just the above-mentioned districts 
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that have suffered from urban disasters; even the most prestigious districts in 
Seoul are no exception. Of course, this is not to deny that hazards vulnerability is 
more than the matter of exposure to hazardous events; consider other 
components of vulnerability such as adaptive capacity, resistance or resilience 
(Adger, 2006). It is plausible to think that less adaptive capacity results from 
socio-economic characteristics. Suffice it to say at this stage that compressed and 
concentrated development by the strong state has put both developed and 
underdeveloped land in Seoul at risk.  
 
Third, Choi (2010: 32) considers the deteriorating hyper-centralization as indicative of 
Korea’s regressing democracy, attributing its origin to the low political participation 
and conservatized system of representation. He argues that this mirrors the dearth of 
value diversification and the narrow ideological spectrum, thereby making Korean 
society monolithic. In addition, the 1997 financial crisis and the ensuing restructuring 
further aggravated the socio-spatial polarizations in Seoul (Yim, 2003). In fact, until 
the early 1990s the authoritarian government was able to continue high economic 
growth with relative success in keeping down the level of economic inequality. The 
trend was interrupted by the financial crisis and the ensuing structural adjustment 
policies. Accordingly, social policy reforms have aimed for more inclusive protection 
of citizens since the financial crisis until recently: e.g. unemployment benefit, public 
pensions, and health insurance. Nonetheless, as Kwon and Holliday (2007) notes, the 
present developmental welfare state has been designing and using social policy for 
further economic development. This argument is similar to the case of the Lee Myung-
bak government’s abuse of climatic risk to legitimize grand scale construction projects 
such as the FRRP. 
 
From the above points, it is reasonable to say that the strong state has predominantly 
shaped the spatial structure of the nation and cities. This fact has huge implications for 
Korea’s adaptation to climate change risk, because urban vulnerability is a historical 
result of collective endeavors to foster the compressed modernization. It is one thing to 
say that the developmental state has to a large extent intervened in the shaping of 
vulnerability to environmental risk, in terms of exposure to hazards. It is another thing 
to say more importantly that such rapid land use change in urban space has led to the 
situation that even the richest parts of Seoul – Gangnam districts – are now highly 
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vulnerable to environmental risk, as will become clear through analysis of the 
Woomyeon landslides crisis and urban floods. 
 
6.3: Urban hazard disasters in Seoul 
Torrential downpours and typhoons are common hazards in the Korean peninsula. 
They often lead to (flash) floods, landslides, vessel sinking, destruction of buildings 
and infrastructures, despite some beneficial effects such as mitigation of algal blooms 
and droughts (Son et al., 2006). With the rapid development of urban dwellings near 
mountain areas across the Korean peninsula, however, urban landslides have been an 
increasing concern in Korea. 
6.3.1. MT Woomyeon Landslides crisis 
In the early morning on 27th July 2011, calamitous landslides took place in Seo-Cho 
gu, that is, one of the three local counties of Gangnam. The two-day record downpour 
(461mm) from 26th to 27th was enough to reveal the high vulnerability of the area to 
landslide. This was about one-fourth of annual precipitation. Figure 6.2 shows the 
proximity of local dwellings to steep mountain slopes of Mt. Woomyeon. Despite 
repeated claims, the weakening of the ground was not the root cause of the landslide 
disasters. The urban landslide on Mt. Woomyeon occurred in one of the richest areas of 
Seoul, Seocho gu. Triggered by the record rainfall (87mm per hour), it struck nearby 
villages killing 16 residents. Just like the floods risk, urbanization and climate change 
will continue to test the capacity of the local government to adapt to the risk of 
landslide.
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Figure 6.2. The MT Woomyeon landslides crisis in Seoul 
 
Source: Adopted from NEMA (2011). 
 
Certainly, it was institutional and behavioural failures that led to the loss of life and 
damage to property in the landslide. As usual, before the crisis the Korea Forest 
Service sent landslide-warning message to local authorities in the area. In the case of 
Seocho gu office, however, it was retired officials who received the landslide alert text 
messages. Seocho gu is one of GANGNAM areas, although some victims were living 
in converted green houses. In fact, there had been continued petitions by the residents 
to develop measures to prevent landslides. There were visible signs of a landslide 
when the Category 3 typhoon Kompasu hit the villages near Mt. Woomyeon in 2010. 
6.3.2. Urban inundations 
Most losses and damages from natural disasters in Korea over the decade have resulted 
from meteorological hazards. Chang et al. (2009) stresses that deforestation, land use 
changes and human encroachment on floodplains have exacerbated flood risk in 
several cities in the Gangwon province of Korea. He also argues that climate change 
will increase flood risks, since Korean society has not properly developed proactive, 
non-structural measures such as building permits and related regulations. Yet, nowhere 
is land use change and development in floodplains more evident than in Seoul. As a 
result of rapid urbanization over the last four decades, the water infiltration capacity of 
the ground surfaces in Seoul has greatly decreased; the imperviousness rate of roads 
rose from 7.8% in 1962 to 47.1% in 2010. Indeed, changing soil characteristics in 
urban areas evidently have a strong bearing on the shaping of urban flood risks (Yang 
and Zhang, 2011).  
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Figure 6.3. Inundation of Gwang-hwa Square and Gangnam area in Seoul 
 
Sources: Modified from Ko (2010). 
 
More detailed analysis of the two-year urban inundation will follow later with an 
emphasis on its indirect role in diminishing the political legitimacy of the local 
government and incumbent mayor. It should be noted however that the impacted areas 
are highly developed, commercial areas in Northern (Gwang-hwa Square, the left in 
Figure 6.3) and Southern Seoul (GANGNAM, see Figure 6.1). This is probably why 
they attracted more media attention when hit by environmental hazards than other 
invisible, backward areas in Seoul. 
 
Two years of inundation brought a question as to whether intensifying disaster risks 
are the only important factor in urban flood disasters. According to the governmental 
report of investigation by the Board of Audit and Inspection of Korea, the excessively 
heavy rainfalls were less responsible for the floods; improper urban development was 
the main cause. Of course, flood risks are still rampant in rural areas in which the 
means of livelihood largely consists of primary industries prone to the changing 
climate. The ongoing tension between the Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries and insurance companies offering flood insurance is closely related to the 
rising disaster compensation for crop losses due to annual typhoons and floods.  
 
Korea has set new records for the rate of urbanization– e.g. concentration of urban 
population in large cities such as Seoul (Henderson, 2002) as well as the intensity and 
frequency of local rainfalls every year. In this sense, (Mitchell, 2006)’s call to take 
account of climate change risk, urbanization processes, and vulnerabilities to disaster 
risk in a simultaneous manner is greatly resonant for Korean society. Regrettably, 
research into CCA by Korean scholars has not furthered fuller integration and mutual 
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learning between different disciplines. 
6.4: Political reactions to the urban hazard disasters 
There has been minimal research on the issue of the political impacts of hazard 
disasters on local governance regimes, particularly in the context of post-
developmental states such as Korea. This is curious, not least because of the relatively 
long history of a politics of disaster asserted by radical geographers over the three 
decades (Pelling and Dill, 2009), and the increasing evidence of the political 
implications of environmental risk in Korea. It is not easy to foresee the political 
implications of urban hazard disasters. A possible starting point for the debate is to see 
if and how the immediate aftermath of environmental hazard disasters opens up new 
spaces of governance.  
 
Two contrasting hypotheses have been developed to identify the political implications 
of natural disasters risk. One is that disaster impacts are argued to reinforce the status 
quo and existing power relations, as in the case of the FRRP; another is that they 
trigger irreversible political/institutional changes (ibid.). This thesis uses and 
elaborates the concept of “dual-risk” to verify the applicability of the two hypotheses 
to the Mt. Woomyeon landslide disaster. The physical intervention of the landslide 
hazard is argued here to have opened up a new governance space, such that the 
existing concepts of, and discourse on, natural disaster risk are tackled from the bottom 
up. Before examining the consequences of the emergence of the new governance space, 
it is vital to question whether the landslide crisis is a typical symptom of dual-risk. 
6.4.1. Dual-risk of the Woomyeon landslides crisis? 
The theorists of dual-risk have not even posed the above question. The concept was 
originally developed to reveal that East Asian societies such as Korea, Japan and China, 
after compressed development, now face qualitatively different, complex risks than 
Western Risk society (Beck, 1996), owing to the dually structured sources of risk – 
stemming from both the success and deficiency of modernization (Kim, 1998). 
Elaborating the dual-risk thesis, however, Han and Shim (2010: 475) argue that 
“[r]isks differ from natural disasters since the former refers to the manufactured 
uncertainties produced by modern social systems”. 
The dual-risk thesis has yet to overcome the dichotomous conceptualization of nature 
and society that blurs the important roles of social systems in shaping the vulnerability 
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to the hazards disaster risk (Mustafa, 2005, Mustafa, 2009, Pelling, 2003c). The 
socionature thesis reminds us that it is difficult to demarcate the boundary between 
nature and society (Castree and Braun, 2001, Mustafa, 2009). This does not deny the 
importance of the material aspects of natural disasters, but stresses the difficulty of 
separating the existence/reality of natural disasters from social values and human 
knowledge (Mustafa, 2009). Meanwhile, however, the socionature thesis has paid 
scant attention to the environmental risks of East Asian societies. In fact, dual-risk has 
significant implications for the socionature thesis, too. Arguably, the wide cleavage 
between the strength of instrumental rationality and the lagging social/political 
development (or the undiminished presence of traditional discourses and normative 
values) of dual-risk societies has created various contexts in which the edifice of the 
socionature tradition can be testified and advanced. In addition, the emphasis of the 
socionature thesis on social construction is in line with the efforts by dual-risk scholars 
to differentiate among reflexive modernizations of different societies (between 
Western and East Asian societies and, within those of East Asian countries), by 
looking into “the cultural-discursive articulation of collective desire and aspiration” 
(Han and Shim, 2010: 465). 
It is also critical to take into consideration the close relationship between the changing 
climate (structural process) and existing/future natural hazards that groups of 
prominent researchers have defined through interdisciplinary collaboration 
(Seneviratne et al., 2012). Arguably, more complexly interwoven sources of 
environmental risk – natural hazard, technical and institutional – will be felt and 
recognized, requiring a more integrative and holistic approach to natural disasters 
(Pelling, 2003c). In this regard, to graft new insights of dual-risk onto socio-nature 
thinking has several benefits in addition to those mentioned above. In particular, this is 
expected to inform research into CCA in the context of societies in transition 
challenged by unbalanced paths to development, if not necessarily identical to those of 
East Asia. The integration of dual-risk with socio-nature ideas is argued to help those 
societies develop proactive CCA politics with more feasible options than Risk Society 
thesis itself, which will account better for the temporally distant modernization of 
Western societies. 
It is hard, if not impossible, to explore the causal relationship between climate change 
and the landslide crisis. However, if the findings of the SREX report and IPCC reports 
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are accepted (Seneviratne et al., 2012), the landslides crisis is already a sign of a 
failure to adapt to climate change risk. What makes the landslides a typical example of 
dual-risk is the “institutional contradiction” (Seo and Creed, 2002: 222) that the 
existing institutions (socially underdeveloped) fail to adapt to anticipated 
environmental risk.  
A year before the landslides crisis of 2011, category 3 Typhoon Kompasu had already 
demonstrated the “inefficiency”, “non-adaptability”, and “incompatibilities” of the 
existing institutional arrangement of the governance regime (see Figure 3.3). The 
typhoon (recorded up to 188km/h) and heavy rains had recurred in Seoul over the 
years, including the regions surrounding Mt. Woomyeon. Several residents and radical 
scholars had already made several requests to the previous Mayor Oh administration to 
take immediate measures against the anticipated landslides risk (SI, 2012). The 
requests were either simply ignored or fulfilled in a partial way. Thus the rare 
opportunity to prevent disasters was totally wasted. As the foreign experts who were 
invited to the second investigation on the cause of the landslides crisis also point out, 
one year might not have been enough to set up any fundamental resolution (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the foreign experts as well as the residents did not forget to mention, 
“immediate action needed to have been done with deeper understanding of, and 
detailed investigation into the impacted areas” (ibid: no page). It is not clear why the 
previous mayor Oh’s regime and the local council ignored the request from the local 
residents. Yet, it is clear that, despite the warning in the previous year, the partnership 
between the local authority and civil society did not work out well. 
Thus it can be understood that the local self-government system in Korea has not led to 
strong public-private partnerships for disaster risk management, despite two decades of 
political decentralization. RAI 1(2011†) adds that: 
“Well for one thing, the local government tends to be more conservative 
than the national one in the context of Korea. For example, the national 
bureaucracies are more exposed to international interaction with foreign 
governments, and have more opportunities for studying abroad on 
government scholarship…probably they are more enlightened in their 
views on collaborative governance…however, closer to local areas, more 
social traditions and authoritarian cultures have remained.” 
 
This can be comprehended as meaning that a public-private partnership at the local 
level is more limited for promoting cooperative disaster risk reduction than at the 
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national level. NI 2 (2012) also notes the failed attempt of the local government and 
local community in Yangyang (a small seaside town in Gangwon province) to build a 
participatory governance model for the sake of floods management. The failure is 
attributed to the pre-existing rights and power of the local authority, a lack of 
communication with local communities and the continuation of unnecessary 
construction. RAI 1 (2011) also adds that the risk management system in Korea still 
relies heavily upon the top down approach, which is not very different from that of the 
authoritarian regime. He exemplifies this point by pointing out the case of the delayed 
development of the national safety management information system: 
 
“Working for the advisory committee in the national safety management 
information system, I realised it was still much performed in a top-down, 
government-centered way. Over several years, I argued that only by being 
connected to private organizations could the effectiveness of the system be 
advanced. The existing modus operandi of the system does not show real-
time data during natural disasters. The problem is not the system itself. 
Rather the necessary data are not entered to the system. Why? Under the 
current system, the data has to be validated through officials’ field 
investigation on disaster-torn places. But during the chaos two to three 
days after the occurrence of natural disasters, such field investigation does 
not happen. So decision-making over which area needs which relief 
supplies is delayed. So my argument was that NGOs should be given the 
rights to enter data. NGOs do not have responsibility so they can roughly 
yet quickly enter unvalidated data. Here accuracy and speed lie in inverse 
proportion to each other…by contrast, a big gap between the offered data 
and real needs can be problematic to officials. So, validated data are 
important for them. My argument has yet to be accepted by government. 
The logic of their counterargument is that civilians should not have access 
to the system that includes sensitive information on national security” (ibid: 
†). 
 
Again, the national security issue is used as an excuse to keep the information system 
for natural disaster risk management in officials’ hands only. Similarly, the 
opportunity to prevent the landslides crisis was missed because of the poor information 
feedback and the low level of trust between the local authority and the residents. In this 
regard, the landslides crisis is a product of socio-political underdevelopment. The lack 
of communicative rationality and social capital was not replaced by any alternatives 
such as traditional norms/values, even when the landslides disaster risk was anticipated. 
If proactive efforts are so difficult for government to make, what political options are 
open to society, in terms of preventing the recurrence of similar disasters? 
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6.4.2. Regime change as a response to environmental risk 
This section shows the local expression of urban disaster risk in the context of Seoul’s 
recent mayoral change. Almost always, (local) government improvises a “renewed” 
proposal for disaster risk management after being hit by environmental shocks and 
stresses. Any delay to clarify where the responsibility lies and to make a long term 
plan for DRR might be too much of a political burden to local authorities. To appease 
the irate victims and shocked citizens, governments prefer immediate, visible, and 
excessive reactions to urban disasters that often largely rely on engineering 
consultancy. It is therefore no surprise that the new proposal lacks the essential, if 
laborious, diagnosis of root causes of social vulnerability to the risk of hazard disasters 
(Wisner et al., 2004). This prevalent, yet problematic environmental hazard risk-
sociopolitical response relationship helps account for why natural disasters recur. Yet, 
this is only the beginning of the debate because the transition of critical consciousness 
to reflexive CCA (Pelling, 2011) does not occur spontaneously, despite the complex 
political and discursive mechanisms of society.  
 
There are two central aspects of this debate: whether the urban disasters in Seoul serve 
as a catalyst for political change; and how the latter in turn alters the nature of urban 
hazards resilience (Pelling and Dill, 2009). First, the debate begins by mapping out the 
relationship between the urban disasters (inundation and landslide) and the subsequent 
mayoral change of Seoul (from the conservative to the liberal) in October 2011. As 
acknowledged by several interviewees (RAI 1, 2011, RAI 3, 2012, NI2, 2012), the 
urban hazard disasters did not autonomously oust the previous mayor of Seoul. The 
debate opens to other driving forces and contexts of the mayoral change. Second, it is 
also imperative to see how the mayoral change has affected the existing discourse of 
disaster risk, related organizations, and the policies and practices of DRR. Positive 
proof has been observed to indicate that urban hazards resilience and its enhancement 
largely rely on the nature of the leadership and governance regime (RAI 2, 2011, NI 4, 
2012). 
 
Yet, the discussion does not aim to produce universal accounts of the above 
hypothetical causations between the variables as in Duit and Galaz (2008). What is 
important is to shed a new light on the critical moment at which the immediate 
aftermath of urban hazard disasters, along with other crucial drivers, has begun to 
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knock out the already debilitated local authority of Seoul. Research into CCA in the 
context of Korea has not paid enough attention to the non-material impacts of climate 
change, such as a regime change. Probably, this section is a first effort to fill the gap 
between the lack of knowledge of institutional adaptation to, and growing awareness 
of, climate change risk. 
6.4.2.1. Causes of the change in mayor 
A political regime changes for many different reasons such as external shocks, internal 
violence, unmet social needs, and often a combination of all of these. Throughout this 
thesis, an urban (governance) regime refers to an institutional arrangement around 
which actors/groups with differing interests, priorities and power either collaboratively 
or conflictually address specific issues that they believe define their collective survival 
and sustainability (Young, 1989, cited in Wijen and Ansari, 2007). 
Not every mayoral or presidential change can be considered as a regime change, 
though. As shown by North Korea’s recent case, the family dictatorship (the transfer of 
power from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un) did not entail change in institutional 
arrangements at all. Therefore, not only the change of a political leader but also the 
contextual reasons for the mayoral change are of profound importance, as well as new 
expectations people have of the new leadership, accompanying changes in 
development priorities, and most importantly actual innovation in the form and quality 
of governance. Given this, to what extent can the recent mayoral change of Seoul be 
construed as a regime change? To answer this question, a brief depiction of the then 
political landscape is required. 
Under the newly coined banner “Design Seoul”, the previous local authority of Seoul 
(Mayor Oh Se-Hoon, hereafter referred as Mayor Oh) strived to rebrand Seoul and 
boost the city’s global competitiveness, amidst its recognition of growing competition 
with other global capital cities. “Design is everything” Mayor Oh said when launching 
the Design Seoul plan. High-cost events and construction projects such as Seoul 
Design Olympiad (2010), Han River Renaissance Project (2006-2010), and the 
construction of Dongdaemoon Design Plaza (2009-2013) were major parts of the 
plan.27 
                                                
27 The past authoritarian regimes once heavily influenced the building of the socio-spatial identity of the 
local cities, including Seoul. At present, however, the banner applied by the local authority mirrors the 
development of local politics and decentralization since the mid-1990s as well as the increased right and 
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When the urban floods and landslide badly damaged Seoul in 2010 and 2011, Mayor 
Oh, in his late forties and a party member of the conservative Grand National Party 
(GNP), had just started the second term of his mayoralty: 33rd (2006-2010) and 34th 
(2010-2011). He was elected mayor in 2006 with 61.6 percent of the popular vote 
against the candidate of the Democratic Party (DP) with 27 percent. His popularity 
could not last long, as the percentage by which he won the election dramatically 
decreased from over 30 percent in the 2008 mayoral election to 0.6 percent in 2010.28 
In addition, the media reported that his victory was due to landslide wins in the three 
GANGNAM districts. 
 
Mayor Oh’s second four-year term began with already increased political opposition, 
visible in the 5th local election on 2 June 2010. In the Seoul Metropolitan Council, the 
opposition party (the DP) turned into a majority (DP: 79 versus GNP: 22: see Table 
6.2). The newly elected superintendent of education of Seoul was somewhat 
progressive in his pursuit of policy-making; and most borough leaders (21 out of 25) 
were members of the DP. As Table 6.2 illustrates, the complexity of Korean politics 
over the decade is characterized by regime changes between the two political parties – 
the Grand National Party (GNP) versus the Democratic Party (DP) at different levels 
of government. The dark dotted line indicates the moment of the mayoral change of 
Seoul to the first-ever former civil activist mayor Park Won-soon.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
power of local governments to carve out their own future. The central government might still exert 
strong influence on local authorities and economies through various means. Nonetheless, its reach and 
control over deciding on the local vision and development priorities are not as absolute as they used to 
be in the era of authoritarianism. 
28 The mayor of Seoul, like all local government leaders, can serve a maximum of three four-year terms. 
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Table 6.2. The dynamics of Korean politics since 2001 
 
Source: National Election Commission of Republic of Korea (NECRK) (2013).  
Notes: The DP is the liberal, Democratic Party whose inaugurations for each position are 
colored in yellow; dark yellow is a combination of two levels of progressive adaptive systems. 
The GNP is the conservative Grand National Party; purple, dark purple means a combination 
of two levels of rigid adaptive systems. Red-rimmed dimensions refer to the emergence of 
cross-scale combination of adaptive systems with differing political origins and inclinations. 
The Korean political system has a single five-year presidential term. The national assembly is 
the unicameral legislature of the country with 246 members directly elected and 54 allocated 
by proportional representation as of the 19th general election. Minor political parties such as 
United Liberal Democrats and Democratic Labour Party are excluded. 
 
The local political situation of Seoul gave birth to recurrent and increasing hostility 
between Mayor Oh and other elected officials, as epitomized by the former mayor’s 
rejection of the free school lunch scheme that was introduced by the liberal DP. Amid 
the growing demand for welfare benefits in Korea (Kwon and Holliday, 2007), Mayor 
Oh did not oppose the free lunch policy per se. Instead, he argued that the local 
authority could only afford to offer the universal free lunch plan to 30 % of vulnerable 
groups of children in Seoul. On the contrary, the DP argued for universal benefits. The 
former mayor called for a local referendum over the free lunch issue. Consequently, 
however, the referendum result was rejected, as the turnout (25.7%) was below the 
required voting rate (33.3%). Just because the referendum was rejected did not mean 
that Mayor Oh had to resign his mayoralty. Yet, he resigned as mayor on 26 August 
2011 because he had promised that he would do so in the case of any failure in the 
referendum.  
 
In addition to the free lunch referendum, other issues and events opened discursive 
space through which differing ideas and visions clashed. It is worth mentioning that 
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changes in party and presidential approval rating, the suicide of the ex-president Noh 
Moo-Hyun (2003-2008; DP) in 2009, or other events such as the Yong-san fire 
disaster that killed five evicted residents and one riot policeman in 2009 might have 
directly and indirectly impacted on the mayoral change. NI 2 (2012) gives an account 
of various causes of the mayoral change: 
 
“Seoul city recently suffered three consecutive years of urban flood. We 
could not respond to the first year’s flood; the scale of the next year one 
was not that big. The year before last [2010], however, saw a relatively big 
flood in Gwang-hwa Square and the areas such as Gang-Seo and Yang-
Cheon. We had learnt much from this flood so that we could better respond 
to the urban flood in Seoul in 2011. In the meantime, we analyzed their 
official announcements and policy in response to the floods over the three 
years. Yet how on earth can any government lay out such a high cost DRR 
plan of $17 billion in five days right after the flood occurred? This is why 
we made a fuss over their reaction to the flood, for example through 
contributing to newspapers. At that time they could not just avoid their 
responsibility to talk openly to the public and civil society as they did last 
time. I believe that how public opinion is delivered defines its formation as 
well. We refuted their logic stressing that whilst the Seoul government 
tried to avoid their responsibility [calling the floods God’s work], the 
floods were man-made events, and the government failed to communicate 
with the citizens. As a result, their causal account of the disasters crumpled. 
Not only these but also the situation that Mayor Oh’s popularity was 
already seriously eroding made the urban floods much more controversial” 
(parentheses added†). 
 
This argument is also partly upheld by the data used in the graph below of the impacts 
and repercussions of recent environmental hazard disasters (Figure 6.4). 
6.4.2.2. Environmental risk as a catalyst of loss of political legitimacy 
As shown in the chart below, three months after re-election, Mayor Oh’s 
administration faced the unprecedented urban hazard disasters. The dramatically 
increased repercussions of urban natural hazards in 2010 and 2011 possibly meant 
totally novel challenges to Mayor Oh’s administration. It might be hard to argue that 
political responsibility for current urban disasters should be exclusively attributed to 
the incumbent government; even though the latter is primarily charged with protecting 
its citizens from disaster risk. In addition, as the then government underlined, the 
record rainfall in the summer of 2011 – 587mm for three consecutive days – was 
unprecedented. The thesis does not aim to search for root causes of the urban disasters. 
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Of importance here is that climate change is expected to bring about more 
unprecedented disaster events in the future; and these are likely to have much more 
complex political ramifications. Therefore, it is critical to comprehend if and how the 
urban disasters led to critical thinking amongst various actors/groups in the urban 
governance regime. 
 
Figure 6.4. The economic loss and victims of natural disasters in Seoul (2002-2011) 
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
The death toll  0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 22 
Source: Based on NEMA (2011). 
 
In response to the urban catastrophes, the previous Seoul local authority released a 
“new” 772 billion won (about US$700 million) plan for expanding sewage and flood 
pumping stations. This plan came out just two days after the outbreak of the urban 
flood on 21 September 2010. Four days after the tragic landslide killed 18 citizens on 
26 July in 2011, the government yet again released another “reportedly new” five 
trillion won (less than US$ 5 billion) plan for expanding the drainage capacity in the 
long run; even before putting into practice the previous year’s new plan. The 
government also made a promise to immediately aid the victims and disaster-torn 
communities. However, these improvised, reactive measures failed to pacify the 
disaster-torn community as well as the electorate of the looming by-election that 
Mayor Oh himself was facing. The opposition DP (Democratic Party) immediately 
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responded to the urban disasters by critiquing the failure of the Seoul government to 
prevent the urban disasters. At the end of September, they launched a parliamentary 
inspection of the local authority; but Mayor Oh refused to attend it. Several comments 
made by the local lawmakers at the inspection need be considered as follows (Chun, 
2011): 
 
Table 6.3. Comments made at a parliamentary inspection 
DP 1 “Last year, boughs, branches, and dry avalanche blocked the sewage that 
recurred this year for the same reason. Wholly insufficient reconstruction 
increased the damage.” 
DP 2 “Professor Lee, Soo-gon had submitted a proposal for suggesting policies to 
prevent the landslide disaster before the crisis occurred, but he was totally 
ignored by the Seoul administration and Seo-cho gu office. This is dereliction 
of duty.” 
DP 3 “The conclusion of the investigation report that defines the landslide crisis as 
a natural disaster sounds very absurd. Among the participants, there were no 




“In Korea all such disasters are conventionally defined as a natural disaster. 
This cannot be solved within Korea. We should invite international experts in 
the area of landslide disasters. We need those who can objectively investigate 
the cause of the disaster.” 
GNP 1 “Isn’t it right that the findings of the investigation have fundamentally 
become invalid? Three participants in the investigation are disciples of the 
fact-finding committee. Needless to say, reinvestigation is necessary”  
Source: Adopted from Chun (2011: no page)†.  
 
Interviews with scholars of DRR and environmental activists show that the urban 
inundation and landslides crisis created a public sphere in which opposition parties and 
NGOs could criticize not only the failure of disaster management of the previous local 
authority but also other engineering development projects under the Design Seoul plan 
(NI 2, 2012, NI 5, 2012, RAI 3, 2012). 
 
In sum, it is hard to claim that the urban disasters were the immediate cause of the 
resignation of Mayor Oh Se-hoon, or that they would continue to place the 
conservative GNP in grave peril. Indeed, the 2012 presidential election saw the 
emergence of another GNP candidate president (see Table 6.2), the daughter of the 
former president Park Chung-hee (1962-1979) who is now gaining dual fame for the 
rapid modernization versus authoritarianism with abuse of human rights. Nonetheless, 
the mayoral change represents much to Korean politics, particularly the politics of 
environmental risk that the following section will discuss. 
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6.4.3. The implications of the mayoral change for hazards resilience 
Park Won-soon, a former-human rights lawyer and civic activist without any former 
experience as a politician, decided to participate in and finally won the 2011 by-
election for Seoul mayor. Despite his furious activities in the civil movement over two 
decades, with his low approval rating (5% at best) at the beginning of his mayoral 
campaign it looked nearly impossible for him to defeat the competing candidates such 
as Ahn Cheol-soo (independent) and Na Gyeung-won (the GNP). Soon after having a 
talk with Park, Ahn Cheol-soo with the highest popularity rating unconditionally left 
the mayoral campaign, declaring for Park Won-soon. This demonstration of support 
played a key role in Park Won-soon’s election as mayor of Seoul.29 
6.4.3.1. The connotation of the new mayor in Korean politics 
This was an extremely critical moment for Korean politics. First, no independent 
candidate has previously won such a major election in the history of Korean politics. 
Mayor of Seoul is thought of as “the second-most powerful job” in the country 
(Williamson, 2011: no page). It might be premature to see it as concrete evidence of 
the crack in the long-established two-party system of the DP and the GNP (see Table 
6.2 and footnote 31). Of course, his candidacy was supported by the DP after he won 
the DP primary election; he also then became a member of the DP after his 
inauguration for Seoul Mayor. Yet, the mayoral change is meaningful because it 
constituted the first regime change, not based on the logic of representative democracy, 
but on the people’s decision to give a clear mandate to a candidate without intimate 
connection to formal politics. Indeed, Park had to set up the “Park Won-soon Fund” 
because he did not have enough funds for the election campaign. It took just 52 hours 
to collect 3.3 billion Korean won (equivalent to about $US 2.9 million), owing to 
citizens’ voluntary participation (half the 5778 participants were micro-donators). 
 
Second, related to the above, it has already been noted that the narrow ideological 
spectrum has long produced discursive distortion for such issues as social welfare and 
DRR. Not unexpectedly, ample evidence (e.g. news articles) illustrates that the 
candidate Park was also branded as a ‘commie’ and pro-North Korean by some GNP 
                                                
29 The former medical doctor, successful IT businessman, and professor of business, Ahn Chul-soo who 
later ran in the 2012 presidential election is a rising star in Korean politics. Despite again withdrawing 
his candidacy in favour of the DP candidate in the election, his recent political success (later elected as a 
legislator) reflects the people’s changing expectation of politics in Korea. Like Park Won-soon, Ahn has 
not registered any party, meaning that the virtual two-party system (the DP and the GNP) has begun 
slightly to lose its solidity. 
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lawmakers and the conservative media, during and after the election. His election, with 
53.4% of the vote, means that the use of ideological/discursive distortion no longer 
worked that well in the election. It should be also noticed that he overwhelmed the 
opposing GNP candidate in the election in every district, except for the three 
GANGNAM districts and Yongsan district; note that the previous mayor’s small 
victory margin in his second-term mayoral election was largely due to the landslide 
victory in GANGNAM. 
 
Third, no previous mayor of Seoul used social media as means of communicating with 
the citizens as much as Mayor Park. With more than 700,000 followers on Twitter as 
of June 2013, he has used it not only to announce new policy ideas but also to 
communicate about everyday life with them. Although the latter might not be the 
primary reason for heavy use of Social Network Service (SNS), as will be argued later, 
it also has helped build trust and fostered real-time exchange of disaster risk 
information. This new attempt at communication is meaningful as it is expected to 
shake, to its very foundation, the orthodox structure of the public sphere (Schmidt, 
2008) – which has until recently been dominated by a few allied groups (e.g. the 
winners from compressed development).  
6.4.3.2. Addressing the high risk perception before Park’s mayoralty 
If the thesis is to discuss the impact of the mayoral change on Seoul’s hazards 
resilience, it is important to understand the origin of Park’s particular concern with 
environmental risk. Eight months after his election as mayor of Seoul on 17 June 2012, 
he was elected chairman of the World Mayors Council on Climate Change (WMCCC), 
and has held the position since October 2012. His non-ephemeral interest in the issue 
of environmental risk goes back to the period of time when he was working as head 
(and founder) of the Hope Institute that organized the first-ever, citizenry research 
institute for DRR, funded by POSCO (multinational steel-making company), and the 
Disaster Management Institute (see http://disaster.makehope.org). Although this 
business has temporarily been inactive as of 2009, perhaps with the end of the 
stipulated time for the fund, it is considered to have underpinned the evolution of 
participatory DRR in Korea in vital ways. 
 
The first head of the Disaster Management Institute accounted for the evolutionary 
process of citizen participation in DRR as follows: 
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“Travelling around the country we held a lot of seminars, and due to the 
Hope Institute, the conference on crisis management was founded. For one 
thing, that was a kind of voluntary movement of citizens, because during 
all the seminars from Jeju to Gang-won province we investigated disaster-
torn communities, again held seminars and met the disaster victims, found 
out about and revealed the causes, and then researchers got together, and 
through these processes committee members [of the Disaster Management 
Institute] and researchers joined them, and with the funds we ordered 
disaster studies. Five books came about then that were all awarded the 
National Academy of Sciences Award. Continuing efforts by researchers 
led to the establishment of the International Conference on Emergency 
Management…The establishment of the academic spheres for risk and 
crisis management, such as the International Conference on Emergency 
Management and the Korean Association for Crisis and Emergency 
Management, would not have been possible without the Hope Institute and 
mayor Park” (RAI3, 2012, parentheses added†). 
 
Indeed this is completely different from the atmosphere of the academic sphere for 
disaster risk management, as he continues to explain: 
 
“In the past [20 years ago] it was extremely difficult for us (then a few social 
scientists who researched the issue of hazard disaster risk and crisis) to have our 
articles published in social scientific journals. The editors might have considered 
our work unfamiliar and even bizarre” (RAI 3, 2012, parenthesis added†). 
 
There is also the question of why Mayor Park has had such a high interest in the given 
issue. When questioned about this, RAI 3 (2012†) suggested that: 
 
“Well I don’t know much about it, I’ve never got inside of his head. Yet, 
when I was working for the Disaster Management Institute, I felt that he 
thinks DRR as the first duty for mayor. If government cannot protect 
citizens from risk disasters, what is the rationale for government to exist in 
the first place? At that time when he was the head of the Hope Institute, we 
used to have a lot of discussion together, he showed us hundreds of photos 
of disaster risk management he took during his visits to foreign countries, I 
was really surprised...I guess that probably he obtained the experience and 
policy ideas in terms of DRR at that time.” 
 
However, this passage does not clearly account for why he is so interested in DRR 
issues. Much clearer is the connection of his current approach to DRR in Seoul with 
the past learning experience he accumulated as a civil activist. In addition, this might 
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be one of a few practical, collective attempts from the bottom up to satisfy the high 
interest in, and awareness of, environmental risk (c.f. the LCGG during the Lee 
Myung-bak presidency). 
 
In addition to the Disaster Management Institute, Park founded many NGOs and 
fundraising organizations. Some personal opinion of his leadership was heard from one 
former staff of the Hope Institute (now working for the Young Foundation in London): 
 
“He has countless new ideas with a big dream. He often suddenly suggests 
new ideas, “let’s make a project 1000 jobs!”, for a genius, charismatic 
leader…if his creativity is to continue, the organization needs much more 
than him alone. I personally think creativity comes out of exchange of 
ideas among many other people; he has too many creative ideas. So, the 
work in the Hope Institute was too tough. But he does not stay in one 
organization more than five years, made and left and made and left the 
organizations. He always leaves organizations he made…actually, I 
thought that mayor Park and President Lee Myung-bak resembled one 
another in their extremely strong impetus and ability to mobilize people. In 
the case of President Lee, the FRRP was done quickly and in a compressed 
way. I think Mayor Park is the same” (NI 3, 2012†). 
 
Certainly, she does not denounce Mayor Park and President Lee wholesale, but points 
to the importance of leadership to make a difference in the context of Korea’s public 
sphere. Indeed, leadership appears to be critical when an organization requires social 
innovation (for the definition of social innovation, see Chapter three). In line with this 
thinking, PAI 2 (2011) and NI 4 (2012) also make it clear that, in the context of Korea, 
the changes necessary for local governments’ CCA have greatly depended on the type 
and willingness of the local leadership. Yet leadership should not be narrowly 
conceptualized in terms of the ability to bring about change, if it is to elicit wider 
participation of the people in CCA. This point has already attracted analysis from 
many scholars of leadership (Williamson, 2011). Thus, a single entrepreneur is not 
sufficient because social innovation concerns structural, normative and discursive 
changes that one actor cannot bring about. This is why theorists of institutional change 
pay greater attention to “collective action” in addition to “mobilization” and a 
“reflexive shift in consciousness” when accounting for institutional change (Seo and 
Creed, 2002 and see Figure 3.3). When a leader with such bottom-up experience of 
DRR was given a mandate to extend it throughout the wider political landscape, what 
would happen, in terms of hazards resilience? 
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6.4.3.3. The mayoral change: momentum for the building of hazards resilience 
On 30 November 2011, the report of the first investigation concluded that the crisis 
was a “natural” disaster without anthropogenic drivers (see above). With this 
conclusion, any responsibility of the then incumbents in charge of DRR was denied, 
despite the huge loss and damage; indeed, this can largely impact on the lawsuit 
between the victims of the crisis, Seoul government, and Seocho-gu (district) office. 
At the beginning of his term, Mayor Park immediately committed to carrying out a 
reinvestigation of the landslides crisis: more precisely, to identify any man-made 
aspects of the disaster. It took another eight months for the new mayor finally to 
launch the reinvestigation process in the summer of 2012. It is crucial to explore how 
the process came about, who was involved in the process, and most importantly to 
what extent the reinvestigation has reflected the bottom-up critiques of the 
conventional manner in which urban disasters triggered by natural hazards are de-
politicized.  
 
On the one hand, the decision to reinvestigate came as a result of a quasi-network of 
the victims, environmental NGOs and critical scholars, who pressed the Seoul 
government to reinvestigate the disaster site. More investigation was required to look 
into the omitted areas of the disaster site. The alliance was partial, if critical, in that 
their major concerns were not the same (NI 2, 2011). An environmental activist who 
had been deeply involved in the risk governance space since the occurrence of the 
crisis expressed his thought that “the victims were more interested in the issue of 
compensation than fundamental issues such as exploring the cause of the crisis and 
finding a fundamental resolution for the future” (ibid.). Nonetheless, it is clear that the 
network contributed to Mayor Park’s decision to reinvestigate the disaster. The 
residents living in the disaster-torn towns stressed this point later at the hearing on the 
result of the reinvestigation (SI, 2012). On the other hand, however progressive a 
perspective the mayor might have, without the press to unearth social roots of the 
problems, such corroborative investigation would not have been possible. The role of 
the scholars who consistently provided critical ideas, which often collided with the 
researchers involved in the investigation process, was also critical (ibid.).  
 
That said, the findings of the second investigation into the cause of the crisis, to which 
four foreign experts in landslides crisis were also invited, did not dismiss the 
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conclusion made by the first investigation that the crisis is a “natural” disaster. The 
new report noted dry avalanches and branches that blocked the sewage systems and the 
record rainfall (ibid.). Some new perspectives were included in the report such that 
“the crisis might be called a man-made disaster to the extent that it would have been 
possible to prevent the disaster if the previous government had more seriously taken 
into consideration and dealt with the landslides triggered by Typhoon Kompasu last 
year” (ibid.). Nevertheless, the victims of the crisis see the findings of the new report 
in relation to the Seoul government’s intention to prepare for the ongoing lawsuits with 
them, by placing more stress on the physical aspects of the causes of the crisis.  
 
Meaningful reflections are not found within the investigation report, but at the public 
hearing on the findings of the second investigation. For instance, the scholars who 
were working on behalf of the victims were not invited by the investigation committee 
to join the expert discussion. However, the victims’ strong demand enabled them to 
present their perspectives, which conflicted in many ways with those of the committee. 
As the public hearing was planned for the victims, the members of the fact-finding 
committee had not expected to discuss any technical agenda (e.g. the modelling 
process for landslide prediction) beyond the findings at a generic level. Yet, the critical 
scholars triggered a hot debate on technical issues as well as normative issues. It is 
worth noting the counter-argument made by one of them that: 
 
“Well, if disasters occur, this society [Korean government] defines it as 
natural disaster first. It has long been like that. If some experts or activists 
pose questions about the conventional approach, they normally say one 
thing and then the opposite. Very absurd! Then they order investigations 
and research with pre-defined results, with which they can defend lawsuits 
later. Then the findings of the report play a major role in the result of the 
lawsuit. I have taken part in many such lawsuits so far, on behalf of 
families of the victims. What I have felt from our convention is that the 
victims or their families initially suffer from disasters, so they cry. Next, 
during the processes of the trial, we fail to investigate the cause of the 
disaster, and we cry again. Then, if we lose the trial we have to pay for the 
cost of the lawsuits, and we cry again” (SI, 2012)†. 
 
This shows how Korean society has dumped the cost and responsibility for clarifying 
the cause of disasters on victims, and what ratchet effects disasters might have 
(Chambers, cited in Pelling: 16). It is hard to record all the feelings (usually anger and 
disappointment) expressed by the victims and their families against the findings of the 
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new report and against the committee and Seoul government. However, it is observed 
that the victims intervened to change the conventional culture of public hearings (i.e. a 
unilateral presentation), for instance: 
 
“I am sorry for intervening during the debate, but I should say this. Last 
Monday I received the two-page paper stating that the Seoul government 
has scheduled this hearing for today. After some thought, I made a call to 
Seoul city hall, and they said to me, the government had already chosen all 
the participants on the panel, and we [families of the victims] can just 
come and sit in. They did not express it exactly that way, but the 
meaning…I thought that it would be meaningless…this hearing for today 
would become just like a rite of passage unless I intervened. I had to come 
out to oppose the conventional approach to public hearings because I 
underwent all the processes that were keeping me dangling, and I did not 
know who would join the discussion, so I emailed the Seoul government to 
ask, “I am not an expert in the given issue, but you have to invite those 
who can talk on behalf of families of the victims.” Differently put, the 
hearing would proceed as usual as in the past unless I asked, emailed them 
and made a fuss. So I phoned them [those scholars on behalf of the 
victims], and found that they had not received any materials for the debate 
from Seoul government. How on earth would they be able to meaningfully 
join the debate without preparation? So I called back the government to ask 
why…someone has to represent our stance. That’s why I asked Professor 
Lee to help us” (SI, 2012: parenthesis added)†. 
 
This is a common expression of the families of the victims, against the lack of 
representativeness and the conventional top-down approach to communication with 
citizens. However, this passage notes the possibility of citizen participation to bring 
about change in the discourse on environmental risk. The change in mayor has not 
been a cure-all for these problems. The individuals exercise agency, in alliance with 
other groups, to call the conventions into question. 
 
When government fails to provide its people with basic protection against disaster risk, 
as was noted earlier, there is often space for institutional change to occur: in this case, 
the informal area of politics was able to tackle the conventional top-down approach. 
The mayoral change has influenced the way in which disaster risk discourse has 
recently evolved.  
 
First, the decision to reinvestigate was not easy and a political burden for the mayor; it 
could potentially lead to huge compensation for the loss and damage. Once 
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institutionalized, this will probably impact on future cases of urban hazard disasters. In 
fact, Korean society has very recently opened up the discursive space to create a social 
consensus over the issue of how to deal with man-made causes of natural disasters. It 
is less clear how far such disaster discourse has been extended to include social causes 
and aspects of the disaster. None of the interviewees and other sources of data have 
helped answer this question.  
 
Second, the landslides crisis appears to be a failed adaptation to environmental risk, 
despite many opportunities to avoid it in advance (Typhoon Kompasu in 2010, the 
policy proposal submitted by an individual scholar, the residents’ demand for disaster 
prevention). It is critical to see what lessons the society has learnt from the crisis. This 
question is closely related to the future CCA of Seoul. Has the detailed action plan for 
CCA of Seoul (2012-2016) embraced such issues as the political implications of 
disasters or the responsibilities of incumbents for failure in DRR? The answer is 
certainly not. Instead, these issues will continue to be dealt with via other discursive 
channels such as elections, trials and many other informal public spheres. 
 
Third, it was found that the mayoral change has brought about undoing-effects: in other 
words, the new mayor has either cancelled or extensively reduced the large scale 
development projects and plans set up by the previous mayor Oh. If buffering effects 
occur between different scales of an adaptive governance system, undoing-effects 
come about as a result of a regime change. The undoing-effects have a bearing on the 
way in which cities maintain their hazards-resilience; most importantly by tackling the 
influence of the various growth alliances such as Mopia and the engineering-
construction mafia. Of course, the mayoral change has not brought forth immediate 
changes in the power relations, as not all construction of DRR facilities has been 
cancelled. It may be that the annihilation of such power cartels will not be possible in 
the near future, as they also play essential functions and roles. The point is that the 
mayoral change expresses one possible way of how the relationship between political 
and environmental change can co-evolve, and how differing ideas are generated, 
mediated, and compete to shape the nature of risk discourse. 
6.4.3.4. The Internet space as a public sphere for disaster risk? 
In the summer of 2012, the Mayor of Seoul, Park Won-soon, made, jointly with a 
Korean web portal company Daum, a webpage-based flood risk map and forums 
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whereby citizens could freely report blocked drains and potentially risky facilities, and 
express their views on how to improve disaster prevention. This was the first ever 
attempt by a Korean local government to open up a discursive cyber-space in which to 
request local participants’ ideas about Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). It was also 
observed that the Mayor consistently communicated with his followers on Twitter to 
gain real-time information about local outbreaks of flood during heavy rains and 
typhoons.  
 
Of course, it is not clear how much the social media tools and the Internet actually 
helped actual disaster risk reduction in Seoul, due to the limited access to essential 
information. Cyberspace is but one of many platforms for social relations which can be 
used to cope with the given issue. Despite the unusual succession of three typhoons – 
Typhoon Bolaven (28 August), Tembin (30 August), Sanba (17 September), there was 
no fatality in Seoul during the 2012 summer monsoon season, even though chronic 
inundation of high streets occurred in some parts of the city. This thesis does not 
simply argue for the use of the Internet for DRR and CCA. It is already clear, however, 
that the Internet now offers additional, if not necessarily alternative, space for the 
city’s hazards resilience to be further developed.  
In spite of some challenges that should be overcome, such as more reliable treatment 
of data (SI, 2012), social media has been increasingly piloted and harnessed over the 
world for a variety of DRR objectives. Information sharing networks such as Crisis 
Mappers have been used for obtaining data about the missing and victims of disasters – 
Person-Finder (Google) and Anpi report in Japan – and to support a disaster recovery 
process – e.g. the Emergency 2.0 project in Australia. There is also a growing body of 
scholarly evidence that the use of social media shifts institutional arrangements for 
DRR (Ng and Lean, 2012, Smith, 2010) and constructs an alternative public sphere 
(Douglass, 2005) in which new ideas and shifted power relations have practical 




This chapter has explicated the co-evolving process by which political reflection on 
urban disaster occurs as a part of a political regime change. The argument was not that 
the landslides crisis directly caused the change of mayor. Instead, the reoccurrence of 
urban disasters and the failure of the previous mayor’s orthodox DRR were enough to 
bring about a new governance space before and after the landslides crisis. In this new 
governance space, alternative ideas that had previously been ignored gained more 
attention and support, although the orthodox engineering-based DRR strongly resisted 
the winds of change. For many reasons, as described in this chapter, the landslide crisis 
was a typical example of dual-risk on the grounds that the cause of the disaster can be 
ascribed to rapid urbanization, the lack of public-private partnership and the previous 
exclusion of civil society from the risk governance process. The first election of a 
former civil activist who belonged to no existing political parties as mayor can be seen 
as a symptom of the breaking of the old political structure and culture. At the same 
time, it is evident that the marginality of environmental risk in public discourse seems 
to have gradually changed after the election of the new mayor. It remains to be seen 
how far the urban resilience specific to disaster risk will be further fostered by the new 
political regime. 
 
Theories of institutions and institutional change have been inclined to overlook the role 
of disaster or environmental change in triggering institutional arrangements. In 
particular, scholars of dual-risk have focused on explaining the ramifications of 
compressed modernization and reflexivity, nearly exclusively in the context of 
technical, social and economic risks. Although a natural hazard is but one of triggering 
forces of an urban disaster, climate change will continue to question the adequacy of 
urban resilience in Seoul and other cities. In particular, the coexistence of 
spatiotemporally heterogeneous ideas and values in Seoul, which continue to compete 
in the situation of urban disasters is of great concern. In the following chapter, the case 




Chapter 7: Jeju, imported dual-risk (the naval base construction) 
7.1: Introduction 
Evidence of dual-risk in Jeju was less clear at the early stage of the fieldwork, 
compared to that of Seoul; its endemic, modern history shows the lack of constitutive 
elements of compressed development such as the intimate relationship between politics 
and business (Chaebol), rapid industrialization and, rapid urbanization.  
 
Indeed, Jeju has remained on the periphery of the national compressed development. 
There are crucial aspects of adaptation to environmental risk in Jeju that the discourse 
of compressed development and the dual-risk thesis are not fully appropriate to clarify. 
Of course, the past authoritarian government’s five-year economic development plans 
raised the massive development of tourism and fruit industry, and contributed to the 
construction of socio-spatial identity of Jeju. Thus, the local developmental path of 
Jeju can be generally understood in the wider context of the national, modern 
transformation, impelled by strong governmental intervention. Nevertheless, the 
manifestation of environmental risk and following political reflections in Jeju have 
taken a very different shape and direction to that of Seoul, due to the turbulent history, 
traditional social capital, and a hostile sentiment against external capital and central 
government. 
 
This chapter seeks to suggest that external capital, a central government, and 
globalization have rather imported dual-risk to Jeju society that has less local 
contributed to its formation. Imported dual-risk is observed in rapid urbanization 
processes, focused on the construction of a naval base, and associated land use changes, 
weakening local social capital, loss of community identity, and a tendency to 
underestimate disaster risk in Jeju. Contradictions arising between the recent pressures 
for urban development and the strong local institutional assets embedded in the local 
history of Jeju society have not been incorporated into local and national plans for 
CCA. Relying on informal interviews and documents, an argument is made in this 
Chapter that the disparity between centralised development trajectory and local values 
shapes new disaster risk in Jeju. Following this introduction, this chapter first presents 
disaster risk and its perception in Jeju; second, it explores social and historical root of 
risk in Jeju; third, the chapter suggests construction of the naval base as a case of 
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imported dual-risk; and last, the chapter concludes by broaching the difficult problems 
of social innovation.  
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7.2: Disaster risk and its perception in Jeju 
The pilot research in 2010 indicated Jeju as a place of high awareness of climate 
change risk in Korea. In particular, the local authority was seen to be making 
preemptive and pioneering local initiatives for responding to climate change (e.g. the 
Model City Project for Responding to Climate Change, NI 14, 2011). At the 
southernmost part of the Korean peninsula, the island also has a subtropical 
environment and climate change-prone industries (tourism and orchard industry) 
through which diverse inquiries into climate change risk can be provoked in the future.  
 
In addition, “Jeju seems almost the only place in Korea in which residents, with great 
interest in overall and particular development issues, examine the past developmental 
path” (Lee, 1995: 99)†. Even further Kim (2010b: 81)† argues that “Jeju people have 
started to take critical perspectives to transfer the pre-existing policies of the 
development after Typhoon Nari in 2007.” These observations led to the selection of 
Jeju as the research site, indicating a distinctive and engaged local culture that would 
contrast with that found in Seoul. 
7.2.1. Physical indicators of climate change risk 
There are an increasing number of scientific accounts of physical indicators of climate 
change and variation in Jeju. For example, the sea level rise around Jeju Island has 
reached 225.7mm over the last four decades, that is, a nonparallel increase of about 
6.10 mm per year as shown in Figure 7.1. No definitive reason has been given for such 
rapid sea level rise. This, however, appears to be linked with the freshwater run-off 
together with a changing climate (JDI, 2010a). 
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Figure 7.1 Annual Mean Sea Level (Jeju: 1970-2007) 
 
Source: Adopted from JDI (2010a). 
 
The physical change is not the only important point. The local authority has attempted 
to use the partial evidence about the sea-level change to raise awareness of the severity 
of climate change risk (with e.g. the information center for climate change at the 
Yongmeori coast). Accordingly, this led to a visit to the coastal area. As old, local 
female divers (called Haenyeo in Korean) catching and selling sea products at the 
Yongmeori coast said, “there was not inundation of the Yongmeori tuff ring area, even 
during the high tide, when I was a child” (LRI 2, 2011). Besides environmental 
changes, the discourse of national security threatens their means of livelihood (see 
below). The point here is that the early phase of the fieldwork already captured 
awareness of climate change risk. The public access to the causeway in the right-hand 
photo in Figure 7.2 is already been restricted during high tide. 
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Figure 7.2. Female divers selling sea products at the Yongmeri coast 
 
Sources: The author. 
 
Amongst other local indicators of the impacts of climate change are ecological 
changes, such as the changing vegetation in Mt Halla (Kim, 2008b), the changing 
marine species, and the moving north of citrus plantations to the mainland of Korea 
(JDI, 2010a, JDI, 2010b). It is also evident that various local groups are fully aware of 
intensifying rainfalls in Jeju (RAI 8, 2011, NI 14, 2011). The changing Sea Surface 
Temperature (SST) of the adjacent seas, as seen in Figure 7.3, is also a critical sign of 
environmental change in Jeju (Belkin, 2009, Ho et al., 2004, cited in JDI, 2010a).  
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Figure 7.3. SST Change in Large Marine Ecosystems: 1982 ~ 2006 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Belkin (2009: 211). 
Note: The dotted red box indicates the sea around Jeju Island  
 
The above-mentioned environmental changes are of great concern to government and 
the people of the island. This is because they are expected to bring about new risks that 
could exceed the present level of resilience and adaptive capacity of the island.  
Typhoon Nari in 2007, which devastated the island, is one so-far-known case by which 
to anticipate future impacts of climate change on the island. A typhoon is quite a 
familiar natural hazard to Jeju as well as Korea. Yet, the scale of loss and damage was 
unprecedented, the greatest of all typhoons to have affected Jeju over the last five 
decades with 13 casualties and about 130 billion Korean Won (equivalent to $US 114 
million) in damage. In fact, the size of the typhoon was not exceptionally large, 
compared to those of the catastrophic typhoons Rusa in 2002 and Maemi in 2003. As 
demonstrated by Figure 7.4, however, the weakening typhoon (with day maximum 
rainfall of 420mm), unusually, penetrated through to the heart of the island on 16 
September 2007. 
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Figure 7.4. The path of Typhoon Nari in 2007 
 
Source: Modified from KMA (2011: 205). 
Notes: The dotted blue line indicates the path of Typhoon Nari. The paths of other past 
typhoons in Korea are provided for comparison (see Chapter thre). 
 
The typhoon Nari disaster shows that even familiar/known types of hazard can have 
unexpected ramifications. In fact, this is exactly why Cutter’s (1993, cited in Mustafa, 
2009) conceptualization of risk that includes consequences in addition to probability 
can capture fuller aspects of risk. In addition to the unexpectedness or abnormality of 
the hazard, the recent rapid urbanization process is claimed to have been related to the 
unprecedented scale of loss and damage from the typhoon (RAI 8, 2011). At the same 
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time, however, local NGOs and academics expressed less confidence about their own 
claim for the correlation between development and the huge typhoon impacts. 
Accounting for this needs be integrated with a generic local perception of disaster risk. 
7.2.2. Perception and the tendency to underestimate environmental disaster risk 
 
Jeju confronts strong typhoons and heavy rains almost every year, but I never heard of 
inundation in Jeju when I was a child. Inundation is a very recent phenomenon in Jeju  
(RAI 8, 2011, in his late forties†). 
 
Jeju is famous for its abundance of three things:  
Winds, Rocks and Women (Korean saying†). 
 
How, then, have the environmental changes and their increasing impacts recently been 
perceived in Jeju? Of course, the answer to this question should be different depending 
upon who are questioned and which disaster impacts are discussed. Chapter five 
presented the increasing perception of environmental risk and how institutional rigidity 
and existing power relations are reinforcing the marginality of environmental and 
climatic risk in Korean public discourse. Much the same can be said of Jeju, but the 
reason for the marginality is slightly different, due in part to the social milieu and 
history of Jeju society. 
 
It was observed during field work that the islanders in general still pinpoint the 
geological characteristics of the island (volcanic geology) as preventing natural 
hazards such as typhoons from triggering disasters such as flood and inundation. This 
was the case even after the recent catastrophic event of typhoon Nari in 2007.  
 
The current research was able to respond to an earlier study of perception Farmers 
Perception of and Adjustment to Typhoon Hazards on Cheju [translated as Jeju in this 
thesis] Island, Korea (Kim, 1989) informed by the tradition of behaviorism in hazards 
research  (e.g. Gilbert White, Ian Burton). This research has been rare in Korea until 
recently, and is invaluable to help understand the adaptation of Jeju to risks from 
natural hazards. Kim’s work stops short of scrutinizing how the hazard and risk 
perception and actual impacts of environmental risk are dealt with politically, to reflect 
on the first phase of modernization of Jeju. Still, the research does reveal how a certain 
group – Jeju farmers (based on their perception of typhoon hazard and risk, and social 
capital) – adapt to the typhoon disaster risk, taking social, cultural and historical 
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contexts into account. It is argued that the farmers had a much higher sense of “self-
reliance” and “independence”, as opposed to “exclusivity” against, the mainlanders, 
due to the island’s “turbulent history, involving popular rebellions, invasion, [and] 
political upheavals spilling over from peninsular Korea” (Kim, 1989: 96)†. This 
historical context has been enshrined in such unique socio-cultural traits as their dialect, 
family and marriage institutions, and particular strong local ties of social capital 
(called Gwon-dang in Korean and Gwen-dang in Jeju dialect, see below). Of 
significance is that the awareness and experience of typhoon hazard and risk among 
farmers ironically led to “a tendency for them to underestimate their actual suffering 
from annual typhoon hazards” (ibid: 110). 
 
Interviews found that a similar tendency was still evident in Jeju (NI 11, 2011, NI 12, 
2011, RAI 7, 2011). When questioned about any perspective they might have 
regarding the implications of recent urban development for environmental hazards in 
Jeju, NI 11 (2011†) a local environmental NGO, makes it clear that: 
 
“I am a member of the Committee for Environment Impact Assessment. 
During an assessment process, we do not take the issue of disaster risk so 
seriously. This is because Jeju Island does not have the type of geological 
environment in which mal-development can bring about landslides crises 
as in other places [the mainland]…in the case of Jeju Island, which is 
covered by volcanic deposits, absorption of water by the surface is very 
fast. Such hazard disasters as floods and landslides are unheard of.” 
 
This perception is commonplace; another interviewee even went further to assert that 
Jeju is not a proper case for the current research and that the research site should be 
changed, given that natural disasters rarely occur in Jeju (RAI 7, 2011). Of course, 
these remarks should not be construed as signifying their absolute ignorance about or 
indifference to environmental disaster risk per se. Much clearer from these views is 
that the tendency to underrate the severity of risk from natural hazards is still prevalent 
in Jeju in a way that fails to address the underlying social cause of disasters. If this 
observation is not erroneous, a few local voices for altering local priorities and greater 
emphasis on environmental sustainability after typhoon Nari require additional 
attention (Kim, 2010b). 
 
The informants reveal that structural constraints prevent bottom-up criticism from 
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feeding into plans for projects and practices of development. They speak out about the 
difficulty of obtaining, and/or the limit of, scientific evidence. RAI 8 (2011†), a local 
expert on water resources, explains the complexity of the geological features and 
structure of underground water in Jeju: 
 
“For urban planning, especially large-scale development of apartments in 
the mainland, the use of rainwater [for the purpose of risk reduction] 
should be approved in advance. I think that this should also be applied to 
urban planning processes in Jeju, but it is not easy in reality…The water 
permeability rate is already very high due to the geological features of the 
island, but there are also more than 5000 ground-water holes in Jeju. Urban 
development of upstream [mountainous] and downstream [coastal] regions 
might construct a situation in which the causes and impacts of hazard 
disasters are created in different places. For instance, hotels in the New 
Jeju City area [coastal area] fully rely on ground water. Yet, it is highly 
plausible to assume that development in a mountainous area [e.g. golf 
resorts] can change the existing flow of ground water, thereby affecting 
those of downstream areas. This correlation between developments, which 
are geographically distant from one another, is extremely hard if not 
impossible to clarify” (parentheses added). 
 
A local expert working for a government-affiliated research institute made this 
argument. Simply put, not only pre-existing urban development but also the complex 
geological features, precluding essential DRR facilities (e.g. for rainwater storage) are 
both reckoned to generate exposure to disaster risk. Local geological complexity is not 
unfamiliar to local environmental activists. Nonetheless, NI 11 (2011†) only partially 
agree with the above claim:  
 
“Research into the complex correlation and geological features is possible 
and supportive of overall disaster risk reduction for Jeju but far beyond the 
capacity of local NGOs. I think that government-affiliated research 
institutes have enough capacity to conduct such research. They, however, 
cannot carry out such research if the local authority does not want it. If the 
local authority prioritized environmental conservation over development, 
the institutes together with us would be able to deal with the given issue 
more seriously. Otherwise, the institutes cannot help catering to the local 
authority. Jeju is where the local government has enormous power over 
other groups such as the local press.” 
 
Undoubtedly, another reason why Jeju society has not seen much experimental social 
research so far is clearer: the rigid political structure is a constraint (for the same issue 
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at the national level, see Chapter five). Unsurprisingly, the nature of political 
leadership and political culture largely influence the scope of explorative activities for 
building hazards resilience. More evidence for this argument will be considered in 
Section 8.3. 
 
The lack or difficulty of scientific research into environment-society relationships is 
not exclusive to Jeju as the case of the public sphere after the Mt. Woomyeon 
landslides crisis in Seoul reveals (see Section 6.3). As will be addressed later in this 
chapter, constraints in existing, rigid institutional arrangements have hindered 
opportunity for learning for risk reduction and hazards mitigation. Suffice it to say that 
the triangular relations amongst climate change, disaster risk and development have 
yet to be taken seriously in Jeju, despite the need for this being loudly stressed 
elsewhere (Schipper and Pelling, 2006).  
 
It is necessary to note how the local authority and central government reacted to 
typhoon Nari. Amongst other things, these were the designation of Jeju as a special 
disaster zone, construction of a dozen detention ponds in upstream, mountainous areas, 
and encouragement for residents to take out storm and flood insurance. Again, these 
technical and reactive measures would be helpful for maintaining the hazard resilience 
of the island society, but partial, in the case that exposure to both familiar and 
uncertain hazards in any unprecedented way would lead to entirely novel risks and 
consequences (Mustafa, 2009). In addition, some of the retention ponds have already 
been critiqued for various reasons: for example, being located in mountainous areas 
(rather than adjacent to disaster-prone coastal areas) and inadequate maintenance (NI 
14, 2011, RAI 8, 2011). The local press also anticipates potential risk from the lack of 
collaboration between different departments of the provincial government office: e.g. 
between the construction of retention ponds (disaster mitigation) and ecological 
restoration of urban rivers (Ko, 2013). 
 
In the above situation, the need for proactive adaptation comes to the fore. As a matter 
of fact, it is not true that the local society lacks any institutional tools for proactive 
adaptation (e.g. Pre-Environmental Review System and Environment Impact 
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Assessment)30. Yet the current urban circumstances, on which urban life and 
livelihoods rely, was composed before such regulations came into existence in the 
mid-1990s. Even further, enforcement of the regulations has been neither stringent nor 
appropriate to their initial purpose. How easily these regulations have been ignored or 
misused (to indulge in development activities) will be analysed below with reference 
to the construction of the Jeju naval base. 
7.3: Social and historical roots of risk in Jeju 
There is a significant disparity between Jeju Island (as a peripheral geography) and 
urban places in the mainland of Korea, in terms of the developmental path to building 
its current socio-spatial identities. Diametrically opposed to other urban sites for CCA, 
Jeju and its informal space of local CCA and risk reduction should be understood by 
looking at its unique history first. Yet, this section does not devote much space to 
elucidating and enumerating historical events. Instead, it will address the historical 
contexts within which actors/groups in Jeju interpret the origins of current crises of 
development and environment disaster risk. The construction of locals’ view of history 
– the coexistence of hostility towards the outside and dependence on external relations 
– is not unrelated to the nature of the local environment and resources. This is a kind of 
dilemma for Jeju; the island has long been subject to external intervention, but their 
major industries (tourism) require a consistent material and financial exchange with 
and support from the outside world. 
7.3.1. The 4.3 Jeju Uprising 
As was noted above and from locals’ points of view, the volcanic island has a unique 
history of suffering from exploitative intervention by central government and external 
capital (NI 14, 2011). It is strongly argued in this chapter that the tendency to 
underestimate disaster risk in Jeju cannot be properly grasped without a historical 
perspective. 
 
As a relatively recent instance, the Jeju 4.3 uprising (or massacre), that caused huge 
loss of life (estimated from 30,000 up to 60,000, more than one tenth of the then local 
population), was triggered on 3 April 1948. It lasted through the Korean War, until 21 
September 1954. It is second only to the Korean War itself as regards the number of 




innocent people massacred, owing to the ideological confrontation. An official 
investigation into the ideological tragedy did not take place until the late 1990s. Before 
then (especially during previous authoritarian governments), it was taboo even to 
openly and publicly discuss the 4.3 incident (Heo, 1992). Only after the Special Act on 
Jeju 4.3 was enacted in accordance with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission by 
the Kim Dae-jung administration (Democratic Party) could the first official 
investigation commence in the early 2000s.  
 
The Jeju 4.3 Research Institute attributes the cause of the incident to “brutal 
suppression by the Korean government against armed rebellion in Jeju” (Song, 2010: 
no page). More complexly interwoven causal factors are argued to account for the 
incident: 
 
“[T]he Jeju people’s deep mistrust and anger toward government 
maladministration and Japanese police officers who abused their authority 
[during Japanese rule]; co-stationing of the local and national army with a 
U.S. military presence; and a controversial looming election after the 
partition of the peninsula. In addition to that, lingering social unrest after 
independence from [the] Japanese rule was another cause of chaos in Jeju” 
(ibid: parentheses added†). 
 
These manifold forces might not still exist in the same manner that brought about the 
tragedy. Yet, recent development processes in many parts of the island have called 
forth similar hostile sentiment against external capital and central government. For 
instance, some oppositional locals regard social conflict brought by the construction of 
a $970 million naval base at Gang-jeong village in Seo-gui-po City as another 4.3 
incident (NI 11, 2011, LRI 1, 2011). This might be because it has split the local 
community, and made the locals feud over the issue. Interviewees support this view 
that it has completely and nearly irreversibly destroyed traditional values, pre-existing 
community activities, social capital, and trust amongst the locals (NI 11, 2011, NI 14, 
2011, LRI 1, 2011). This is but one ongoing top-down project in the island. It indicates 
that the issue of adapting to environmental risk in Jeju (particularly at Gang-jeong 
village) requires considering the way of how the islanders’ resistance to outsiders at 
present originates in their history of external exploitation. 
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Equally important is that the island poses distinct environmental and geopolitical 
characteristics that to attract external, capitalist development based on tourism, the 
development of natural resources (e.g. water and wind power), and the construction of 
a naval base. For example, the island has earned three UNESCO awards: World Global 
Geoparks, World Natural Heritage and Biosphere Reserves. Drinking water produced 
in the island is among the highest-selling products across the country. Electronic 
power companies (built mainly with external capital) are making higher profits than 
local counterparts, by running wind power generators on the island (NI 14, 2011). For 
these reasons, it is no wonder that the island has long been the subject of external 
exploitation. 
 
That said, during the fieldwork, it was frequently observed that local officials of Jeju 
province were making a lot of phone calls during office hours, in order to press for 
their island to be awarded another title “New7Wonders of Nature” (For the 
New7Wonders foundation, see http://www.new7wonders.com). The Zurich based-
organization giving this award has been subject to criticism: for example, for the 
nontransparent procedure for selecting the winning landscapes, self-claimed authority 
and partnership with the UN, unreasonableness in their demands for huge donations 
from the selected countries, and so forth. A civil activist criticized (Ahn, 2012: no page) 
them as follows: 
 
“According to media reports, the foundation does not even have an office - 
it is a sort of paper company. How on earth can the provincial government 
office spend more than 21.5 billion won [about $US 19 million] per year? 
Its normal annual expense for a phone call is about 0.3-0.4 billion won 
[about $US 0.3 million]. Further expenses by the people joining the 
campaign for their patriotism are impossible to estimate. The scale is 
tremendous! The issue is that the profit from telephone votes is 
contractually obliged to be distributed among the foundation, the domestic 
promotion committee and KT [Korea Telecom] Corporation. It turned out 
later that the phone calls made for the votes were not international but 
domestic. The people had been set up to pay the cost of international phone 
calls for making domestic phone calls” (†). 
 
Yet, most important to this thesis is the national and local efforts to earn the award 
through public service announcements, such as encouraging the public to cast 
telephone votes for Jeju, mobilization of celebrities and public figures for this, and 
thunderous advertisement of the anticipated economic effect of the award based on 
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research. One official reportedly got a promotion due to the thousands of phone calls 
he made for the event (NI 14, 2011). Eventually, Jeju was awarded the title in 2011 
due to the enormous number of phone calls. It is far from clear how much benefit the 
award would bring to Jeju Island and Korea. Regardless of the anticipated benefits 
(possibly illusory), this could be seen as a classic example of how a strong public-
private partnership is built on distorted information, mis-claimed authority (e.g. UN), 
patriotism, newly made expectation of future benefits, benefits-seeking groups, and a 
combination of these and other core drivers. This provides a look at the face and 
workings of social relations in the developmental state (Evans, 1996) that still remain 
in Korean society. In this case the strong partnership was established to wrongly 
benefit a few groups, but this is exactly how the authoritarian regimes promoted their 
national development plan for compressed development. 
 
Certainly, Jeju has developed broadly double, contradictory relationships with external 
power and capital. On the one hand, the islanders were victimized for the national 
ideological confrontation during the time when Korean society, right after 
independence from Japan, was experimenting with various ideological thoughts in the 
late 1940s. The Jeju 4.3 incident is but one of geopolitical accidents that originate in 
the Japanese colonial era. On the other hand, the developmental state later set up the 
local circumstance in which the local society faces a dilemma (NI 14, 2011): top-down, 
external capital-led development of orthodox tourism (requiring large infrastructure) 
versus an endogenous, bottom-up approach to the development of eco-tourism (e.g. 
Olle trail for hiking, see http://www.jejuolle.org/#). 
7.3.2. The developmental path of Jeju Island: dual-risk? 
Jeju Island is one of the peripheral regions in Korea in terms of its geography and the 
importance its industry has within the entire national development path. Thus it is not 
wrong to infer that Jeju has not been the epicentre of compressed development. 
Notwithstanding this point, Jeju society has lately confronted dual-risk that is 
externally fomented. In the case of Jeju, much of the experienced dual-risk is imported 
from the outside rather than endogenously created: c.f. Seoul. In supporting this 
argument, the nature of the developmental path of Jeju needs to be grasped, in the 
context of an industrial structure and recent urbanization process, political culture, and 
social capital. 
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7.3.2.1. Tourism-directed development with later urbanization 
Just because the developmental state (under President Park Jung-hee) planned and 
reared the development of tourism and orchard industry does not mean that the dual-
risk thesis can be directly applied to Jeju without question. In fact, there are aspects of 
Jeju that either refute or are incompatible with the tenets of the dual-risk thesis. Surely 
rapid socio-economic changes have occurred in Jeju too, during the same period of 
compressed development, yet in the absence of rapid urbanization, secondary industry 
(manufacturing), and endogenous business groups such as Chaebols (NI 11, 2011). 
 
The authoritarian government has promoted Jeju as a tourist city, but this was actually 
an attempt to attract foreign tourists. This was mainly to assist the national 
industrialization (heavily focused on manufacturing industry) which, at that time, 
severely lacked industrial capital (Lee, 1995). Thus the central government developed 
Jeju as a source of foreign exchange. Even if this was not successful (changed to 
satisfy domestic demands for leisure and travel later), the development of tourism 
continued. Local participation and priorities were disregarded, in the dominant 
presence of external (both domestic and foreign) monopoly capital, the Ministry of 
Construction, and central government (ibid.). Starting in earnest with the 1973 Jeju 
tourism development plan (set up by the Blue House), which continued until 1981, the 
improvement of infrastructure and urban facilities had been geared exclusively towards 
supporting tourism development. Investment resources spent during that time were 
made up of government funding (48.5%) and private resources (47.1%); c.f. the local 
government’s investment (4.4%). For these reasons, the thinking that the fruits of local 
development were not for locals but for visitors has been common even until recently.  
 
The context of development in Jeju changed in 1990, when the governor made a 
proposition to President Roh Tae-woo for the establishment of a Special Law for 
empowerment of the local authority. There were some issues regarding the 
compatibility between the national and local plans for Jeju development. At a critical 
juncture, soon after the democratization of Korea in 1987, President Roh accepted this 
proposition, meaning that local development has taken a different modus operandi 
since then. Of course, the improved rights and roles of local government did not mean 
a halt to strong roles and intervention of the state in local governance space. At this 
stage, Lee (1995: 109†) notes, “from that time, central government has fallen back to 
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set up local government at the head of impelling local development, without giving up 
its influence, yet in a different way.” He continues to argue, “the new Special Law was 
a change in strategies, not the direction, of development with capitalist development 
still prioritized over environmental conservation, for example.” This view is accounted 
for in more detail by NI 14 (2011): 
 
“So, after the democratization of 1987, Korean society achieved 
institutional democracy, which led to a local self-governing system in the 
1990s. In the past, central government directed land development. Yet, 
now central government acts as a wirepuller behind local governments. 
The Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs used to have the 
right to decide local development, which has been now ostensibly 
devolved on governors. You know what recently happened? At the 
provincial council, local councillor asked the policy-planning officer, “how 
on earth can the construction of the naval base go on without local 
consent?” He said, “if we do not do this, central government would cut off 
ten billions [Korean won] of treasury support.” This would have been 
deleted from the minute. Whatever the issue, such as climate change, is 
under this local social structure how can we [NGOs] willingly cooperate 
with them [(local) government]? There is no sense of trust [between 
different groups]” (parenthesis added†). 
 
This passage accounts for one aspect of local politics that Jeju has undergone. The 
devolution of rights to local government does not necessarily mean a complete local 
self-governing system. Again, the presence of central government within a discourse 
of local development has played an adverse role in the deterioration of trust in local 
governance. In this regard, much of Jeju’s socio-spatial identity as currently known 
outside Jeju has not been endogenously but exogenously formed. As mentioned above, 
local oppositional movements against exploitative development and recently made 
alternatives to the orthodox tourism development (e.g. the eco-friendly Olle hiking 
trail) are another important constitutive part of Jeju’s identity. The problems of various 
vertical and horizontal relations also partly continue because of recently propelled 
urbanization. 
 
The recent urbanization phenomenon in Jeju Island has taken place exclusively in Jeju 
city. It has come about without the development of secondary industry unlike in many 
urban places of Korea, including Seoul. The “Jeju Special Self-Governing Province” 
consists of two cities – Jeju City and Seoguipo City - that occupy the north and south 
territory of the Island. Until the mid-1990s, Seoguipo City was wealthier than Jeju City, 
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due to its good environment for advancing primary industry (e.g. mandarin industry 
and rice farming) and tourism industry (e.g. Jung-moon tourist complex). Recently this 
disparity has reversed, in the wake of structural economic reforms (e.g. agricultural 
import liberalization following the Agreement on Agriculture in 1995 and land use 
changes) (see Lee, 1995), and the concentration of transport and relocation of 
government offices to Jeju City). RAI 9 (2012) notes, “it is against the backdrop of an 
engineering-construction project, the so-called New Jeju Development Project, that the 
new urbanization began.” As chapter five clearly demonstrated, an alliance among the 
winners from compressed development (e.g. the so-called engineering-construction 
Mafia) is strongly present, and seems already to have deeply engaged in the 
construction of the urban landscape of Jeju. Another ally can be found in the rigid 
political structure of Jeju. 
7.3.2.2. Political culture: greater autonomy only for the local authority 
Jeju province is a sole “special self-governing province”, meaning that, similar to the 
relationship of Hong Kong to China, the local authority is empowered to deal 
independently with all local issues (except for rights to diplomacy and defence). 
However, the reality is very different, as mentioned above. Central government still 
exerts hegemonic power to influence local agenda setting and decision-making. 
Additionally, whilst the local authority is not given autonomy from central government, 
it wields absolute power within the island. NI 11 (2011) aptly explains the reality of 
local politics in Jeju:  
 
“Within Jeju, the local authority has tremendous power over other groups. 
Jeju is a special self-governing province, but the governor appoints the two 
mayors of Jeju City and Seoguipo City, which is different from the local 
political system of other provinces. It is also distinctive that in Jeju there 
are no powerful business groups such as Chaebols. This fact is important 
because its annual budget amounts to about three trillion Korean Won 
[about 2.6 billion $US]. This is really large compared to other 
municipalities, given the size of the population [over half a million]. For 
this reason, the governor wields absolute economic power. The local media 
of Jeju are normally in dire straits. There are just 40 local newspapers, 
including online newspapers. If these offend the governor, no 
advertisements are given to them. Sometimes they even get directy 
financial support for operating expenses from the local authority. The 




This account can be interpreted as meaning that political decentralization at the 
national level has turned into the reinforcement of centralization in Jeju. This 
situation is also encouraged in the absence of countervailing forces – the lack of 
indigenous business groups. In fact, the two mayoral positions and members of 
local councils used to be elected until 2006. Then governor Kim Tae-hwan (first 
term – 2004 to 2006; second term as the first governor of the self-governing 
system – 2006 to 2010) abolished the local political system (local councils) 
through a local referendum. This was interlocked with the introduction of the 
new provincial system. Finally, the governor was “recalled” by locals to a local 
referendum. NI 11 (2011†) continues to explain: 
 
“It was the first case in history of Korean democracy that the people had 
recalled an elected governor. The procedure for sponsoring the referendum 
was easy at first. When voting started, however, you know…the civil 
service community in Jeju is powerful. The provincial officials were 
allocated at all the polls monitoring, and writing down the names of, those 
who joined voting. So, the turnout did not exceed 11%, which was far too 
low even for the vote to be valid. The local referendum failed therefore.” 
 
If a turnout does not exceed 33% of the total vote, the vote does not count in the first 
place. Among other matters, Kim’s failure to sort out the issue of the naval base 
construction was said to be the main cause of the referendum. This is because it was 
one of his main pledges at the time of his second election of governor in 2006. This 
will be discussed in detail later. What implications did the referendum have for the 
local politics of Jeju? The referendum apparently failed, but it caused a shock for the 
existing local power structure. For one thing, this referendum is extremely meaningful 
in that civil society directly progressed the referendum from beginning to end. Yet the 
failure of the Seoul referendum in 2011 led to the resignation of the conservative 
mayor, but that of Jeju resulted in the opposite result.  
 
There exist both promising and limited aspects of the local politics of Jeju. The clear 
presence of civil society and its roles in local governance was observed, despite not 
being strong enough to lead to a political regime change. Challenges to the 
development of local politics in Jeju, such as the unintended outcome of local 
centralization, are considered to result partly from the endemic social capital, the so-
called Gwon-dang (NI 11, NI 14, 2011). 
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7.3.2.3. Traditional social capital: Gwon-dang 
Gwon-dang (Gwen-dang in Jeju dialect) refers to close relatives. In a narrow sense, 
social capital is not exclusive to Jeju. However, the Gwon-dang institution has long 
been a major element of the island’s local community, hinging on strong ties in both 
paternal and maternal lines. 
 
A proper understanding of Gwon-dang would involve a detailed ethnographic and 
semantic study of marriage, family and kinship institutions of Jeju, which is beyond 
the scope of this research. Instead, it is worth quoting the limited research into Gwon-
dang, showing both similarities and differences between Jeju and the mainland:  
 
“As a general concept that widely refers to all relatives belonging to 
“kindred”, Gwen-dang is a term that Jeju people normally use to express 
close relatives. Those using the same family name with father’s side are 
called Seong-pen Gwen-dang; for mother’s side, Oepen Gwen-dang, and 
extended to Cheo Gwen-dang or Si Gwen-dang. After all, there do not 
exist “Maenom” (absolute strangers) within the village endogamy system. 
Even between those who are not relatives to each other, they can be called, 
for example, “Samchon” (uncle). Without adhering paternal blood lines, 
wider Gwen-dang relations are made so that Jeju people have a strong 
sense of community instead of that of clan” (Kim, 1993: 456)†.31 
 
NI 11 (2011†) provides a different interpretation of Gwon-dang: 
 
“Gwen-dang is community culture in Jeju. It also means going to Sindang 
(a shaman temple for worshipping local gods) together. In Jeju, each 
village has Bonyangdang for divinizing local gods. So we call going there 
together Gwen-dang. Its other meaning is a relative…the role of the village 
community has recently weakened, but still exists.” 
 
Dictionaries of Jeju proverbs (Ko, 1999, cited in Kim, 2006: no page) also state that 
“Gwen-dang refers to close and distant relatives. That those get together to support and 
be concerned for each other, including rites such as weddings and funerals, has 
become custom”. Beyond semantic/literary definitions, “Gwen-dang is generally 
understood as indicating social ties including regionalism and school ties in Jeju” (Kim, 
                                                
31 Seongpen and Oepen are Jeju dialects meaning father’s side and mother’s side. Cheo and Si means 
wife’s parent and husband’s parent side. 
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2006: no page). Gwen-dang can also be seen “a sense of exclusivity toward outsiders” 
(NI 11, 2011). This reading appears plausible, yet it needs further examination. 
 
Observation throughout the fieldwork confirmed the strong sense of community 
culture in Jeju. Koreans from outside of Jeju would not understand Jeju dialect, 
although Jeju people speak both standard Koran language and Jeju dialect. A lot of 
disparities in informal institutions were observed, from marriage through family 
structure to livelihood, that together constitute a relatively high status for women (due 
to their high economic participation) and a sense of independence (based on nuclear 
family even before modernization) (Kim, 1993: 456). As in the mainland, however, 
Confucian institutions have also coexisted with the above indigenous culture in Jeju. 
Unfortunately, the existing research does not reflect on the possible impacts of the 4.3 
Uprising on changes in Gwen-dang culture around the 1950s (ibid: 459). This means 
that the historical tragedy has reconstructed the public space of Jeju very much; and 
since then there could have been many changes to Gwen-dang as a whole. This is an 
extremely crucial point – a contemporary reading of the traditional social capital in 
terms of the politics of disaster. It is far beyond the scope of this research to track all 
the processes by which Gwen-dang has changed so far. Nor is this to deny the 
possibility of it changing. Alternatively, it is worth quoting a long passage:  
 
“Gwon-dang was reciprocity and a spirit of mutual help in the past, yet it 
has turned into something unhelpful now. Look at how the local society 
has changed after adopting the self-governing system in 2006. Changing 
local communities, bigger development projects, and so on” (NI 14, 
2011†). 
 
Comparing the current situation of Jeju to the colonial era, in which natural and 
human resources were extracted from their hometowns, leading to the lack of 
those who can organize local communities, he continues:  
 
“Jeju is going exactly the same way. Outsiders occupy most lands. Young 
people prepare for civil service examinations. If they fail them, they leave 
Jeju. Old people turn to farming or playing golf. A thousand people 
outflow annually. I can’t hardly get infuriated! There are no peers working 
with me. If they are to study properly, they must agonize about the 
community their life is based on. The issue of climate change is much the 
same. Why do we adapt? Why mitigate? Why should we make such 
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policies? People don’t act just because of ecological changes unless they 
are ecologists. Yet, they might be concerned about death, yes and then they 
would reflect and act…if the community my life relies on collapses, why 
should I act on such issues as climate change from the start?” (NI 14, 
2011†). 
 
This local environmental activist reveals that the building of socio-spatial identity the 
islanders have developed (not the one formed by (central) government, for example, 
“Tourist City”) is in danger of disappearing. Perhaps this is a slightly exaggerated 
expression of personal anger against recent urbanization processes, accelerated by a 
combination of the distorted Gwon-dang, external capital and centralized politics, 
amidst the fading spirit of local community. Closely related to this, NI 11 (2011†) 
pinpoints multiple forces of recent development in Jeju that go hand in hand with the 
collapse of community: 
 
“It is hard to further develop urban places that have been already 
developed because of the high land prices and immediate opposition. So, 
recent large-scale development projects tend to be located in undeveloped 
lands in mountainous areas. Consider Gotjawal that is a volcanic area of 
unique forest [the only place in the world in which the tropical northern 
limit and polar southern limit plants coexist]. The land price is much 
cheaper and the locals have used the land there as ranches. Yet the village, 
not single individuals, collectively owns the ranches. If they or their 
children leave the villages or die, their rights to the lands are forfeited. So 
they might try to sell the lands before they die, whether they are huge or 
small. This attracts the builders trying to build hotels or amenities. It is a 
quite unique property rights institution that the right to lands remains as 
long as they live there” (parenthesis added). 
 
Again, it is evident that there are multiple structural forces threatening the continuity 
of local community in Jeju. There can be many other conditions in which the existing 
spirit of local communities ends up disappearing. When a place loses its local identity, 
and then is replaced by the builders’ pursuit of profit, is it likely that the place will 
regain a discursive space for local issues to be concerned as was the case before? It is 
not so difficult to comprehend that local ideas coevolved with the local environment, 
and institutions cannot be immediately replaced. “Place identity” is one of the 
emerging agendas for CCA (Fresque-Baxter and Armitage, 2012), although it has long 
been studied in geography.  
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Another matter is the relationship between Gwon-dang and the working of local 
politics. The power of Gwon-dang is easily witnessed during elections in Jeju. It was 
reported to have had an immensely powerful influence on local elections, that even 
national political parties cannot simply ignore (Kim, 2006). This claim brings into 
focus a sharp contrast between Seoul and Jeju. Seoul fairly recently saw the election of 
an independent candidate, which can be interpreted as the first evidence of bottom-up 
political reflection. Jeju has seen several independent candidate governors since the 
inception of local elections. In the case of Jeju, the election of independent candidates 
should be construed as meaning that the de facto two-party system of national politics 
does not work. In this situation, local agenda setting and decision-making are liable to 
opportunistic manipulation by a few groups whose Gwon-dangs are more intimate 
with elected political leaders. 
 
In fact, the above-mentioned case of a recall of the previous governor to a local 
referendum in 2009, and its failure, reveal how the distorted Gwon-dang of the Jeju 
public official community can act to undo bottom-up critiques of maladministration 
from some locals. One of the previous governors of Jeju province stresses at an 
interview with local press (Shin, 2013, cited in Lee, 2013: no page), “the most urgent 
task for the development of political and electoral culture is to eliminate Gwon-dang. 
This should be done, but there is no action. Politicians, would-be politicians and even 
progressive figures are busy talking about funerals and parties. This is very 
disappointing!” This interview indicates that Gwon-dang is overtly expressed as the 
Achilles heel of Jeju politics in the public sphere. 
7.3.2.4. Why is dual-risk “imported”? 
There are symptoms of dual-risk in Jeju, although they may be less clear than in urban 
places such as Seoul. While the extent of urban and industrial development within 
Seoul is far greater that in Jeju, the socio-economic, cultural and educational 
centralization in Seoul might have enabled better circumstances for reflecting on dual-
risk. Yet dual-risk in Jeju can be far greater because the indigenous institutional 
arrangements for risk governance are not necessarily adaptable to imported risks. 
 
On one hand, the constitutive elements and impetus of urbanization and development 
of Jeju are fairly exogenous: e.g. tourism development by external capital and for use 
of outsiders and foreigners (golf resorts and hotels in Gotjawal forest), auxiliary role to 
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assist national industrialization (to earn foreign exchange), and obviously a changing 
climate. For example, the orchard industry of Jeju and the construction of golf resorts 
are argued to have increased the risk of inundation in downstream areas (RAI 8, 2011). 
The focal point here is that the locals have been exposed to risk originating from 
decisions they have not made, which have not been made for their own wellbeing, and 
which they have often opposed. Of course, this kind of risk formation can be widely 
found in the real world. In fact, the issue of how environmental change in one place is 
caused by distant others’ activities in another place is one that political ecologists have 
strived to unearth (Peet and Watts, 1996). Ironically, it is not only spatial distance but 
also historically constructed marginality from the core current of compressed 
development that has defined the risk profile of Jeju. 
 
On the other hand, it is necessary to question the socio-political aspect of dual-risk. 
Although gradually diminished, traditional social capital has remained relatively strong 
in Jeju society. However, the lack of human resources due to outflows of younger 
generations, organizational resistance to new expectations of political changes (e.g. the 
officials’ community), low fiscal self-reliance ratio – hence lack of local autonomy 
from central government (NI 14, 2011), political corruption, and the perception-reality 
gap of environmental risk all account for the nature of the dual-risk facing Jeju society. 
Jeju is also in danger of losing its ‘place identity’, as illustrated above. It is plausible to 
argue that the civil society of Jeju has yet to experience a critical moment, at which 
environmental disaster risk will be collectively interpreted to open new space for risk 
governance (as in, for example, the aftermath of typhoon Nari). Most political 
reflections from local NGOs emerge elsewhere, interlocked with the historically 
maintained exclusivity against outsiders, to encourage environmental movement.  
 
Multifaceted contradictions facing the island society are that: 1) the locally distinctive 
sense of independence and the need for material reliance on external forces; 2) the 
coexistence of nominal autonomy from central government (“freedom from”) and a 
lack of indigenous positive freedom (“freedom to”); 3) the intensifying environmental 
hazards together with a tendency to underestimate them; 4) privatized Gwon-dang by a 
few politicians with diminishing collective endeavors to keep place identity; to name a 
few. These contradictions have not only generated the opportunity for institutional and 
discursive changes of various kinds, but have also reinforced the structural forces of 
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dual-risk. Nowhere is imported dual-risk more evident than within the discursive and 
actual competition over the construction of the naval base construction.   
7.4: Construction of the naval base: a case of imported dual-risk 
The case of construction of the naval base was selected for this chapter, in pursuit of 
searching for locally generated questions of environmental disaster risk. Preceding in-
depth interviews with local environmental activists offered hints, which were 
interpreted as suggesting that the naval base construction would typify imported dual-
risk. Moreover, one of the potential informants was arrested and imprisoned for his 
involvement in objection protests against the construction on the day scheduled for an 
interview. These altogether brought about particular attention to the case, although 
they did not intimate strong implications of the case on this research at first.  
 
Box 7.1. Chronology of the process of construction site selection 
The first governmental plan for building a naval base in Jeju came about in 1993.  Since 
then, previous central governments and the navy have confronted severe local 
oppositions, thereby keeping changing a potential site of construction of a naval base 
until 2007. After many complications, the navy under the Lee, Myung-bak presidency 
finally chose eight proposed sites in March 2007. One month later, Gang-jeong village 
expressed wish to host the naval base; 46 opponents were taken to the police. On 14 
May, then governor Kim, Tae-hwan determined to host a naval base in Jeju that led to a 
recall to local referendum in 2009. As one of these, Gang-jeong village and the 
surrounding area were selected for the final construction site. In August 2007, Gang-
jeong village decided by election to oppose the naval base. In September 2008, the 
central government announced an amendment to the plan (from construction of a naval 
base to a joint naval base and cruise port). In 2010, the construction commenced. 
Source: Based on Gureombisalligijeonguksiminhaengdong (2011). 
 
The analysis of the naval based development and risk production will be developed in 
connection with four points: 1) destruction of Gwon-dang (traditional social capital); 2) 
discourse of national security versus local vulnerability; 3) invisible versus concealed 
disaster risk; 4) Consequences for local resilience and implications for hazard-specific 
resilience. The construction site is located in Gang-jeong village in Seo-gui-po City, 
which a villager describes as follows: 
 
“Gang-jeong is one of a few areas in Jeju with workable soil for rice 
farming. Due to this and other reasons such as fertile soils, high amount of 
sunshine, and communal sharing of labour, Gang-jeong village was far 
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richer and more salubrious than other villages where only tangerine 
farming is possible, yet we have benefited from four-season farming. 
Therefore, the benefits of nature were great here… community based pro-
environmental activities such as saving sweet fish and Gang-jeong 
stream…so the Ministry of Environment designated Gang-jeong as an eco-
village with an excellence award in 2006” (LRI 1, 2011†). 
 
Indeed, environmental value was well understood and secured by the locals until the 
naval base construction commenced in late 2010. This passage indicates his sense of 
pride and understanding of how nature, livelihood and traditional bonding capital have 
coevolved in harmony with each other at Gangjeong.  
 
Figure 7.5. Photo of the naval base construction site: Gureombee Rocks and 
Gangjeong 
 
Source: Captured from Google Earth (2013). 
7.4.1. Cracking bonding capital, Gwon-dang 
In 2012, a local paper reported serious findings from the psychological research into 
the locals’ mental health condition at Gangjeong village, conducted by the Institute for 
Medicine and Human Rights: one tenth of the villagers are categorized to a high-risk 
group with serious suicidal impulse, one third for feeling of suicidal impulse over the 
last week of the survey period Gureombisalligijeonguksiminhaengdong (2011). It is 
also revealed that depression (38.8%), obsession (33.7%), fear/anxiety (25.5%), and 
enmity (24.5%) were prevalent among the local people (ibid.). 91.8% of the research 
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participants believed that “the issue of the naval base construction has aggravated 
relationships amongst villagers.” 47.4% answered “conflict of opinion among families 
continues.” At one in-depth interview, one respondent discloses, “When I was a child, 
I witnessed that my teacher and headmaster were shot dead in front of me during the 
4.3 incident. The current situation here is more grave than that time.” 
 
When questioned about how the local community has changed, LRI 1 (2011) offers 
another depiction of the community fission and the role of the navy that: 
 
“In the past, did not we bear a funeral bier when one of our neighbors dies? 
This culture has remained here until fairly recently…in terms of sharing of 
labor, consider when villages hit by a typhoon. We normally help each 
other by turns for reconstructing disaster-torn houses. Well, despite our 
community divided over the naval base issue like this, we won’t 
completely lose community spirit; just divided pro and contra. We would 
not cooperate with the advocates of the naval base construction…was it 
Typhoon Nari in 2008? Our village and green houses were seriously 
damaged. At that time, the navy and police came and help our village. The 
issue was that they helped only advocates even with no damages while 
hugely damaged opponents were left alone” (emphases added†).  
 
Whether intentional or not, the navy’s unfair approach to disaster aids seems to have 
exacerbated the community divide. NI 11 (2011) offers another example of the 
community split that “even children are divided at a school depending on their parents’ 
perspectives to the naval base construction.” A lot more stories of conflict can be 
enumerated here. An important question is why the villagers who had once strong 
bond have had to face the destruction of traditional values and social capital. 
 
An equally important aspect of Gwon-dang in Jeju can be grasped by looking at how 
unhelpful the Jeju police have been in disrupting opposing groups of the locals, priests, 
and activists, many of whom the police are their Gwon-dang (NI 11, 2011). After all, 
the central government has sent the land police to the island. It is worth citing that: 
 
“Seeing the land police dispatched to Jeju again where the scar of the 4.3 
Incident has remained intact, a villager Kim’s open scar also seems to get 
worse. The 4.3 Incident and the current situation at Gang-jeong resemble 
in a way that condemn innocent locals as rioters, commies and North 
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Korean sympathizers, and violently ejects them by mobilizing the land 
police” (Kang, 2011: 96)†. 
 
In line of this expression, Hong (2011: 63)† adds that: 
 
“During the 4.3 Incident, the largest number of people who were killed in 
Seo-gui-po was from Gang-jeong. This is why people here have remained 
that deep scar. Not only Gang-jeong people but also all the residents in 
Jeju. The land police have opened up the scar. The Jeju 4.3 Uprising is 
history of bleeding. Locals were dragged to mountain and killed for no 
reason.” 
 
These expressions of anger against outsiders and unfair power relations are socially 
constructed based on a historical perspective. What this most crucially tells us is that 
current conflict and cracking Gwon-dang at Gang-jeong are exogenously conditioned 
phenomena. At the same time, however, an increasing number of “outside” groups 
started to join the opposing campaign. 
7.4.2. The national security versus the demimonde in alliance 
The issue of the naval base construction should be considered as more than a pros and 
contra issue. Actually, far more diverse ideas, values and interests have been 
complexly projected onto the wider conflict arena. 
 
 220 
Figure 7.6. Photos of violent conflict at Gang-jeong: activists deported 
 
Sources: Adopted from http://www.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/view/at_pg.aspx?CNTN 
_CD=A0001620958  
Notes: Hundreds of activists, priests, and locals have been fined and arrested for the infraction 
of law on assembly and demonstration, and the obstruction of justice and business. 
 
First, the orthodox rationale for construction of “a” naval base in Jeju is broadly 
twofold: geopolitical stability (e.g. to secure sea routes against infestation of pirates at 
the Strait of Malacca and the issue of territorial waters with China) and national 
security (North Korea). One can argue against this rationale by stressing that: 1) the 
maritime police in place are fairly enough to deal with the geopolitical issues, and 2) 
the claim that the southernmost island of Korea is a optimal, strategic point for 
preparing for threats of North Korea is not logical (NI 11, 2011). Yet, more intriguing 
than refuting the rationale is questioning why it has to be Gang-jeong, let alone Jeju.  
 
As noted in Box 7.1, it is true that Gang-jeong village was favorable to the naval base 
construction plan, and even hoped to host the construction at first. As the central 
government and the navy argue, agreement of residents was gained: everything 
appeared to be going smoothly despite then some loosely organized protesters. A 
situation suddenly changed when some alliances among “outsider” and islander groups 
including Gang-jeong village bagan to be made after solitary struggle of oppositional 
villagers for three years. This seems to have been triggered by the provincial assembly 
‘s decision to reassign the Gang-jeong area as an absolute preservation area, and the 
participation of wider groups and people from all different walks of life (e.g. 
celebrities, artists, foreigners, priests, monks, etc.). Outsider groups are not identical to 
their reasons for opposing the naval vase construction: e.g. peace, environment, 
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democracy, and anarchism/anti-nationalism. Even amongst opposing Gang-jeong 
villagers, there are different reasons for the opposition, as NI 11 (2011†) notes that: 
 
“There are broadly three groups. One group opposes it because they might 
feel economic compensation was not enough. This is quite understandable 
claim, particularly for those who used to rent land for farming. Another 
group is those whose lands were acquired by compulsion. Third group is 
worried about future impacts the naval base would bring forth to Gang-
jeong.” 
 
Then how have such a many number of differing ideas and values been united to resist 
the orthodox discourse of national security? In particular, it was discussed before that 
Jeju people are known for their independence and exclusivity against outsiders for 
historical reasons. Strictly speaking, central government, the building Chaebol 
companies and NGOs from the mainland are all the same outsiders to the locals. Of 
critical importance is to recognize the altering discursive dimension in which the naval 
base issue is dealt with: from narrowly national security versus local priorities to 
widely national security versus wider values, ideas and worldviews. In fact, the 
villagers were also holding a sense of detachment against even the outsider NGOs and 
opponents, believing that the issue is exclusively “our own” with the central 
government (NI 11, 2011). Over time, only the central government, the navy and 
adherents who are absolute majority in the discursive competition have maintained the 
thinking (ibid.). To the opposite groups, it has already been a “national” issue; even a 
global issue given the presence of foreigners at the village and the discursive 
competition such as Noam Chomsky (a progressive U.S scholar) and Angie Zelter (a 
UK peace campaigner). Box 7.2 offers a story of an American, amateur photographer 
who taught English in Jeju over two years until 2011, and how he was kicked out of 
Korea for the photos of Gang-jeong he took. 
Box 7.2. A story of a boomerang effect: an American photographer deported 
I was actually ready to go home. My plan was to go home on August 21. I had a ticket. And I 
had a plan to see my family for three months, and then I even had jobs here. I had a teaching 
job more than one. Already. So I decided, ok I am ready and I come and teach again. And I, 
but I decided I needed to stay for taking more pictures. And I moved to Gang-jeong August 
15? Maybe? And I don’t know when they started investigating me, but my school tells me 
around that time they got a phone call about me. Because I never kept my identity secret 
because I was doing my work for Jeju government. Jeju Weekly was until now funded by 
government and a lot of people working there almost everyone who contributed to it had 
teaching visa, but the pay is very little, it’s not a job. It’s more like passion? For volunteer 
work? And I needed to get into news so I was volunteering, more like volunteering. So I can 
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get experienced. Anyway, ah…yes the government never had a problem. They never said 
anything. Anyway they called my school and asked who I was. And found out about me. But I 
didn’t know. I didn’t know about it. Anyway it wasn’t secret…and then August 24 it’s when 
everything really happened. It was when it got really serious. And I was there all day long 
taking pictures of all..everybody saw me. All the police saw me. All the navy saw me. 
Everybody saw me. Actually I spent most of my time with other journalists because I’ve 
developed some relationships…anyway that morning I received strange a text massage from 
well I found out it yesterday. It’s from a navy guy. Yeah. It had a picture of baby dog, I will 
show you a dog…I don’t know who it was…Pretty sure it’s he. [How would they have your 
number?] Maybe somehow through Twitter? Because I used Twitter to talk about Gang-jeong, 
talk about the news. And that person was on Twitter. I know another one of my friend said 
same thing happened. Anyway so yeah I think then maybe they really became concerned. But! 
I also think they let me be. Let me be. They call other people about me. They call other 
journalists about me…I think the big difference was Al Jazeera came. And they were really 
unhappy about Al Jazeera. They did not like Al Jazeera. They followed Al Jazeera 
everywhere. [Why?] I don’t know why. I don’t know what they were doing.. I spent a lot of 
time with Al Jazeera and I think it was real, that was the kicker. Because it was right after I 
spent time with Al Jazeera? I went to Seoul to see my girlfriend. And I got a phone call from 
immigration saying you’ve been investigated. You have to come to immigration. That was in 
September...they called me in September maybe 15th? And my first meeting with immigration 
was September 21st? [What did they say to you?] They just asked me about my work at the 
Jeju Weekly. Because it is technically against my visa, but since it’s government paper, 
immigration had always said the news, “don’t worry”…even last year they had same problem 
with someone else who works there. They went in 15 minutes. Done. No problem. No fine. No 
nothing. [So, it should be no problem unless you got involved in the crisis?]. Oh absolutely, 
my name has been on the front of the paper every issue since December of 2010. My name on 
the front of the paper!...Actually the Seou-gui-po police called immigration and said 
“investigate!” that’s what happened. And they tell me yeah the Seou-gui-po police called. 
[How do you feel?] How do I feel? Haha angry. [Did you think you were doing something 
wrong?] Absolutely not. All I did was take pictures. That’s it. Even the pictures I took no one 
has really published them. No one sees the pictures because I am too new in photojournalism 
to get published. So yeah they are not even out. [Maybe the government and the navy were too 
sensitive to having you at the village because…] Well because I am foreign. They think I can 
publish my pictures internationally. But here is the thing now I have to. Now  I am kicked out 
of Korea, I have no choice. Well they took all of my money. They took my home. They took 
my job opportunities for a year. They make me hard to come back to Korea. They are taking 
my girlfriend from me. So what do I have left? Pictures. I have the pictures. That’s all I have. 
So yeah, when I go home. I have no car, no money, no health insurance and no job. So what 
choice do I have? Other than to show the pictures to everyone. And I have to and I will. Even 
the worst part is they made my story better because they catch me out. So my story is even 
better now. Even better…obviously they tried to get me out. Because I am telling the story. 
But also they’ve cut the paper’s funding. And they fined the paper, too. So now the paper is 
struggling. The worst part is they’re cutting their own nose off. 
Source: MI 1 (2011). 
Note: The parentheses are my own questions. 
 
This story offers crucial points for this research. First, a government can manipulate 
enforcement and application of institution at will. It was observed that the police 
stationed at the village held stricter application of the law to the villagers on the 
opposition side. For example, when stopped by the police for not wearing a helmet, 
one local woman on a motorcycle shouts, “I’ve never put on a helmet over the four 
decades of my life here. Why is it a problem now!” (n/a, 2011, from the thesis author’s 
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observation). As a matter of fact, there is ample evidence that the government and the 
navy have breached various laws and individuals’ rights: e.g. property rights, sea 
pollution adjacent to the construction site, construction enforcement in disregard of the 
parliament’s call for reconsidering the adequacy of the construction; just to name but a 
few. Indeed, the opponents use these cases to publicize the illegality of the naval base 
construction. Yet, the discourse of national security seems just enough to underplay all 
of these (NI 11, 2011, NI 14, 2011). Second, it is also confirmed that a (local) 
government can if indirectly exert its influence to local media as noted above. 
Together with this, the (local) government’s effort to keep the issue insular/domestic is 
also grasped. In this case, more did the government try to control information (e.g. 
photos of Gang-jeong crisis) more likely was it to be spread. 
 
Again, it was witnessed that the adherent groups use ideological distortion, as in the 
case of the FRRP and other public space, denouncing the opposing groups all together 
commies or North Korea sympathizers (LRI 1, 2011). Of another importance is that 
the opposing locals learnt about the importance of various values other than just 
compensation or livelihood issues. Among the three groups of the opposing locals, the 
above-mentioned last group worrying about potential, adverse impacts of the naval 
base other than material/compensation matters is in fact a result of the extension of the 
discursive space (LRI 1, 2011). 
 
Despite the wider discursive space ever, the construction of the naval base has 
continued until the time of writing this chapter. It should be noted that both groups do 
not totally deny the importance of others’ priorities. For instance, the central 
government and the navy do not completely overlook the significance of 
environmental conservation insomuch as the opponents also care about national 
security. In reality, however, differing priorities, dissimilar approaches, incompatible 
underlying ideas (e.g. worldviews/historical views) and asymmetric power relations 
coexist to continue bringing about winners and losers. In the context of the Gang-jeong 
crisis, who are winners and losers? Will be the central government and the navy 
necessarily winners with the naval base completed? These questions do not have 
concrete answers.  
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That said, neither groups have seriously embraced environmental disaster risk to 
fortify their positions. It is argued in the following section that the naval base 
construction has multidimensional aspect of climate change and environmental disaster 
risk that can make neither side necessarily winners. 
7.4.3. Is it invisible or hidden disaster risk? 
Jeju Island is located at the front line of annual, northward typhoons; and Gang-geong 
village is the southernmost of the island. Ironically, it is highly probable that exposure 
to a typhoon hazard is a worse problem to the naval base itself than the locals. Figure 
7.7 aptly shows the power of Typhoons Bolaven and Denbib in 2012. Six heavy 
caissons out of seven (W: 8,800 tones, L: 38m, W: 25m, H: 20.5m), placed at the sea 
to build seawalls were completely destroyed by the typhoons to unuseable states.  
 
Figure 7.7. Photos of caissons destroyed by Typhoon Bolaven and Denbin in 2012 
 
Sources: Adopted from Yonhap News (2013), Gang-jeong village (used in Ohmynew, n/a). 
Note: A caisson is large concrete structures that are frames of seawalls. NI 11 (2011) reveals 
that the builders use these structures in order to complete the construction more quickly; and 
claims the safety of the use of caissons had not been tested. 
 
Even after this event, neither the navy nor opponent groups made the hazard event a 
political issue; at least in the media no such a claim has been found. Instead, there 
made concerns about sea pollution, a budget waste, and collision of a vessel. No 
argument is made here that future typhoons will inevitably damage the naval base. 
Instead, it is extremely important to question what reflections the destruction of 
caissons has made on the naval base construction. Indeed it is one of a few 
opportunities through which to regain space of critical consciousness to proactively 
adapt to uncertain environmental risk.  
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No such space can be offered by the system of a prior disaster impacts review under 
Article 4 and 5 of the Natural Disaster Countermeasures Act, and Article 3 of 
enforcement decree of the same Act. The report based on the formal institution covers 
only physical aspect of anticipated disaster risk, and suggests engineering resolution 
(MD, 2009). The conduct and findings of the report should briefly be reviewed. First, 
only the last ten years of disaster history (1997~2006) are reviewed in the report; quite 
unhelpful for proactive adaptation to 100-year-return hazards, for example. In addition, 
past disaster impacts are limited to losses and damages from wind and flood hazards. 
Based on this, the report concludes that no one was killed by natural disasters at the 
construction site and nearby coasts. This is refuted by NI 11 (2011) that:  
 
“About ten years ago? Not even during a typhoon season, swell waves like 
tsunami suddenly crashed into here [Gureombi rock, see 8.5], and killed a 
couple of people. According to Gang-jeong villagers, if the naval base is 
built here, such disaster risk will be very high. So, tsunamis here are 
localized...they can easily pull ships out of the sea” (parenthesis added†). 
 
None of the opposing groups seem to have taken this fact seriously, maintaining the 
marginality of environmental risk in the discursive competition of Gang-jeong crisis.  
 
Second, the report concludes, “among the planned facilities, there is not a high-rise 
facility so that no wind hazard disasters are expected to occur” (MD, 2009: 112). This 
conclusion is completely false as the destruction of caissons shows it; the construction 
site is highly likely to be exposed to future typhoons. In fact, the report arbitrarily and 
wrongly interprets the guideline of the Natural Disaster Countermeasures Act for 
conducting a prior disaster impacts review. The Act specifies, “[i]n the case that a 
proposed construction site is for building high-rise facilities such as a pylon, a review 
of wind disaster impacts must be conducted” (ibid: 111). This should really not be 
interpreted as meaning that in other cases a review of wind impacts could be simply 
exempted from the review. In essence, implementation of a formal institution is subject 
to the possibility of vested interests influencing outcomes. 
 
Third, the worst part of the report is its lacking any account of social vulnerability to 
the risk of natural hazards. This problem is rather to do with the tendency to prefer 
engineering approach to disaster risk in Korea. In the case of Gang-jeong, however, it 
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is clear that the cracking Gwon-dang and weakening community activities, to which 
the naval base crisis is largely contribute, would impede the locals’ hazard-specific 
resilience, yet this aspect has been completely ignored by the central government. Not 
only the presence of the naval base itself but also the entire process (before and after 
the construction) and any socio-economic impacts need be taken into consideration for 
the system of prior disaster impacts review. 
 
Last, suggested measures for reviewed disaster risk are far from detailed and 
appropriate. For example, one sentence is devoted to suggesting a measure for 
typhoons: acquisition of precise typhoon information through TV and radio (ibid: 163). 
In the case of tsunamis, a code of conduct is suggested for timely evacuation and 
information dissemination. As RAI 8 (2011) points out, “it is not true that Jeju totally 
lacks a system of forecast and warning for typhoons and tsunami. Realistically, can the 
system work well? The elderly are sleeping and unprepared; can they even receive and 
read text massages?” The reason why the system of prior disaster impacts review 
exists is to offer a detailed picture of anticipated disaster impacts and tailored answers 
to the anticipations that existing provincial and municipal plans for disaster risk 
reduction cannot address. But the reality is completely the opposite. 
 
With the above points in mind, it can be argued that the report on prior disaster 
impacts was limited in scope and framed in a way that supports the development 
proposal. In this sense, any future typhoon disasters at the naval base will be the 
collective responsibility of not only those who have constructed the port but also those 
who sanctioned and undertook the risk asessment. The death of 46 Korean sailors on 
the sunken corvette Cheonan in 2011 could be clearly ascribed to the torpedo attack of 




Jeju faces a situation of ostensible autonomy from a central government. But research 
shows the limitation of this narrative. There is a lack of freedom, despite being named 
a “special self-governing province”; a thwarting of local capabilities through a lack of 
positive freedom, cracking and privatisation (at hands of a few politicians) of social 
capital resulting in the co-production of dual-risk of environmental hazards. For 
various reasons (e.g. foreign exchange, leisure, national security, liberation of 
agricultural products), external capital and central government have brought about land 
use changes, loss of place identity, and local and family conflict in Jeju. The naval 
base construction is but one example of how dual-risk can be imported to a historically 
and developmentally marginalized place. At the same time, the islanders’ long-held 
sense of exclusivity against outsiders, the tendency to underestimate disaster risk, 
diminishing bonding capital and community destruction will not help them to prepare 
for the era of climate change risk. This point is quite straightforward that global risk 
such as climate change risk is not what the local society alone can deal with.   
 
NI 14 (2011) notes that: 
 
“Jeju has made the first provincial level plan for responding to climate 
change in 2008 even before the national master plan for climate change 
adaptation. With the help of ministry of environment, a professor, policy 
maker and myself [environmental activist] led to building the plan. 
Actually, the policy maker and I were students of the professor. Without 
the existing strong ties, the plan building would not have started in the first 
place” (parenthesis added†). 
 
No judgment is made on how effectively the plan has been implemented so far. 
Important is that social capital is a means to fulfilling ideas, beliefs, and values rather 
than an end itself. New ideas and values can emerge whenever new needs and 
expectations either endogenously or exogenously occur. NI 14 (2011) also adds more 
comments that: 
 
In terms of the issue [climate change adaptation], well most government official 
do not understand the need to work with NGOs, yet the policy maker knew it well. 
He was young, and passed the national examination to become a high-ranking 
official. Plus, he became a section head when he was 29 years old. Most of those 
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whom he had to lead and supervise were much older than him. Would they listen 
to him to whom they are almost uncle? In an attempt to do his roles, he brought 
civil society into policy making processes to gain power from outside. This 
relationship has lasted so far (parenthesis added†).  
 
The complexity of social capital becomes clear, especially when the need for different 
actors/groups to compete and cooperate is compelling. When the nature of Korean 
culture that age is seriously taken restricts the scope and capacity of a political actor, it 
is also possible to change it by extending his or her external relationships. 
 
Implementing environmental risk reduction and CCA will be much more difficult than 
planning them. In Jeju, the national government’s top-down approach to reducing 
uncertainty of national security (for resilience of a national security system) has in turn 
hindered the adaptive capacity of the locals to disaster risk (for resilience of a local 
adaptive system). Despite the reportedly high reflections of the locals on the 
contradictions between development and environment, no significant change has been 
made to fill the perception-reality gap of environmental dual-risk. Existing formal 
institutions such as the system of prior disaster impacts review are in danger of being 
abused to give indulgence to the central government and the navy, rather than protect 
potentially vulnerable groups. Thus there exist a many number of gaps between 
perception, reality, institution and agency. Collective, political endeavor and policy 
targets, based on critical consciousness, should be directed to filling the governance 
gaps, if the local society is to remain adaptable to future risk of climate change. 
 229 
Chapter 8: Conclusion (Theoretical and policy implications of the thesis) 
In this concluding chapter, several key findings of the research need be made clear 
before there are reassessed in relation to the theoretical implications described in 
Section 8.2. These key findings together support answering the research questions in 
Chapter one.  
8.1: Core ideas of the research 
A. The failure to address socially differential vulnerabilities today will affect the future 
disaster-specific resilience of the whole community in diverse ways. One of the main 
reasons for this is that issues of equity and justice are likely to be considerably more 
important to future generations than they are now in Korea. For example, issues such 
as the further widening of already wide governance gaps, increasing social costs, and 
higher rates of staff turnover are likely to lead to decreased labor productivity. These 
issues would be important for further research in the context of the Korean case study, 
but have not been addressed in this thesis (instead, for how the term “social” risk is 
disapproved in Korea, see Chapter five).  
 
B. If viewed from a dialectical perspective, “dual-risk” should not be seen as just a 
“problem”, but also an “opportunity” for actors and groups to make material and 
discursive changes. Indeed, the critical consciousness of dual-risk is one of the core 
drivers of social innovation that has recently taken place in Seoul (Chapter six). 
 
C. A study of institutional adaptation to disaster and climate change risk might involve 
not only the causality that is modeled from certain institutional arrangements towards 
their resilience outcomes, but also that which is modeled the other way around; for 
example, from rapid growth – through increasing economic resilience – to social 
innovation in response to increasing inequality, vulnerability and injustice. 
 
D. There is an institutional vacuum, which impedes the transformation of latent 
adaptive capacity to climate change adaptation in Korea, and it is this that policy 
makers and non-profit organizations urgently need to target. However, it is also 
important to examine the extent to which the national climate change adaptation policy 
(2010) would be able to address the issue of the governance gap between current 
institutional capacity and future climate change risk. In this thesis an institutional 
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vacuum does not mean merely an absence of institutions. Rather it is the space in 
which certain groups of people lack the social connections, political power and access 
to essential assets that are required for addressing the underlying causes of social 
vulnerability in the wake of “rapid” cultural change. For example, the elderly used to 
be taken care of through family-oriented care systems (RAI 5, 2011); people were 
expected to respect and care for their elderly relatives in accordance with Hyo, a core 
family value in Korean culture. However, this value system has changed and many 
elderly now live alone without material or mental support from their children, but 
Korean society has not developed until fairly recently any alternative, such as the long 
term social care system seen in some European countries. 
 
E. In the case of Korea, unlike that of Vietnam (Adger, 2000a), the liberation of the 
political economy from the early 1990s onwards has not lead to a reduction in the 
strength of the role played by the state, including that in the area of disaster risk 
reduction or climate change adaptation. Be that as it may, the state has never played a 
particularly strong role in terms of disaster risk reduction. However, the re-
organization of civil society has not been confined to informal realms; rather it has 
begun to substitute the roles of the state. Therefore, in response to increasing 
symptoms of dual-risk, socio-political entrepreneurs from civil society have emerged 
as an alternative political force to both the ruling and leading opposition parties 
(Chapter six). 
 
F. One of the least developed areas of institutional work on disaster risk and climate 
change adaptation is the question of how to measure institutions and institutional 
change. Most work on the issue of disaster risk focuses on the outcomes of 
institutional change, rather than on institutional changes or social innovation itself. 
This thesis suggests ways of measuring institutional change, for example by looking at 
regime change, change in disaster discourse, and conflict between national security 
and local values (Chapter four).  
 
In addition, it is also apparent that the comparison of the local politics of disaster in 
Seoul and Jeju has allowed me to capture the endogenous and exogenous causes of 
dual-risk (Chapter seven). In Seoul, the ideological distortion was overcome, if only 
temporarily, because the changeability of political regime allowed the scope of 
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disaster-specific resilience to be widened; whereas, in Jeju the external capital and the 
central government contributed to the formation of urban disaster, as well as future 
exposure of the navy to typhoon hazards. 
 
G. It is evident that social innovation travels across different realms of politics (e.g. 
from life to formal politics) to encourage discursive and material change in the way in 
which urban disaster risk is dealt with (Chapter six). The thesis also looks at a variety 
of the drivers of social innovation, such as the diversification of social needs. These 
have come to function as critiques of orthodox ideas and development priorities, such 
as the previous anti-communist hegemony or growth-centered values, the arbitrary 
interpretation of property rights to facilitate the evasion of local government’s 
responsibility for natural disaster mitigation (c.f., property rights have been too easily 
ignored for development work such, for example in housing redevelopments by large 
conglomerates and the construction of the naval base in Jeju (Chapter seven). Other 
drivers of social innovation considered include recurrent natural disasters in urban 
settings (Chapter six), and the political participation of the younger generation who 
question the legitimacy of the old political systems. 
 
H. The assumptions employed to distinguish the propensities and roles of the 
government, civil society and business for social innovation might be helpful, but only 
partially sufficient for a fuller account of social change and innovation. Some NPOs 
are more status quo-oriented, whilst some bureaucrats have exhibited a great deal of 
entrepreneurship and produced innovative ideas—albeit limited in implementation 
(Chapter five, six and seven). In addition, just as criticizing the Bush administration is 
not equivalent to criticism of the state, we should be cautious about using certain 
administrations as representing the government. This should also apply to the case of 
private actors (Chapter six). 
 
I. The individualistic view of entrepreneurship is obsolete; it fails to catch the core 
roles of collective entrepreneurship as Chang (2010a) argues. In the field of disaster 
risk reduction, social innovation (collective mobilization of critical consciousness) is 
essentially about who should channel individual abilities into collective 




J. Uncertainty can be claimed to legitimize the necessity and desirability of 
governmental projects, such as, the four-river reconstruction project (Chapter five). 
This fact demonstrates that uncertainty is used as not only source of inaction, but also 
as a source of reason to implement unchecked/untested ideas, philosophies and visions. 
The naval base construction was also legitimized by the government on the pretext of 
national vulnerability to the risk posed by North Korea. This is closely related to the 
tendency of governments to use risk/uncertainty to maintain the status quo (Chapter 
five and seven). 
 
K. The “narrow ideological spectrum” (Choi, 2010: 58†) influences not only the ways 
in which the issues of disaster and CCA are discussed, but also the material formation 
of dual-risk (the naval base in Chapter seven). Local responses differ very much 
depending on the nature of local social capital, the political culture and the endemic 
discourse of hazards. It is clear that natural hazard is not a single, direct cause of 
politics nor an institutional arrangement, but is rather a catalyst for existing ideas and 
claims to be competed and mediated (Chapter six). 
 
L. As the basic institution, the (re)construction and use of language have practical 
influences on the governance performance of disaster. Different uses of terms impact 
on the way in which cooperation between governmental officials unfolds (Chapter four 
for disaster and five for adaptation). The dual-risk thesis can learn much from the 
socio-nature thesis about how to overcome the dichotomous understanding of nature 
and society. The socio-nature thesis can pay more attention to the way of how 
spatiotemporally heterogeneous ideas, needs and institutions together shape social 
construction of urban risk, and its political outcomes (Chapter six). 
8.2: The relationship between resilience and freedom in Korea 
As illustrated in 6.2, Mayor Park’s local adaptive governance (with a focus on social 
innovation) seems to constitute a cross-scale combination with the national-level 
adaptive governance of both former President Lee, Myung-bak and President President 
Park, Geun-hye. This combination is what Duit and Galaz (2008: 326) might see as 
having relatively high “adaptive capacity for unexpected shocks”, thanks to the 
“buffering effects” between different scales of adaptive governance system (e.g. 
rigid+fragile, see Figure 8.1). This line of thinking has been also empirically 
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questioned by Adger (2000a), in the context of the transitional Vietnamese society, in 
which the state’s lack of role is replaced by the revival of local communities’ roles in 
environmental risk management.  
 
This thesis has focused on different levels of political dynamics at which the increased 
perceptual importance of nature as a source of future risk has been dealt with. One 
level is the national-level politics at which climate change risk is used as the means to 
sustain the status quo of the society. Another is the city level, at which a mayoral 
change has come about after the urban disasters and the case of the naval base crisis. 
With reference to the concept of developmental resilience, further research needs and 
limitations of this research will be suggested. 
8.2.1. Developmental resilience 
The concept of “developmental resilience” offers new insights into the causal 
relationship between institutional arrangements (the balance between stability and 
flexibility) and adaptation outcomes. Resilience is seen as adaptive systems’ essential 
quality, if it is to deal with internal/external changes whose uncertainty is hard to 
reduce through the existing institutional arrangements of society (Adger, 2000b, Folke 
et al., 2002, Young, 2010). Rather than reiterating the general features of resilience, 
developmental resilience underlines the important process by which institutional 
stability forms the basis of institutional flexibility. In this chapter the two main 
institutional characteristics of adaptive capacity are abstracted to lie in an “asymmetric” 
internal relation (Sayer, 2010: 61). An asymmetric internal relationship means that the 
existence of one entity, disposition or pursuit (stability) presupposes another 
(flexibility); not the other way around (also see Chapter four).  
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Figure 8.1. Moving an analytical focus from the static to dynamic understanding of 
CAS  
 
Source: Adopted and modified from Duit and Galaz (2008). 
 
As in the left graph in Figure 8.1, Duit and Galaz (2008: 319) conceptualize the 
adaptive capacity as an outcome of balancing the two functional capabilities: 
exploitation (to tackle “collective action problems” through strong partnerships and 
high cooperation) and exploration (innovation through learning, experimentation, high 
feedbacks of information). Exploitation is presumed to help a system to adapt to 
relatively predictable and slow changes. High exploration is thought of as necessary 
for adapting to uncertain and rapid changes. Yet, they do not offer any descriptive and 
normative account of how the hypothesized fragile adaptive governance systems might 
transform to the other three types (rigid, flexible and robust). In addition, the 
presumptions do not do justice to the complexity of real-world risk society. Suffice it 
to say at this stage that different adaptive systems might take qualitatively different 
paths from phase 1 (fragile) through 2 (rigid) to 3 (flexible) as in Figure 8.1. Arguably, 
however, it might be much less common for an adaptive governance system to evolve 
directly from phase 1 (fragile) to 3 (flexible) without developing its own strategies for 
“collective action problems”.  
 
It should be also noted that to identify the nature of an adaptive system is a matter of 
degree, direction and progress; not a concrete state (Duit et al., 2010). Differently put, 
no adaptive system can be totally rigid or flexible. Even fragile adaptive systems might 
have some capabilities to cope with local risk problems. Once it has reached phase 3, 
an adaptive system might be able to bring back in the institutional measures for 
organizational integration it nurtured during the phase 2. An example is some laissez-
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faire regimes recently returning to protectionism or adopting far stricter immigration 
laws after the global financial crises in 2007 to 2008. This also might be why some 
sociologists question how individualized society after the first modernization could 
deal with “precarious freedom” when the need for integration is still high – what the 
old institutions of modernity such as the state, family and schools used to offer (Beck 
and Beck-Gernsheim, 2009: 13). 
 
The philosophical jargon “holon” – a whole system that also constitutes a higher level 
system – helps identify the presence of a rigid adaptive governance system (e.g. state-
centered) with flexible sub-systems (collaborative governance at sub-national/local 
levels) or other possible cross-scale combinations of adaptive systems (Duit and Galaz, 
2008). Reconsidering the discourse of agents and groups within the adaptive 
governance system leads to another important criticism against Duit and Galaz 
(2008)’s theory of complex adaptive governance. State-centered adaptive governance 
system is normally considered to support institutional stability than flexibility. The 
higher involvement of civil groups in an adaptive governance system seems to imply 
more flexibility and innovativeness.  
 
The above debate is a reply to the hypotheses developed by most systems theory-
inspired researchers. They tend to prioritize articulation of the causality running from 
certain characteristics of institutional arrangements (self-organizing, diversity, 
openness, flexibility, and feedback) to resilience outcomes; seldom the other way 
around. This means that they provide invaluable insights into what a resilient 
organization might look like. Lacking the historical-structural and ideational 
perspectives, however, they focus less attention on contextual reasons as to why 
alternative ideas bring about unevenly effectual outcomes across place and time (as in 
Seoul and Jeju). Nor do they see the aftermath of phases of critical social changes (e.g. 
colonization, civil war, rapid economic growth, liberation of political economy and 
individualization as structural changes) as entailing novel governance gaps. A 
governance gap here refers to a functional and normative mismatch between an 
existing institutional arrangement and the concrete realities of risk. Also important is 




Governance gaps might mean that a simple replacement of social policy or technical 
measures does not necessarily fulfil the differentiated expectations that different 
stakeholders have of multiple relationships (e.g. between social and ecological systems, 
from past through present to future, and government and NGOs). Different 
expectations probably signify that the taken-for-granted beliefs, norms and ideas 
institutionalized for the purpose of satisfying previous material interests (e.g. growth, 
welfare) do not perform well any more. The roles, power, and rights of those in 
governance processes can also be called into question. Environmental risk might also 
infiltrate into the governance gaps, not only to produce “double losers (O'Brien and 
Leichenko, 2000: 221), but also to activate the “reflexive shift in consciousness” that 
can bring forth institutional changes (Seo and Creed, 2002: 234). The latter case is of 
primary concern to this chapter. 
8.2.2. The intimate relationship between freedom and resilience 
In essence, the conceptualizations of developmental resilience and freedom are not 
mutually exclusive, as freedom is widely supported both as a means and end of 
development that shapes the level of resilience of the given society (Sen, 2001). 
Freedom can be conceptualized in two different ways as follows. 
 
This thesis accepts the wider conceptualization of freedom to include both “positive” 
and “negative” type of freedom (Berlin, 1958: 155). Generally speaking, a positive 
freedom allows actors to fulfil their values or intentions (“freedom to”), while a 
negative freedom means a lack of external intervention (“freedom from”) (ibid.). It can 
be argued that positive freedom is related to the development of institutional 
stability/continuity (e.g. strong roles of the state – investing in education and health 
systems), while negative freedom enables institutional flexibility/innovativeness (less 
intervention of government, loosely networked governance and free access to 
information). Chapter three already accounted for three important roles of institutions: 
constraining, enabling, and constitutive. For one thing, less intervention means not an 
absence or decrease of institutional presence, but replacement of one by another or a 
qualitatively different one. 
 
It is only recently that the pre-existing, classifying labels of politics – e.g. left or right 
wing, libertarian or authoritarian, and anarchist or statist – have been integrated with 
such concepts as vulnerability and resilience. Institutions largely shape the modus 
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operandi of CCA and DRR. Not only the kind of institutions and enforcement tools, 
but also the arrangement, power relations, social capital are all crucial factors (see 
Chapter three). Then one might immediately ask in what institutional configuration 
humans as individual and collective beings can be fully adaptable to various types of 
risk of climate change. The above labels of politics seem to offer much to deal with 
this question (see O'Brien et al., 2009, Pelling and Dill, 2009). The problem is that 
they are not so sufficient and appropriate as to fully account for the diverse political 
and normative landscapes of different societies where CCA is necessary. For instance, 
“the predatory state” and “the developmental state” might completely differ in terms of 
the relationship of their internal structures and external ties to development outcomes 
(possibly adaptation too); although one might call them together an “authoritarian” 
regime (Evans, 1989: 581-4). This is related to the above-mentioned problem of the 
discourse of agents in adaptive governance systems (Finding H, Section 8.1).  
 
In fact, applying a theory of resilience and governance whose normative origins lie at 
Western philosophy (e.g. liberalism) directly to non-Western societies such as Korea 
requires extra caution. For example, Korea is now a liberal democratic (full democracy) 
society, as spelled out in its own constitution, and it is described thus by international 
organizations and scholars (EIU, 2010, Jacobs, 2007, Kim et al., 2008). Yet, resilience 
building in liberal democratic societies with strong liberal social contracts such as 
Norway, New Zealand and Canada (O'Brien et al., 2009) might have limited 
implications for Korea. The transitional route from the authoritarian to the liberal 
democratic state and the increasing civil participation in Korea cannot be attributed 
just to the negative freedom and civil rights that Western societies gained through 
fighting against feudalism and reforming the medieval catholic (Choi, 2010). It was 
rather the particular combination of positive (“freedom to”) and negative (“freedom 
from”) freedom by which the authoritarian regime first succeeded in unifying the 
collective aspiration towards implementing compressed development, that 
unexpectedly (?) brought about the bottom-up call for the need for negative freedom. 
Yet, the individualization process (dis- and re-embedding of individuals from and to 
institutions) of Korea lacks “individualism”, so that the normative orientation of 
reflexive modernization significantly differs from that of its Western counterparts 
(Chang and Song, 2010, cited in Beck and Grande, 2010); c.f. individualization with 
individualism in Western societies (Han and Shim, 2010). This structural change 
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generates tensions and conflict.  Although the self-actualisation needs for women have 
been far greater than before the remaining traditional roles are collectively imposed to 
construct new risk on Women (Chang and Song, 2010).  
8.2.3. From developmental resilience to disaster-specific resilience 
Again, in theory, it is easy to argue that governance systems require both stability and 
flexibility to be resilient against complex risk problems (Duit and Galaz, 2008). This 
idea presumes that exploitation- and exploration- oriented systems have respective 
strengths and weaknesses so that an ideal type of resilient system (the so-called “robust” 
system) ought to strike a balance between the two functions. A robust system can deal 
with both abrupt and long-term risk challenges. However, they do not theoretically 
articulate why or how some governance systems are either robust or flexible without a 
substantial degree of stability now, or how they can or cannot become so. 
 
DRR and CCA are some of many goals and values to be concerned in society. As 
Burton (2009: 91) notes, “Type II Adaptation [adaptation to climate change] should be 
built upon and strengthen Type I Adaptation [adaptation to current climate variation 
and developmental issues].” This thesis certainly supports this argument for 
“mainstreaming” CCA into current development visions. Whilst the thesis included a 
brief historical sketch of the Korean developmental state, it did not provide detailed 
accounts of if and how developing countries can adopt or imitate the developmental 
state model.  
 
Developmental resilience is a term coined to illustrate the contextualized level of 
resilience, specific to the developmental path of Korean society. After societies go 
through transformations (compressed development), the inherent functions, properties, 
and values that they have promoted to secure might change anew, with the help of 
critical ideas and alternatives stemming from agency. When political actors fight, often 
it is disparity between their underlying ideas as well as causal beliefs. Simply put, the 
nature and level of the status quo (what to secure) alters as the nature of social 
expectation also changes (what the world/society should be like). This idea helps 
uncover many dilemmas facing, if disproportionately, almost every country of the 
world. What is the point of transformations if it is merely to lose more lives and 
properties because of disasters?  
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8.3: Policy implications 
Korean society has evidently shown belated political reflections on dual-risk of 
disaster. Two points should be made here: one is for Korea; and another is for other 
would-be dual-risk societies.  
 
It is clear that the application of the model of developmental state to other countries 
(e.g. Africa) has been academically discussed (Mkandawire et al., 1998, Dassah, 2011). 
In addition, there is ample evidence that African countries have been eager to learn 
Korean development model or at least a model of developmental state. It is worth 
quoting an interview with Ungandan finance minister at the Korea Africa Economic 
Cooperation Conference that: 
 
“Korea has been where we are coming through…Korea is about the only 
country that has graduated from being a major aid recipient to being a 
major assistance giver over the last 50 or 60 years ... we feel that they can 
understand the problems that countries like ours face” (Reuters, 2012: no 
page). 
 
This is but one of expressed reasons why it is this that Korean development model is 
appealing to African countries. In addition, as one interviewee of the current research 
explains, Korean government and companies have a stake in building partnerships with 
those less developed countries: resource security or export window (RAI 2, 2011). 
Even the partnerships built with ASEAN countries for supporting CCA are considered 
as means of securing natural resources (ibid.). Regardless of the applicability of the 
model, urbanization in African countries has already caused various problems: one of 
them is urban disaster risk (Pelling and Wisner, 2008).  
 
Of particular concern is not that adopting the Korean development model (or the 
developmental state model) will necessarily bring about localised dual-risk in 
importing countries as in the same way in Jeju (Chapter seven). As this thesis 
illustrated, there are many elements that involve the formation of and reflection on 
dual-risk in a complex way. Nevertheless, it is probable that policy learning or 
technology transfer from other societies can possibly generate new ideas, values and 
environmental deformation in beneficiary countries that heterogeneously clash with 
indigenous values. This is partly why the Korean Federation for Environmental 
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Movement has recently opposed the export of the FRRP model (flood-control work) to 
Thailand (see http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/07/123_137252.html). 
8.4: Limitations of the research and further research needs 
Major limitations imposed on this research are: 
 
A. Limited time and financial constraints 
B. Potential interviews who could not be interviewed (interviews denied, arrest, 
no responses) 
C. A lack of related literature in the context of Korea (e.g. politics of disaster and 
CCA) 
D. Translation issue as articulated in Chapter four 
 
The clearest limitation imposed on this research was that it was fairly hard to get 
access to data about the ideas and perspectives of the locals who were directly exposed 
to the urban disasters in Seoul and in relation to the naval base construction crisis in 
Jeju. As noted in Section 8.1 (core idea A), socially different vulnerabilities to the risk 
of disaster and climate change might be an important subject for future research. 
Various factors, such as gender, age, income, ethnicity, social capital, occupation, 
political views and the experience of disaster, need be incorporated into studies of 
dual-risk of disaster. Such research will build on the current research to make wider 
theoretical connections.  
 
Second, more effort was made to collect the views of NGOs rather than governments 
because the research focused on the emergence of critical consciousness. As this thesis 
mentioned before, however, critical consciousness is not an exclusive characteristic of 
social activists/civil society. Although it was the case that governmental officers 
interviewed tended to be reluctant to share their critical ideas during interviews, future 
research should adopt more flexible data collection methods in order to reveal the full 
diversity of the interviewee’s opinions. 
 
Third, it is promising to compare different (post-) developmental states (e.g. Korea, 
Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and China) in terms of DRR and CCA. The similar 
experiences of rapid urbanization, industrialization and liberalization, as well as their 
common background of Confucian culture are expected to offer an excellent 
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opportunity to examine the ways in which natural hazards complicate their institutional 
stability and flexibility at different scales in diverse ways. 
 
Fourth, one of dilemmas that delayed the initial progress of this research came from 
the fact that the researcher has not experienced any serious disasters triggered by 
natural hazards during his lifetime. This does not mean that experience of disaster is a 
necessary qualification for carrying out research into disaster. However, it does mean 
that, particularly at the early stage of the research, the researcher tended to 
underestimate the risk of disaster in Korea in most of the interviews in this research. In 
this sense, the current research has been a long journey through which the researcher 
has come to realize and overcome his own bias towards and tendency to make 
assumptions about the stability and safety of the world. 
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8.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the theoretical implications this research has for the dual-risk 
thesis, the theory of institutions, and the systems theory-informed resilience school, as 
well as for the concepts of freedom, adaptive capacity and adaptation. The policy 
implications for other would-be dual risk societies were also briefly discussed. Finally, 
the chapter looked at the limitations of the current research and further research needs. 
One of the empirical contributions this research has made is that policy makers can use 
these research findings when setting up plans for CCA. Existing research tends to rely 
heavily on quantitative approaches to the issue of CCA and DRR. For example, 
comparative research on the vulnerability of different provinces to climate change 
conclude that Jeju is most vulnerable (You and Kim, 2008). Note, however, that this 
statistical study can only partially inform the national climate change policy. For 
example, the number of civil servants per capita is only a proxy indicator of effective 
governance in the study. Qualitative research equipped with an in-depth understanding 
of the dual-risk of disaster can complement the quantitative research.  
 
In addition, what is missing from the national policy of CCA is an understanding of 
the fact that citizens – broadly speaking, civil society – have adaptive capacities, and 
political power, are able to define what groups are vulnerable, and, moreover, have the 
potential to promote social innovation. The ways that people utilise political power, 
social networks and creative ideas differ across place and context. If managing the 
underlying causes of social vulnerability is a crucial part of climate change adaptation, 
which has yet to be true, it is plausible to draw more attention to the origins, processes 
and impacts of “successful” social and political innovation, which are often less visible 
than those of failed cases. I argue that deepening and diversifying social needs at 
present, as well as social expectation towards the future always precedes social 
innovation, although the former does not guarantee the success of the latter.  
 
In post-developmental Korean society, a disaster triggered by natural hazards has 
already become a complex political issue. This is a huge difference compared to when 
a disaster remained apolitical; an ‘act of God’ or an individual tragedy. In the era of 
climate change, it will be perhaps be more visible that the clashes of values, norms, 
ideas, visions and interests will happen in a public space created by natural hazards. 
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I end with a quote from Nobel Physics Prize winner, Dennis Gabor (1900-1979), 
“History must stop, the insane quatitative growth must stop; but innovation must not 
stop – it must take an entirely new direction” (Gabor, 1970: 3). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 An example of guiding questions 
Role and responsibility 
1. How did you become a member of the organization? 
2. What is the responsibility in your role in the organization? 
3. What is the main goal of the organization in the past and the present? Any change in the 
issue you commonly deal with? (e.g. there were hardly any critiques of natural disaster 
management of Seoul in the past when some typhoons hit Seoul before, why now?) 
 
Social networks and participation 
4. With which organizations/groups do you normally meet and interact to deal with the issue 
of natural disasters and environmental change? 
5. What is the relationship between local authority officers and the organization like? Any 
financial aid from the government? 
6. Who are the authority officer or department dubbed as “engineering-construction Mafia”? 
Why are they called like that? 
7. Do you feel free to participate in the process of local risk governance? If not, why? If yes, 
any change since the last inauguration of Mayor Park? 
8. Apart from making comments, statement, joining public discussion, by what means do you 
influence policy construction regarding natural disaster risk management and climate 
change adaptation? Any actual case that the suggested ideas are accepted and applied by 
government to policy construction? 
9. In informal realms (not policy and formal institution area), what activities do you carry out 
to inspire citizens’ civic consciousness of and participation in natural disaster management? 
 
Information and ideas 
10. How easily do you acquire information and data regarding the issues you deal with from 
the local government? 
11. Have you ever tried to suggest the local government new ideas as resolution to 
environmental risk problems? How did the government react to your suggestion? 
12. Why do you think the government and the organization have different perceptions of the 
same, if any, issue, for example the cause and result definition for natural disasters (God’s 
work v/s man-made)? Is this often like that? 
 
Recent natural disasters 
13. On what grounds do you argue that recent natural disasters (urban inundations and the 
landslides crisis) are because of previous Mayors’ engineering-focused development work? 
Is not it also true that rapid urbanization over the last 4 decades is more responsible for 
them? Or other causes? 
14. What political ramifications do you think the recent crises brought about? Regime change? 
15. Any change to the local authority officers? More hardworking? Different strategies? 
 
Climate change general 
16. What is the organization’s view to most urgent work to be done in terms of climate change 
risk? Any future plan and work for that? 
17. Have you ever engaged in the policy building process for climate change adaptation? If 
not why? 




Appendix 2 Variables for the analysis of vulnerability 
 
The below table shows a set of possible variables that can be considered for the 
analysis of vulnerability to environmental hazards and climate change. Such variables 
for analytical purposes are divided into four quadrants, depending upon the knowledge 
domain from which social and physical science studies can offer tailored knowledge 
and the dimensional sphere that demarcate the internal and external zones where 
vulnerability arises. Of course, the spheres shown in the table are not fixed as such: for 
instance, for the global climate system all the spheres simply become internal; for 
households their social network can be an external dimension. 
 
Examples for each of the four categories of vulnerability factors classified according to 
the dimensions sphere and knowledge domain 
 
Sphere Knowledge domain / main approach for each knowledge domain 
Socioeconomic Biophysical 
Internal Household income, 
social networks, access 
to information, literacy, 
nutrition, trust, 
reciprocity 






RH, PR, IA, RA 




development aid, global 
economic recession, 
financial crisis 




level rise, heat 
wave, torrential 
down pour 
IA, RA (?) 
Source: Based on Füssel (2007: 158) 
Notes: RH (Risk Hazard research), PE (Political Economy), PR (Pressure and Release model), 
IA (Integrated Approach to vulnerability, e.g. the hazard of place approach, SESs approach), 
RA (Resilience Approach). 
 
The above table cannot wholly account for the dynamics of vulnerability to the risk of 
climate change. Rather, it should be further developed by applying them in a more 
detailed, yet holistic framework for the sake of particular analytical purposes. In 
addition, natural hazard is just one of sources that endanger society. The local people 
whose family members committed suicide due to the MT Hebei Spirit oil spill (see p. 
68) will suffer not only from the impacts of the medium to long term climate-related 
risks but also from the declining trust and reciprocity that in turn will hamper their 
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